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SC[Il'O•!lly ove:r ~' @;>"'nerti tion ago 1 thE~ term oartc~l was 
not a ft'tllliliar• t'~rm 1n the l·~;~;:l.oot'l of' th<~ Aille:r1oan people. 
Sinoa tllat t1me, ho~Hllver•, it b&H! been tn•oj!;oted into thll} 
:umeU.ght by in'\u~~< C1g(<l-l.;iom> o:f' e;ov~~·tl!l>ent bO'J1es and. pr1w 
V!ilt<!l 1nd1vidu!ills, both ~>t'l the t1n1t<~d ~il,;iil,t'>S smd ~bl"OlMi. 
It is a t&l':tl wh1Cih evO~(!)S d1r~parate :r<~<lot1ot1f:l whenevor• it 
is uttered. tn the United. 3tsti;l!l 1 1t. is a tc,<rm which 
\.UIU!llly lli&Htif<llSI>lil dilltlpJ:)I"OOi'l.tiOll Whli'nGViH' it ill dilfiO\olli!:!Hi'ld 
by te~~<oh~~:~rlil and laymfo.n, In Gerl:t~l\\ny, it h ustw.lly •mlOEhl'ld 
by bUJ'i!1Mslilmen ll!.t'ld th•~ ·man oo the street as an orderly form 
of aGonom1c Ol"gani)J:;Il>t1on; in the rem~tinder of Enrop<~ 11nd in 
!£nglll:nd sueh ooopllllt•'!:l <ar<dor•sii~<ll<nlt is ls.okltli£1 though the 
llll!I.JOrity of th'l people d.ew 0€-'l:'tt'lls in &, f.la'IIOt'<lbla light, 
Tbiw tliverglflnoe of opinion holds trt!l!;l 1n r•0!;p!!H:lt to 
Of,l,t't&,ll'l and their aotions tmd®l" the l<m. In O·!n'Hl!!lny rcnd. 
the llll!!tjor•ity of Ft:l•~·op{;li!n n1~.tioo<S, Oi\rtf>ls :u···~ r·::>ooe:;;n1zed e~:~ 
ll!lgal eut1t1eo; !lnd ar•:~ not amenahl<i to P'~r,u.H:JUt1on beoe.use 
of their fane t:l.on:;;. In aont••,;;di~·ttn<Jt:l.on to thie view, the. 
lliJ.Wlil Of ths 111'l1t>~d 3t<ilt<H! l'i!lij;.f';t•d Oell'l.<!!le 1~,!> Oll',!!;:;cn:l.a:atiO'Il.l~ 
1n the restrj~:l.nt ot' tlNl.d,s, ttnd thus ar® aubJlliot to indict• 
Jll~<~nts under tbi:l antit:ru.st law;;i. 'l'he only uception to 
th~llill'!l laws art~ osrtN:!.n gov€lrtllllllltll> approved Biii$OOi.\llt:l.ons for 
the oerry:tng on of O.ltport &rnde• ttler~e a;r::mp~> b&i!l<i\ sJUIIf•Pt 
und.er th.e \?~ob-PO!Il'0re.~e Aot ot 1918. 
t>h<lt<~V<&r th+~ roex·i t; ox· dem•wlt oi' ea:vtels thit!ll:' 
eXi!\lt.eno~S and. functions e.re of con!1lsquen.oa to every l"'"'tlon, 
and lllt'eot;J.y or indJ .. ~''"ctly to fl.lmost ev<n•y :tndiV:hlunl in 
the world 1 sinoe thilir opel~:,tlon. ~;.f'f!>Otll thc1 produot1on, 
distribution ~nd c~oxtst.unpt1on or th<l world' .s goods t!lnd 
eervl.c®<h 1~1:Hl eoonf.>mio t:;<nd pol1tlod ,,ff,~cts oi' ~:mrtols 
at hollle ~l.nd ab:ro.,,d s1re of such import!Ulc~ l'c<l\1 to justify 
a careful study of the aubj,;ct. 
i<t the prese11t time• rn~any sohol;:;,r,;, atnttlsmen ~:md 
laymen aee 1n th® o,;•rtlill syt-;tem 1!1, pote11tl<al tl'lre;c.~t to 
pollc 1cr~l demo<:~t•acy !il.l:ld a lllJ.ol;;;us for t!'u~ bUr£i;aon1ng: of a 
tot<tllt~ri<ln sy~tt~1m. ':l:ha rt'llllilt1o:nshlp wb.1oh tbellie obat~rve:·s 
aee in oorrel~ltlng C<ilrt,el s with totsll.t"<X'llln:ism hMI b''ile:n 
!'Ollltex•a(l by Gernlany 's aft'lnity for. th.l.s form of e.oono:.llio 
orggnl!l!&:it1on for over three !'.;en'.!lrntlon~>, $'\!Pl well as tbli!.t 
nt~t1on•s mil:tta.ristu in or.;e l);uni!l1:'lil't1on. !t h this E;ssoo1-
at1on of th:J o~.~rtel ant't thill political 11lph&tc!!e of inte'i'·.,llt 
1n Ge:rwf,\llY with 1'1h1ch this 1nv,~at1ga<tion will b<> oono~i':O!ld. 
iJI;J)rrMny, the cl2.Ew1oal l<tnd of <HJ.l:'tfllo, bl!l!il d.av~;~loped 
thill t!ystem to its most ad'n'lnCEHl clegr'~'"'' lilnd fo:r· th.l.lll :r&.ason 
an E~Xam1n<J.tioll of r;,~l'many 1 s eart~l orH:W:i.<.tlons should pt<ove 
to be edif.'yin~l: in giving an ins1£,;ht into tile 1nt,:>,rnr,,tiotwl 
ca.rtr~l oper:>tioos in £fb.neral. In addition to t'h'ilse. other 
questions relating to G<l!rmany 's cartels will be closely 
explored, 
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;.Jhat were the effects of th'" cartel system as 
develop!:itd. 1n Germ~my upon the poli'Cical 11rtr·uoture of thst 
stc<te? What; wer<~> the effects of theit n.\l.tiotl 1S int,,n•national 
cart<ll agreements upon thC:> volurlles of pr•oouction, ceohno-
logical progress, and na tiol:l<""l defense prep:n·ation'l of 
oountri,es abroad? It will be the purpos(l) of this paper t;o 
attiilmpt to answ<H' these questions, which for too long a 
time have been gi1nm only a, modicum of attention. An eco-
nomic and his tor :I. cal analysis of' the; c.artel ays tam in 
Germany OVIllr the past ti~Emty-fiV<ll years should se1•ve t;he 
l''u•pose of f'ocu:'liug: new light on cnrtel iiH1Uiill':1 and problems, 
wh1ah for too long a time in the past "nd p~·esent have been 
submerged in world indifference. 
!n tbis study of G·~H'momy 1 s 1nternat1onal cartel 
agreem<:mts there ~'ill be some shortcomings in the textual 
ma,t;er:l.als during oerta.in periods of time covered in this 
report. 'I'his is due both to public apath.y in respect to 
cartels, and th0 reluotauce of firms to publici;;::e their 
cartel ar•rangeu1en·~s. In addition to this the ooin <nnphasis 
of this r<.~port will streFJs t;h<J :r'!'Wlifioations of Gel'ruany 's 
cartel upon the United. States in the decade preoe,~ding 
~Jorld liar II. 'l'hia does not detract from the equally 
in:tportant effects G,n•many 's cartel oper2t:l.ons had upon 
- -----------
4 
other nations, but is indic.stive of the dearth of material 
av·ilable to this writer on cartel ag1•eememta abroad. 
Though this shortcoming is unfortunatre in respect to other 
nations, it is appropriate thr.t emphas:ts be focused upon 
the United St;e.tes bace.uae o!' its position of' leadership, 
induiJtri;,~lly speaking, dtlring the era c;)vered in this 
report. 
This report will first exa.mi.ne th~~ word cartel in 
order to give the reader an insight as to the definition 
of this te:t'lll. 'l'his is necessru•y sinoe there is some dis-
during the period und.er consideration, Though the intent 
or this report is tb,;; exploration of Gerlll<"•llY 1 s intePnational 
cartel effects, the inclusion of that m1t1on 1 a domestic 
cartels is warranted by their relationship and similarities. 
From this point the rt;port will proceed to give a 
bri<!f hlstol'ical sketch of' ttHl devdopment of' cartels to 
the present day, with special attention bein, giv-?n to the 
growth of German cartels, Inol1:1ded in this analysis \vlll 
be t;ho philosophical and legal basis for their g:rowth. 
'I'he role played. by OH.rtels in the r.:l.se of Hitler to 
power and thCJir r<~lationship 1v1th Nat;l.onal Soc.ialism w111 
be scrutinized a.'1d .av11<lUt1. tad. At LenUon will then be giv<n'l 
. ... 
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to specific case histories of international cartel relation-
ships between German and foreign firms. 
The selection of these specific oases was dictated 
by the importance of the products involved in the agree-
ments. Emphasis was given to materials which are considered 
strategic by nations and which vitally effect both a nations 
peacetime well-being, and its ability to defend itself in 
time of hostilities, Px•oducts such as pharmaceuticals, 
aluminum, rubber • magnesium are lnclud.ed .Vlmong other vi tal 
commodities, 'rhe leading GerllFlm and foreign firms in these 
shown, as well as the nature of the agreements. 
Follo~Jillg these specific oases, a oo!llp$ndium of the 
effects of Germ;:m oartels upon th<~ war ef.rorts of nlll.t:l.ons 
abroad will be preswnted., lrlhether ·these ag:reem&nts were 
motivated by economic or political considerations will be 
discussed s.nd elaborated. upon on the ba.ilis of research 
material, 
The functioning or Clermt~n cartels du.ring the war 
period and cartel legislation in occupied Germany in the 
postwar period. will serve ar, a subject for another chapter, 
This will serve to bri\~"; cartels, and their position in the 
German economy, up to the present 1n respect to descriptive 
analyais. It is 1n this pa.rtioulm:· period beginning with 
World War II to the present day, tha L there 1s tlle greatest 
paucity of materials germane l;;o the study of Germany •s 
international cartel op<H'at1ons. This is an inher·ent 
shortcoming i.n any endeavor which attem''iil to trace a 
period of twenty-five years of histol'i¢lal evonts, but 
particularly true in respect to cartels wit.h their 
6 
sub rosa agreements. Fortunately some basis for analysis 
1a possible from the material on the subject available to 
the NlSearcher. Before proeeedlng with this report it 
should be pointed out to the reader that the subJect of 
cartels is one in which objectiveness 1:;; di.ff'icult to 
a.eb1ev.e. This iii! due to the hot that the majority of 
writers and students of the subject are resolute in their 
Opinions of cartles, as to their bemefioi'.'ll or pernicious 
effects upon society. 'l?heve is seldom a tniddla ground in 
respect to ones opinion of cartels, one is <~it;her• for them 
or opposed to them, Ftt1.d moderation if:! usually lacking in a 
disousfl.!ion of the sul>ject. All! a vesuly of these pr<Sjud~.ces 
much of the material available on the subjeot 11as somewhat 
great majority of the research mat;eriaJ. ~hat w;s available 
was the wo:rl~ of American autllors who were oloslllo to unanimous 
in their dislike of' ca:rtles, f'Ol' veasons wbioh will be dis ... 
closed later; impartial1 ty by the writer will be difficult. 
It is the intention of the wr1Ce1•, however, to adhere to 
the tenets o:r objective researoh, as far as is possible, 
i,-
------
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human f'rVc1lty not withstanding, If this approach to 
ob3"eoi,1vlty 1!l achieved, the study involved :l.n th1t3 report 
will he amply reN\1trded. '1'he justif'1ct~t1on for such a 
<ttudy having; already been <oSC8.bl1shed by the events of 
the past generation. 
--------
CHAP'l'ER II 
-TYPES AND HISTORY 
The 1~ord 'cartel ~lli!li! f:l.ret wri·tten upon public records 
on i'lay .5, 1879 ~~hen Eugene !Uehtar, a member of tl:l~ German 
lie1ohstag used :l.t in a meet1ng of that legislative body, to 
denote private market control meehanJ.sms of' entreprenuera,l 
'l'he word itself was oantur1es old, ~o'lnd cooperation among 
enterprisers t<1as !lin equally old established function, but 
this was the first instance that; it appearerl upon a public 
record. Since its initial utt<n•anoe the ~~ord has be<iln 
submerged in a mir<9 of <iil!lput;e a.s to a defin:l.tive meaning. 
The detln1tio.na giv~n to the word by oeonom1sts 1 teachers, 
,,1r1te:r•s and ot~H>r' parti•J:lS intereete<J. :l.n ;ooonomic semantics 
have been protean, and 1nv.ar1ably contain 11Uances of the 
def'1ners own thought on cQrt<:~~ls • In the United Stertes, ttm 
word usually is def1.ned in terms which .r;ive the connotation 
of g•~neral 1llegali ty. ln European cottntrles, the tc~rra is 
usually define(~ wl.th 11< cot1notation of acceptability. 
--------1E:rvin Hexner, i.;lterxt.,.tiontl Cartels, p. J, 
9 
Wha:tever one 1 s own defini t1on of e cart;lll, an analysis of 
the various definitions given to the tenn seems Justtfisd 
from the standpoint of economic analysis, if not from one 
of lucidity. 
'rhe term cartel is defined by &loooe writers on the 
intent of minimizing or elim1:nat1ng competition among 
·ckulmselvr~s.Z A definition given to th'"' ~~ord by en 
some-what at v.~r.iance w1tb the first definition. 
I,.o:rd l~c0owan1 head of I:lr ::. tian 1 s ImpaJ.•l.al Chemical Industries 
def1nes a cartel as a method of' orderly marR<Jting which 
assures a planned. expansion Of international trade and leads 
to the elimination of cutthroat praoticea.:.l 
lf one makes use of the standard American college 
d1ct1.onary he will find a cartel desl.n•ibed as an inter-
national synd.lcate, 
regulf!.te prices and 
combine or trust generally formed to 
4 
output in some field of business~ · 
Possibly tha most concise definition ElPP'""'rs in a 
2George W • :Stock.1ng and Myron ~~. via tld.ns, 
C§:lrtels 1n t\ctiou. p. ;. 
3Edward s. Maaon, u<rha. I?utu:re of Int!;'lrnational 
Cartels," Forie:\.gn Affairs. Vol. XXII (Jllly 1944) p. 605. 
4ctarenoe L. Barnhart, Ed. The A1nc1rloan Colle,l:re 
Qictionary, P• 18.5. 
-------
dictionary of economics which defines cartels as, "con-
trgctual IM;sociBtions of indepema.ent business org<Ini-
zations, located in one or more countries, formed for the 
purpose of' :regulHti:ng: tho purchasing, procuct:l.on, or 
mark<liling of goods by the members. 5 
.Before proceeding furthtn• as to th® meaning of the 
term, it sl1ould be pointed out that the word. may have a 
l ' 6 egal as well as an economic definition. Because of 
10 
tl!lis d:l.ohc)tmnous definition, the meaning of the term has 
been chan~J,'ed somewhat of le.te 1 due to its inoreEsed usag<o. 
Once 1t. stood simply fox~ a contr .. ~'totual relationship, 
usually enforceable at law, betwee11 a number of enter• 
prisers who had bnnd.ed together for ~~ fixed period of time 
in order to b'3~t<Jr regulate pr•ice 1 or produc-tion or ma.rket-
ing terms, or divide ax•e:!\ 1 or some other fi!H3.t1.tre of business 
relating to a single o1• a closely l''01Tt;ecl c;:;•oup of com-
modi ties produced by its membet·s. Now thc::_t the term has 
describe a C€tl'tel as me~;ning any sort of compact - whether 
:recognlz·ld and enforoeabl'21 by la.w or not - bGlt><een two or 
more concerns wU;h the purpose of manipul~l~lng one or more 
5Harold S, Sloan and Arnold .J. Zurcher, A Dictionary 
.2( Econgt~, p. l>8. 
6
unole of Cartels in Nodern Economy," Foreig·n Policy 
lieugrts, Vol, XX (October• 15, 19tfl.f} p, 182. 
1-
of the elem,~rrcs of coruluoting business to tl'vs advanta;2,e 
of' the participating parti,~s. 7 
The legal recognition acool'ded to cartels has 
occurred o.nly in N?spect to the o.omestic f'orm of' ce.rtel-
ll 
ixation, and it is hi2,hly Slfnif.l..c?nt th;s:.t to th1~ present 
time • the caP tel ht,s no le.gal statu": in international law, 5 
Due to this lack of recognition in intar'n"tlonm.l la~;, a 
legal definit·ion for the t•:>rm is applicable only to the 
domestic variety of cartels. h comparison of domestic and 
inte:rne..tional cartels, and the r•elationships and similarities 
existing betvJe<:m them ia the next subj•illot; of inquiry. 
- A COM!?'' '!SON 
·the 11&me given to th0 t1•1o terms implies. One type of' 
organization functions within the bouncl:olriefl of a particular 
country, the othGJr C1.tts acrosfl national bouudar·ies to reach 
agreements with foreign oonc"'rns. In es!1enoe, thf:l inter-
national type of cartel is the prototype of the.; d.i)mestic 
cartel. 
" ff{ober·t A. Brady, .Bus in'i.HlS .!!!!. .!:!. §¥8 tem .Qf. Povwx·, 
P• 239. 
8 
"Hole of Cs.r•tels in Nodern Economy," B'or'!!lq:~, 
P9Ucll Reports, Vol, XX (Oot, 15, 194e.'!) P• 182 
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In some nations, cartels take the form of trusts 
and pooling agreements and ar<l not illegal under domestic 
raents on output and prices t•eaohed >~i t~out the use of the 
trust mechanism. An objective s.ppraisal of oaJtels :requir(>S 
discriminat.lng between cart0;ls Hnd. trusts, In the United 
. t:· ough there" tias no legal Ol' economic dif'fcn•entiation 
between· th'ilm, It must be rememb,3red that a cartel is an 
while a trust rc~presents oentra;L1zeq oont.Pol of dependen.!( 
units.? In organization and function trusts and cartels 
differ; some trusts joined cartels, as chemical and 
steel in gngland and in Germany, or used them as 1nstru-
the1l• structural organization, 
The discussion that ~~111 f'ollO'i'l 111 a. lslte.r chapter 
Cj 7Freder1ok Haussmann and 
11 1U.sconcept1ons ahou.t Cartels," 
Vol. LX (l1<;.r•oh 1945) p, 299. 
Dan1el J, Ahern Jr., 
'l'he American Ht!>J:'Cur;y, 
lJ 
close r.:>lationship to domestic as well as the international 
cartels. 'ro give the reader a better understa.nding of 
cartel ·types in general, the following outlinl!! of cartels 
ilil pr'JJsentGd. It includes both the domestic and inter-
national cPrt,el types ''<hioh existih.l. ill G'~rmany >!!nd in other 
European nations prior to \'l'orld 11Jar :n. 'Che <.mtl:l.:ne will 
use tu> a b.asis the particular phase or m2wketi:ng or pr·o-
duction <e~hioh eaoh cartel alms to regl.lle:t;e the means 
cbosen for its spec:l.f'ic purpose. It is truo that; some 
wrlt,<crs on cartels distinguish only three major types of 
ror a mor<3 complete study, I b'i.llleve the follotdng 
clasH1fioat1ons seem mox·a satisfactory: 
I, Cartels regulating phases of sale 
A, Hogu.la·tion of .sale terms 
1. 'I'erm cartels 
3, Hsgula.tion of smles prices 
1, Calculat;1on C''H''tels 
2, Price cartels 
a. Ninirnum-pr1.oe cart,sls 
b. th1l:t'o:rm~price eart<::>lll 
--------
c. Hlilf{;ttl~~ttion of !iH<br> p:rot'lt;s 
1. Pl'Ofl t !'lh1w1ng oa:rteth 
D. fh~gul~tt1on of s.w.e.z outl~t 
1. 'l~et'z•1tory ... p:r,~!let•vat1on oa:rt>r!l.:; 
2. Guilit0lller-pr!1!Silt:rwH;1.on o>u·t~la 
II. Cartels r<~gulating proo.ue.tion o:r ttri.!rketi.Ug 
w.i thout oemtral selling agq$~lOY 
A. Production :ra{;ulation w:!.tnou;; output 
r<l'lst:r1o Uon 
l. P~tant cartels 
:z. Sp~to1elha.t1on ctu·tels 
13. l?roduot:l.on r<~e;ule.t1on througl'l. <u<:u•keting 
t'C;tStJ:•:I.ctiOl:IS 
l. IUddin!\\"'t'<~~ulation c;;;rtale 
a. Ot'd.lllcr allooiii.·tton oartl>ls 
b. Et1ibm1u1on oartels 
2. ill!i'ldtet1ng•reatr1otion Ol'l.li't'>ll':l w1 t.h 
all001irt1oo of st.L.<:~l:'G&. 
a. F'bed lll<>r•kr.~ting shsr<i' eartliil'lliil 
b. l•!,n•k·::t•equaliii:atton n;:u•twls 
o. '1'tll:'t'l.over·-sQ.t•l'tllzst1.on e~u·tels 
0. .Oir~ot p.rod.uo t:t.on-regulation eart<JlS 
l. 'IJithOUt fdloo;;~t10ll Of' IS)H'll'"'S 
a. Plant r'ii!strleUon <:~a:rt<)lS 
--------
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2. tVl. th allooa t.1on of' sh~'ilres 
a. !l'ixed production-share cartels 
b. Production-eqmJ.lieation oar•tels 
III. Cartels x·eguln.t1ng production and marketing 
through ce.ntral selling agencies (syndicate} 
A. Agency sy:ndiomtes 
II. lnternat10n<11 sht,'l.res with mui~ual :preservaeion 
of domestic market 
III. Int0lrnational sh.r.ras allld specific subshares 
for each market 
Within the frwnework of the above functions, 
int~rnational cartels may adopt a:ny of 1~he regu~ latory I'H:tlvltie;s of domestic cartels, ' 
' L_ 
---
16 
Having outlined ·the org,mization r>f both dom!l)stio 
t'lnd intc,rn•.'l.tional o<>rtels 1 the next phase of this report 
will define <:uta elaborate upon the various types of oa:rtels 
cited in the outline. 
:J;:e:rm C!i!rtel, '1'h1s is tih·~ s.troplest form of oartel 
ag:reeruent ancl its :!"unction is to reg,u.late the terms of 
sale which ths members may grant to th<:Jir customers, 
Qalcula t:l.op, Cartels. 'J!h1s form of oa:rt!lll deter-
mines the oost-acoount:l.ng method. to be employed by the 
ro.emben•s in det:11rruin:l.ng the price of tooir output. 
Price Cetrtel. In this form of cartel" an agree-
ment is concluded on whRtt un:l.fnrm price shr±ll be charged 
to t~ consumer tor a p~~rtlcuh<r• commodity. '.!:here is usually 
a minimum !Jrice which o&Hl be charged and a uniform selling 
price. 
':J:r&d!-l!liaf.\t: Cartr~ls. 'l'he prov11lions of this form 
of cartel agreemant stl!lte that th'(l assoo1<;;ted prod.uoers 
of trade-m<~rk goods agr:0e not to sell th,el!.' products to 
wholesal~>rs or retl'lilers who nwl.rk,~t any of th•.il protected 
trade-roark products below t;h£1ir fixed price. 
Profi)!-sharin;& Cartelm. 'l'his type of cartel takeli! 
diverse fo:rm 1 some h.-ave provisions requiring that a fi'Y..ed 
p~reentage of' th~ total receipts of ~11 !ll('>Ulber•s shall p~~riod­
:l.eally be paid :l.n&o a oom•non fund, whi11h is then distributed 
17 
witb allocation depa.ruii:ng upon rel.at;ive sh,,:.res of members. 
Other typr"'s provide for a distribution of.' the diffel•e.moes 
between a basic price and a s:elli:ng price, 
'J,'§rJ: i Lory-presel'VA '>1.® Cftlt:tel. 'I'hllt put•pose of this 
oa:r.tel i8 the mutu.al prol.:eotion by the affiliated enter-
prises· ot ~l1e\r respecuve natural rna:c·keti:ng areas. 
CI,!.St.omer~P;reseryat1on .Garte.j.s, 'fh1s type of oartel 
is ~asually adopted by l.n.dustr:l.es t\lhosa t'ela.'tion ~<Jith their 
o·ustomers are of a more rlurable nature, iimd irrvolve a 
considal'abl.® extentl.on of' ore<Ut by tlliii producer to the 
purcha.se~r of his pro<'\uot. 
li'tgqucti.gp Cartel. '.f.'he objeot1ves of' this cartel 
are the regulation of the relative srvtr•llll or each member 
1\'lnterprise l.n the !11>0lrket demand; thiil dim1nhtvss ·til<'> 
p<:>!!lsibili ty of over- c:-!' ~:.:ue,.:zrproduction. 
li)lten~ Cf!rjle},. The purpose behind this cartel agree-
ment is the desir'e to expHnd the mar·k·~ t for goods produced 
by a parllioul.~tl' ind.u.tltry by the mutuR1 use of pat,mts ~tmong 
certain members of the industry; this lint~:>.bfil,H£;6 of patents 
;and ·the oondi tion<> of thl() excbang'ii! ~~re agreed upon by the 
respec·tive oODlp>.mies concerned. 
§peclal~z!J13;1on Cartels. This type of cartel agree• 
ment 1s in most ins ~~mce s found in l.nd u:' trl. (iS which manu• 
faoture a large variety of products with great similarity 
in the quality of each type, By the terms or this 
---------
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agreement each of th•;; affilia tail. n.ru1s i:i' ~~ssig:w~d one or 
several products .tach a l.s to manufac tur<.> exolus 1 vely ~ 
t)iddir<g-regulatjl,on Cartal;a. ':Chis . type is found 
mainly :ln oompeti ti ve biddi.:ng entsrpri S(~S • and the inlmnt 
of its m·.~mlnrs ilil to prevent underbidding amo:n.,q; competlng 
members 1n a particular industry, Ordel·-allooation cartels 
and submission c•;u-•tels arc ex;?tm,,les .ot bi.dding-l•egul<:it1on 
cartels. 
11al•k!llt,..restrigtjl,on Qartels with. Allocation !ill:. 
l,Ulara§. This type of oa;•tel does not impose any d il'clO c 
restrictions upon ths volume of prOduction of its memberliil. 
In it;;; place 1 t allocates quotas to each memb01~ J.>s to 
t~uanticy which it is pli'H'll!ittsd to market. Included in this 
type of cartel .are fixed-marketing cartels, marke't;~ 
equall;;;a~ion C<l . .t'tels and tu.rnov<~l·-equalization cartels. 
The flrst type provides for ;a, fixed sh~\N of' an't;icipated 
sales, the second provides for oompel1Bat:1on to equalize 
shares, and the last involvr~s a fixed she.r•e of the market 
as expressed in moue hm•y terms •. 
jf'lant-restriotion, .Qartels. This type of cartel 
usut?,lly follows one of three metnoos in its functioni:ng 1 
the f 1rst b;;1:ng en ovet•all reduc t.ion by all associ<< ting 
enterprises of the numbel' of shifts during; which mttchines 
may be employed., th.e second methocl being the px•ohibition 
of the installation of new; rnachinery and lastly, th~;;: ;,hut-
down of' a certain p0rcentage of machines .• 
-------
. 
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a oertain qus,ntity, by limitins tht1 a:nount ®1>\0h firm can 
put on the mat'lt;;;t.. 'I'he quota syt~ t<ol!!l is UI'H.ld in t'lllOOAting 
the market. 
Qartel,-Stndicate, In this typr~ of cartel, thlll 
ayr;d1oate, m<>de up of members of a particulB.r industry, acts 
as the selling agency for all t1lembers and 1s vest~d H1th 
authority to regulate the output of thi3 affiliated. f irrns 
I 
' Internati.ona! Shar*s wi.th l'lutual Presarvation ot\ 
Rornest1o Mm'ket, In this form of cartel. acoot'd, El!!'Ch-- \ 
. ' 
national cs.rtel receivc;s 1ts qu'lta. in th=__ <mtlre itl'l::i!~~ 
national llli!H'.'k<C~t 1 bl:~t it ir> not permitted to sell its pro-
ducts in. th"l do:nastic m'r1tet cf >'U1Y of the ,<J,ffiliated 
!nterU&t~on.;;.l :ShtU"<3S !t!:!d Subsh~.~res, for ~Q.ll ~jarke!i_, 
Under this arrangement eaoh affili®.ted na r.ional mC:trket 
are then divided, inco ep.;oirio quotas for emoh me.rket. 
Inb,il:rmlt:t~ ShHres Without fn~s•ll"V@.tlon .2t Domestic 
M.ar~&et, In this type o:f' oartel qg:reement, an internaUonal 
sell1ng syndicril.t>~ is orgem1:ged which alloo,\Jt~es all lnooming 
requisitions to the various national cartels in the ratio 
to their shrilrel!l; 11 
aotiv ities of the formal'. Natur>'!.lly, the lnter·na t:l.onal 
cartel is likely to be more dif.f1cult to f)rgB.nize and 
oper·ate, but its essential ns,ture is similar to that of 
the domestic cartel. 
20 
III. EAHLY. !USTORY ().!)' OAfl'I'ELS - I.''ROrtl )000 B,C. 'J!O 1933 A.D. 
Having deflned aJ,'IO. el<tsslfied cartels attention is 
now directed to the history of t'lese inatltutions. Strange 
as it may seem, cartftls are not net~ in ~h<lJ field of economic 
e.o't:l.vity, they started over four thowsand y<llars ago. 
The history of c.a:r.tela began as early as JOCO B.c. 
l .. ,, 
in Egypt •·hich had at that time a munber of prioe cartels. '· 
l?ollowing that data there is a dea1•th of information as to 
-----
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marketil:'l<S cartel which had lts 1ncepUon in l~ngland in 1'?71. 
WSIS bold but Unt-luocet;;>ful wRS attempted by Sit• George Cole-
brook to control the production 'md m!lrkethlg of alum, 13 
':!'he Y.;ltgl1sh cold syndicates of 1771 alld 1835 were 
early prototypes of modern c;u•tels, ·~s N6I'0 the FrGnoh 
fayenoe cartel, (1811) alld ·~he b1•aw<H'Y O<'>rtllll of Ghent in 
1835. 11~ The N<tJokar Salt Unio;t, :·>hlch t1Ht1 organized. ln 1828 
Hesse, entered into agreeme~nta 'llith the !>;astern Prench Salt 
Works syndicate in 166? became a fo:rerunn'i;x' of mooern CB.r-
. 15 
tels. 
The chem:toal l:nO.us try provided ex<J.mplas of inter-
nat1onm.l syndicates in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. 'l'he Bismuth Syndicate; ths l3m·ax Syndica.tc, the 
Ac~tlc Acid Syndicate. the Carbide Synd1cate, and the Ct1r-
_/ 
tels in the explosive 1ndt1.stry can all be cHed as being 
prominent cart<llli> of the,t I!U'lh In addition to these, 
international C£~rtel1~ were formed by prod.ucere of poroebd.n• 
table glass, e1atch glt:u;;a• !lnd enamelled. ware.16 
-------------
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ment >vhich evolved with the mo;lern nation ';tv.tc~. ·I'he 
cartel was a nntural growth of this m·~r<},'f..nl;ile protect1on-
ism,17 This syst•3!ll of economic prot·actionlem devalOJ.:vad 
to a great degree ln the majority of !i:uropean countries, 
a.nd as a resu.lt at the begint1ing of ;•Jorld !tlsr I, ther~ 
was reported t;o be <~t lem1t 114· 1nt·3rn:1tional cartels 1n 
existence ,1.8 
l?"lio P'i'>!i!Oe with !, 0, 
(Septemb•or 1942) p, 105. 
18Haussmann and Ahern, 1&.2.· clt. 
since they were the most numerous and fully dr9V<llloped in 
this classic land. of Ocsrtels, 'Though thsy existed in other 
lands prior to their appear:•ance in Gen:nany, 1t took the 
.OI!llrman business mind with Hs p•3rWh<mt !'or orderly, regi-
1870 1s, and are rz~:c·<ll:·ded as having developed out of the 
slump which follm~ed the impstuou:.> and erl'atl.c industrial 
immense war inctsmnity obtained from France follrMing the 
provided the basis for an industrietl anti fins.ncial boom, 
Thi!! boom W9<'1l ·:]:uickly followed by the crisis of ll:l7J, which 
was oonaidered by some economic histor•inml tts th,,: first 
comprehensive crisis it'l tile modern economic v.u.n<ld. 1 B·scause 
lJJouis Domeretzky, "Cartelil and th:' FJusill•'ilSS Cr-isis," 
f'o:r;eign AffeirrJ 1 Vol. X (October 1931) p. 3'7. 
--------
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they were nurtured during this period of depression, 
cartels fAre often designated as •otfsprillg;s of poverty. n2 
'l'hese cartels achieved grectted s.:l.,i)';nificanoe after 
24 
1879 when the German economic system rnr,\de use of protective 
tarl.ffa. This same year ae,w the birth of one of Germany's 
earliest cartels, the Lux6mburgh-Lothrit1ger Erzverband.J 
In addition to being offsprings of poverty, cartels became 
offsprings of protectionism. 
1>11th the imposition of duties on the importation of 
commodities • Get'~M~n producers of various c::.mmodi ties 
instead of engf.tg1.ng in. co.mpet.itive practices among them-
selves sa~>l in the tat>iff' an opportunity to f'lx prices and 
thus eliminate ~'!lY "pernicious" competition among th•om-
selves. '.Hth the tariff, a great stimulus was given to 
the erection of industrial comblnextions which •~ere soon 
to spread over the ,,~hole of' the German \'i!Conomy. 
Germa.ny continued being the srn'\w.n1ng gx•ound of 
cartels into thfJl twentieth c<mtury and there wns a steady 
itlcrease in their numbers. In 1905 the H13:\.ch Ministry of 
Interior counted 385 1 in 1908 the est,J.m<l,ted number of 
2wnHam F. Bruck, Shlia.l and l!!qonomi~< History :2!. 
Oerm§lny £rom Willie 11 .!i.Q H tl•ar, p. 9:3. 
3I•'rank Hunk• 'J:he Legacy !J.f. Nazism, p. 16.5. 
C1H't<~1 S was placed at (lQO, L:. These t'igur<~S did. not. X'f~veal 
for tho prod 1g1ous growt;h of cartels in Gerrnany. l~hy •,;as 
with this study. 
method of protection for all proo.ucers, both larg'" and 
small, though smb\ll px•oducers who needed prot,;,ction against 
tl1,;;1r larger competitors '"nd trusts would benefit most by 
produ.ction and distrl'bution policies the intor<~sts of the 
-------
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consideration, a b;u·rler, more or• leHss ~emporary, is built 
cite the di:> tinction between indus ·tri91 concentration and 
indus tr:lal coop"n'at ion; the for•mex· is .fl. trust and under a 
centr,,_lized control, the lattBr repre~o<'l.nts full partici-
pation in the cont.x•ol of Uw or•gani:i%ttion by ind.ependent 
the dominant. cause for t:h<::l gre 't growth of cc\l'tels in 
/ 
Gernmny. 0 Unregulated CO!!Jpetltion to the majority of 
Gel'lll:CU1 busirH:ssmen could offer' littlrj except economic chaos, 
'l'hey <mvlsioned a continual struggle in th<" market v;ith 
thil denouement predicted by the PrHnell economist Proudhon, 
that "competition kills competition." 'l'he German attitude 
tended, thEJr·efor'"• to look upon the principle of combination 
in a fc;wora:ble light and. tis a means to assure 8\0fll<~ .1n•ofit 
to each ot' the priv<->te business enterprises. 7 
Economic stability was the idea employed. by G<Jrman 
this t'orm of oX'g<ilt1ization could destructiv·0 competition 
be elimiJ:l''•'ted, and only through this method could ord·arly 
5Domeratzky, ~· cit,, p, )8 
6Bru.uo Burn, Codeg, Qart<>ls. and ;-ls.tioney,J, Planning, 
p, 1'1·5._ 
lA., 
Hepubl1c," 
J. Hor; ens te in 1 "liCM C 'rtel s Brolte the German Q;anadil!&n 1\'or!:\m, Vol. xxrn (N"'r·ch l9h4) p. 279. 
markets be main:taimld, Coopora.tion bred stal;Hi·ty; and 
•Jtab:tlity bz•ed economic security, 8.nd. the domir.w:nt urge 
eecuri t;y through organization, 'This drive for meouri ty 
by the national urge to d.rive ·~vcwything to a "logical" 
conclusion, to anticipate and malce allowmces for every-
III, 'l'Hl' l,EGieL 
\vhat is the legal status of cartels in. Gr;rmany? 
Ho;'> do the courts view oou:iolnations·l '.luesclons such as 
th0se are the ncsxt subject of inquiry. "£he findingo: mll.y 
B 
of economic r<Jlat iont>hl.ps. A deci ion of 
, ruling on a o~<ae involving a Supreme Court -
8G:Ubert B1-'uck, liThe Chlrman B~\slness Nind," 
Fprtune, Vol, XLIX (May 1954) p. 112. 
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selling agency agreement among producers of wood-pulp in 
1908, epitomized th& attitude of the German leg,Rl system 
rt}gardJ.ng c;;u•tels. lt stated in part: 
"If in any branc.!'l of' industry the ;n·ices of pro Juc:t;s 
s1nk too low and if ttl~ thr1v1ng operation of the 
industry is t;;·,ereby made '-mpossible or emd<mgered, 
then the crisis whloh occurs is destz·uct;1ve not only 
for i:nd.lvidllals, Jnt ~o;lso f'or the s'>cinl economy in 
general, and 1 t .J.s t;harafore in the interes·i;s of the 
eo=unity that unduly low prices 1n a branch of l.nd.us-
try shall not permanently exist.n9 
Opinions such as this pr•ovided a heal thy milieu 
tor• the gr011th of cartelism in Germany. l'hrn•.lghout their 
history in that nation, thlil courts lla.ve been entreated 
to adjudica~e numex•ous disputes which have arisen among 
cartel m;;mbers. In msmy instances, t;he g<)verruMmt used the 
courts 1n the appl1cat1on ot' legal measures in o:•der to 
J?l.'olong cartels which it c-::msider•ed necessary to p1~otect 
the interests of tbe a·tate. As a.n example, ·the interven-
tion of the statlll through the law was responsible for the 
continuation of the !lhen1sh-1.4estphal1an Coal Cartel as we;J.l 
as the Potash Synd1c'3lte in 1910.10 
The nex·t and most general legislation dealing with 
9quoted in l:i:> A, Robi<'lSon1 Honopol:t; p. 226. 
10aobinson1 ~·~. p, 233. - -- -------- --
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regat>rHng cartel qontrs.c ts, aecondl;y 1t g$tve certain po:qers 
to ths lil .. Jlieh Ni:nis t•&r of !T;conomio ,~:<ff'ctir"J, t:md las t;ly 1 t 
cr~~'D\ted a cartel court and eF.Jtl~bl:tsiled certli\in rules to 
d.eH.veries to ou.tsid.ers, and gave it to the presid.ent of 
the cartel court,ll 
saitl it was successful in givi.tl£1; means to priv;:ate <'mterprise 
to preclude 1.md.ue .:;,oerciOll 11\l:l!.'l control. 1"' 
:rhe genfn•;,,l effect of ·the deorfJe ln the matter of 
regulP;t:ion of trust;s and cal'tels proved to lle inef'fectual. 
p. 198. 
----------- -- ----
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In the ye!ilr following its issuance it ~HIS found want1ng i:n 
many resp®cts, thOU!Sh it remained in foroe until a new 
decr"'e was issued by the Nazi govel->nment in 1933. Th1.s 
no\'1 deCl''l1:e, however, 1dll be fully discussed in th'~ mntt 
chapter dea11n.g with o~nftels a:na. !UCler' s rise to power. 
-------
CHAPTER :tV 
AND 'l'HinH lh1LA1'IONSRIP '1'0 NJ!.'J'!ONAL .SOCiitt,ISM 
eai·tels with which Ger·many had been promitl<mtly a!iH!OO:I.t•,ted 
had been thrown 111to confusion and disorg&mization due to 
defeat and occupation. Any nec-1 at·tempt to rev:I.VIi!l oa1•t•$ls 
•:•as vie1~ed 1·1ith <U.s>E~pproval by the victorious !!!llied powers. 
In th® middle of the 1920 1 s, in a mere prop :I. tious poli ti.cal 
atmosphe1•e, · Gel:'man clilrt•·~ls began their contabacit and ~tare 
once agt'lin to assume their position or importance in the 
struot1,1,re of the Germ<m state. 
It is said that ca.rtela beoame th<> real government 
or Oermen:~,y in thls post-11a:r period, and •anonymously ruled 
the life of the nation d01m to the last detmils of burial 
while the Weimar Republic withe red powerlessly" .1 While 
tb1s statement is hyperbolioal, there is still considerable 
truth in 1ts oontention, as ev1denoed by the role wh1oh 
cartels played in the rise o:f the Hitler regime. 
11L J. BoaHmstein, "Ho,,; Cartt9ls broke the German 
lie public, u Ca!J.~ld i!W !? orum Vol. XXIII (!'larch 19!:.1!) p. 279. 
-o-"07---~-~-
An investigation of available sources of information 
dealing with the ,:,er1od under· consideration gives e:redenee 
to the belief th~1t Hitler's rise to power was financed to 
a considerable degree by OH:t'tel interests. In a memo-
randum d<•.ted March 22 1 1932 1 - a yel!l.r before Hitler took 
control, the head of the Foreign !l.ela Lions depau•tment of 
Du :Pont de Nemours & Company wrote his. superiors from 
Germs.ny: 
~It is a matter of common g':>ilii1.S> in GermallY that 
I. o. is financing Hitler. Other German f.l.t'Wil t~ho 
are supposed to be doing so are Krupp a;t1d Thiessen. 
How much tr•uth tbere is in this gosai,~ w& lilre unable 
to stt,te, bttt there seems to b<a no doubt whatever 
that Dr. Schmit:<: (director a;~tlaral of I. o.) is at 
least: personally a large contributor to the Nazi 
party ."2 · 
Later evidence collfi:rmed this observation. In its issue 
of September, 1942, fortune rnmga:<:ine stated 1 "It .l.s now 
historical t'aot that t.he steel and chemical oartels 
t'inanoed Hitler's early polit.ioal adv•Jntures.nJ lt should 
be pointed out that the firms mentioned, I. G, Farben, 
K1•upp and Thiessen '>'~ere all prominent members of d0111estio 
and internat:1 ')nal cartels, 
---- -----------
2quoted in Joseph .8ork1n and Chr:u~les A, Welsh, 
G•?,Jt'mapy 's !•la[!t'"r ~. p. 58 
3Bork:l.n £U'J.d 1Melsh, op, cit!. • p. 306 
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Hitler had the support of the Junlcer<J, 11ho had beoome 
eartel lee.ders following t·iorld vrar I. This class, which 
represented the cartel m~1gnates, saw in Hitler the psyoho-
log:l.oal magnet with which to align the ftletl"!il• unreasoning 
resent,ments and the :need of the German P"Wf>le for a common 
purpose. Hitler "Focused the ncttion will, t~h11e at the 
same time he protected the oa:rtel inter!:llsts. "4 ~'he cartel 
system extant in Germany e<t the time of :Hitler's accession 
to prn~er was favorable to the mutual growth of both. The 
alliance which was achieved was inevit~ble and sprang from 
"The undemocratic oha.racter of both the cartel System 2o11d 
li'asa ism." 5 
an hUthority on the subject of cartels had the following 
to say concerning cartels and the rise to pOWl~r of Hitler: 
"Hitler built up his system on the inst.ltution he 
found when he came into power. One of the most impor• 
tant instit>;rt:ionf! he found ;-;as the cartel £md patent 
system as developed since lo79 • • • , Ceri;:ll:u~ E~.re tools 
used to accomplish certain ends. :I'hey have :~10 life 
of their own; it is the peopl'" behind them that give 
them life • • • • 'l'he psychology of these people, their 
efficiencies or luz.1ness, their d.efen.sive or offensi~e 
spir1 t, together m~tke up the spirit of the cartels." 
4Borkin find Welsh, gp. cu., p. 306. 
5rrarley Kilgore, "'l'!le Menaol'!l of the Block International, • 
National Ed.uoa,:!?ion ASS<)ciation _igurnal, XXXIII (April 19l,f.4) p. 90. 
6quoted in A. J. Rosenstein, "How Cartels Broke the 
German Republic, • Canadi~n Fol'UJ!!• XXIII (!1arch 1944) p. 279. 
l 
! 
! 
!liUar and th"l system of National Socialism gave 
c;;.rtels a nm; vigor, and along witt! vigot", gre<~ter 
off.;;nsi.ve spirit. The aims of .the c:;u•tels were now to 
be fused. "'ith the S;r;:bttions of the sted\e. Prior to Hitler, 
the produc tton1 prices or mc:'>rks ~ ing of comrrtod i ties were 
s<<bjected to only a minimum of state ccmtrol, '.!'hey Here 
Gubeequent legislation had little eff$at on their act:l.ons. 
'l'hls Gituation was to be radically oh"ll1[;ed after Hitler 1s 
aocecH>lon to power.•, The 1n1 tial steps in th1s change l'lere 
the car•tel deore~s of l9JJ, 
!I. CArtTU:LS AND NA'.r!ONAL SOOIALISr1 
~Che Naz1 state regarded cartels as necessary and 
Iii chang:• from 1nd1ff.~H'€mt tolerance to positive approval. 
/l.coord 1ng to one formula: 
"lrnti-oa:rtGl poll..cl<~s "' Lltwralism, J?ro-ca~"t;C;~l 
policies on the basll~ of thz~ Compulsory Cartel Law "' 
National Soc,l.al:i.sm." t . 
7ao·bort A. Brady, :r.h.! SJ21r:l.t and ::>tr1•oture SJf. 
Gerllllin Fascism, P• Jl•o. 
---- ---------------
-~--. -.-
l 
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'rne e.bove formula h~Cts as one of i te basts; the 
Comp1llsoPy Cm•tel L<ws of 1933. ':t'hese lmrs, Nhich were 
solid bruse for thB enh?.tlcem<'!l1t of economic control by the 
lnd1v1!:i.ual producers to _join the cartel o'f' theil• trade. 
·rhe sta·te was given the full ri;:;ht of ccmtrol over• these 
organizati0.11s. 8 
In addition to thts 1 the Dep,',:i:"t;nont of gconomics ~ras 
assured C<U'tels that no new firms ;you.ld. be permittec1 to 
form ~•i thout the expressed autborization of the cart·'~l 
productive C1%paclty without simllcn' eomHmt from th.1l 
" oona lHn,;wrood e.ltcl En1<'•st ll·?6.it;"''• "O.'H'ru:a.n Cartels In-
vails 3;u:rope," J-i'or~ei;<rl Policy Hepofts, XVIII (Aug. 1942) p, 111-8 
9Fr•ank t•lunk 1 :l')le L<~gac;y; .!2f_ Qiazism, p, 170. 
I.Cl!~L Vi:~E3ION 
·~lh~:n the compulsory c~R:rtel statut;es wel'<' promulgated 
they vJOl'<~ IH:JC<)mp,rxlied l:ly an oft'ioial st"l.tement as to ·the 
aims of the deorces, Nhich attempted, ~~s one writor put it, 
•to mislead public opinion" on thi;; :tss\l.e. 10 'l'his of'fioia.l 
explanation said in part: 
"The s·~v·~:re depr:sssion hB.!l[,;ing over the German 
economy ilf'H3 struclt most sevt::rely at 'those branches of 
lndustl'Y thnt have a prod.uctive cmpaaity far in ·~xcess 
of presen.t market possibilities, Int:~msifi:>O. compe\;1timl 
and th1~ low pr•ioe level resultant tber•$fx·om • • ,have 
brought nearer the point at which the r•uin of enter-
prises V(i:llUBtbl·{J to our ns.t.i.onal ec<-'>nomy t.s thr~.at~ned~ ttll 
'!.'houch the official aims of the d.ecreG stress the necessity 
of state control as the- £llSil.llS to sueco1• the thNJatened 
t:.ct,:o:"dl .r,eonomy, tha actw;tl intent of the daer·e(M was to 
i:nsur(il state control oven' ev,~ry segm1mt of Oerm&n ind.ug tr•y. 
l V , rn:; UL'l'S Qli' 'l'lL~ LA \·IS 
Under these new laws, the number of <Hcrtels, ·che 
10otto Nathan, ~ ~ Economic Syqt{,!ro, p. 72, 
11 quol>sd in !'ram: Neumann, Behemoth, p. 266. 
~--·--
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poe it ion of the cartels Ni th oth:c;r enterprises &md lf1th 
tho covel'lllnent were greatly improved, 'l'hoy >HH'r;; no long~n· 
re.ood 1'11th the tacllt of fight;in(>; outsid•"rs; Sup•JX'ficie.lly 
1 t ;crppee.red t;he.t the CctrtBl 'sy1> ts!lm g;•1 tn/:6 new streugth 
from the lavm; in ao tuc;l i ty, hot•reve:r, G:\l'iM.n o•srtels f:rom 
d oo 11"' ins tn1.l!H?ntG for the execut 1.on of Naz 1 impet•ial.o. 
zaU.ons to regulritte prices wr:us seriously hampered i)y sub-
,iootine rJ.ll ;:;uch functions to ~ho approval of tiH> stHtt3 
'viii;h the 
\ 
' 
issuance or this edict, the cartels lost every 
of :1.1td.$pendent author :I. ty in the price-making field. 
The tightening of foreign exch1:1nge control worked 
cottsidera.ble hardship on oartels. The dlf':f.'iculties confront~ 
inH cartels because of' the foreign exchan;f,e situation became 
acute in 19)1', •~ith the in1tial;io:n of a new plan which gave 
The ?,ct1vlt1es of tbe <lUl'JElrviaory agencies soon developed 
int:o a complElte control of foreign and domest.ic raw materit:tls 
nnd other commodities. '.!:hat this action lncreasad tl~e power 
of' the state r,mc1 greatly ourta:nect the aot1v1t1es of cartels, 
which hac'!. theretofor<l attempted to :regul,,,te the pt'oduotion , 
or' their members ls !'('laCiily understs.nd~1ble.lJ 
The J?O'Her of the goverrunent over Cf1J•tels grew with 
inci•ea.sing regulation or' the enUre eoonqmy, In l9JI~, the 
gover:muent began a program to construct an "Organization 
ot Industry". The Groups and Cha1nbers which madeJ up this 
Organi?.ation of Industry ~~ere under the oom lete domination 
of th'~ govert'lm<.mt, All entreprenuet•s were compelled. to 
'l'he functions pe~·forme~d by the Groups and Carte1s 1n the 
~t~conomy, in respect to marketing regulations, etc., over 
l3N , 6. athan, .m!• ~., P• 7 • 
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cb.are.ctur of tho c.a:rtol or·gc>~nization, wh:l.l<} tho Groups gave 
a certain political emphasis to cartels. · Due to duplication 
of f'unction l'ltld conflict of views, tho gov0rnment a·cepped in 
and on Novemb,~r 12, 19)6, the cartels were intlJJgr&l.ted into 
the adlninistraM:ve economic h:i.el'e•.rchy and were put :in a 
position belO~l the Groups, Since the!;e groups ~Jer'e und.el" 
th"il complete control of th:3 Dep'-u·tm<t;>nt of !i:COl'lOlnics, the 
tr>J.mlfll:l" of respm'lsibility to the Group solidified the 
pONEt:r the [OVermn~nt assumed over ce,rtels hy the ,s.tatutes 
of' ,Jt,ly, 19:n. 14 
Having reached th:l.s stage in this stu.cty of G!llrmaey's 
ct;rtel system. attsntion shall now be foc;UEH!Hi u.pon 'their 
re,mif:\.c;:ltions abroad. Their effect will be appraised by 
CHAPTEH V 
I, GSRNiiNY AND !'Hi:~ ALUMI:NlJN ALLIANCE 
"'£vel'Y pile of aluminum pol~s and pans Nhioh 
Americans bu.Ud 1n public squares is an unwitting 
tribute to the eff1c-.1ency of Germ~m o&u•t·"J>l warfal'<h nl 
This sent,~uce laconically expr<~sees the eff17ats of G<;r•rnany 1s 
oartGl arrMlgemente in the field of alutn.1num production. 
dev•.")loped as a result· of calculated. planning by th~~ German 
aluminum, 
Germany entered the first major int.ern,~tionio!.l alum:l.-
num c.art••jl in 1926 Htlow.:; with several oth•n• nationi!:L. Pr1o:r. 
total ou'l;put, 1t merely regulated quotas for· domestic and 
o_) 
export s···.les• including aluminum sold in th<" torm of alloys.' 
1,..,,,,,,. ~l"'o 
v 1'.1-,;t, k ,.., t--:.> 
Plan, p. '?2. 
-- ---------
n~:nl car•t:$1 v;w:; fortned tn ::>w.itz,ilrlnnd t:n 1931, a.n<l G':'\llcMia 's 
!ll>tin pt'Oduc,~:r ot: lf\lUJ:n:!.nUlll, '.;h''" ,uuminu.m Ll:r•it,;;d U.lted), 
was lrJoludGd. Al tl'lo1.t11J;h the AlumlnUlll f:ooopany of Aoorica 
(Alcoi!.<) thil soll:l pror:t,uoer in t.h") United Stat;;;~c1 at this 
3G;i>orge w. s took ina; fl.nd Myron 'l· Hatk1ns, t;:z\rt!l!ls 
1n Action• p. 265. --------------
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of shares was bmsed. on the production rates of cartel 
the lrargest sl·w.re 213.58%, the quotas of tha other members 
1•ere 21.36% to the French, 19.64% to the Germans, 15.42;~ 
4 to the Swiss, ·and 15 percent to the British, 
In 19341 the German nF;t.ional groups of the cartel, 
the Verellligte Alun1inum Wel'lte (V. t\, \v, ), 1•1hioh was a 
govert'lme:nt sponsored cartel, and ths Aluminum \4et•ka asked 
p1•oduct1on. l'l.ilitary m~eds (!ictated tl:ti;s request fox• un•. 
1'·c>1ltriot::ad domeatio production, H:nt'i. thOuiJ:h the other cartel 
repre;<enk.ttlves a~pproached. the oartel members and offered 
the followi:r.tg alternatives, First, 1f the members v;oul.d. 
1agrse to freeing Oet'!ll%ny from th•:J quottc~. restric1;ions, 
Germany would agrea to stay out of the world market com" 
pletely • buyiJ:lll; /il, p.;mnd of C2ll'tel aluminum for•· avet'y pound 
that was e::q;orted from Germany, It Wif!S m.G~de cleEr that if 
the first sugt_;;estion t'ill\S H8E agreed to, the GerinP,ns would 
--------
4) 
all the allWlinum trwy w~mted ar1d would sell it anywhere. 
This was a serious three.t to the oa:rtiill alliance, since if 
cartel agreed to 1•aleaaa Ch~x·m&:ny from the establish<>d quota 
smd as a result, the pl•oduct:l.on of aluminUlll in that country 
.c;ent from 37,000 met••ic tons to 70, oon met:r1o tons within 
small margin, 6 From 19)8 through 191;1, the primacy of 
was r•?.lit,\bly &stt:IliJ\ted that in 1941, Germany produced 
!!lore aluminum than the combined. !Jl:41 ted .Nations. '1 
IIi. Europe as in Am&rioa• altuninum production in-
5a:&a1t l-jgody, Boom or Bust. p. 23'?. 
6stock1ng and. vJatlq.ns, op. o1t., p. 27l. 
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bounds, In B':r£uJ.ce, aluminum pt•oduc tion wns gr:;Jtatly· 
retarded by th<J cartel agreeme11t. Alumtnum production · 
advanced at such a low ratt< that it t'ell short of doubling 
its output in the s;;1:ne period when (h!!'i:tHi\ll prOduction 
:l.noe,.>ased f:l. ve-fold. 3 
I'hrough the adroit uHe of' th!il instrumentality 
offered by the cartel agt'eeme:nt, thcs le&\de:rs of the German 
State built up tlle air arm of th,eir war machi11e, And 
thOu{!;h this superiority was short-lived, it provided the 
Luftl~"f'f<~ with "'great in:l.tiP.l <<~iivRntage, 
'.l'his agr•eJ:!ll!l(J):Ut reached on November 5, 19281 gcwe 
rise t.o the patent oart~;l ~lhioh provided for the. exchange 
of techl1ological information in add.ition to the pooling of 
pe.tents. Under the terms of this agreemant, Gelleral Electric 
through ita snxbsidiary, Ce.¥·bc1loy lne., !'l.gt•e•''"i not to l1eenae 
othC!lt'l'l to produoe the cemented cstrbiae in thrll United Stetes 
without th·~ specific permission of Krupc>• 
'I'h:l.s ag:reel!wnt was r;oachetl despite &h® fa.ct that 
KrU::'IP • s pat,;nts on the procer~e ·of mak1ng tungsten carbide 
· were tenuous 1 ~md probably would have bii'!i5lll held to be in-
valid if' hNlught before a court. '!'his ma.s th<l opinion of' 
of all expel:'ts on the m&.t tte1.', and for this l'eason the 
---------------
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pat;ents were never tested, since such a. decision ·•,,ould 
have made it impossible for any producer to hav;;; a rwnopoly 
ovel" the new product. J.'his cm•tii!l agreeflH>nt was reached 
of tht~ German firm in order to gain ~;olri'J cont1•01 of the 
Q 
tungsten cr·u·bide indufJ try in the United Stat:·~s," 
from engaging in th0 export of carbide ruaLerials, In 
sbut the metal out of Great Bri ta1n s'nd h<:Jld GtH''lll1'l.ny 1 s grip 
on the;; South American trs.de, 10 
Ilt t:l'li'o United States, the few firms which did function 
ta1n pr1CH'lS at a par 1d.th General Eleotx•.l.c. 'I'he price follow-
ing the conclusion of the agreement rose abruptly in the 
United States from .~:45 per pound to ii4.53 per pound, thus 
these industrial diamonds became "more expensive tha:n gold. ull 
9ouentr~r H<i!1Utnnn, Pat"'nts t:o•• 1;\ltler·, p. 229. 
lOi'loody • Ql2.• oH .• • p. 214-1 
llib1d 
-· 
--------------- --
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In (!·JJrma:ny vJhere a. much l::;rger· amount of tun,,~sten c<1rbide 
was nmi:mfaotur·ed, the prices through /l'. ten year period 
were g0!per!illy only tt•enty-five percent of the u. s. price,12 
Though the price in the Unitc~d E~tt~tes dropped in 
yeF!I.r, T'he price in the United States· r,ema1ned <J,t this , 
g<meral high lev~~l ·t;ill 191H;, But; 1n 191>0 it dropped . 
shal-ply, follON:I.ng ths invalic'L:~.tion of slx important p<ltents 
by a Un1t0d StP1tes Federal Cour·t. 13 
thel 1930 1 s h:lndered its uae by the g!'eat rn!i!.jority of 
manuf.ac tur·e of mi'Wh:l.ne tools. 
the demands of n,.'\\,t1o:nal det"~mse, Amerl.ot'in industry could not 
fully utilize tr11s product bec<mse it; wae not ·<;eohnolog,ioally 
adGquacy ~then ha said.: 
"'I'he control of tungsten carbide patents by the 
G<:;neral i:Elecr'-ric CO!llpm'J;Y and th€.l Krupp Company has 
l2Bone Committee, Patent HeaPings, Pavt 1, pp, 8.'5-87, 
quoted in Hexner 1 OlJ.• oi t., p, )69. 
lJBorkin M<l Welsh, l.Qs. g1t,, p. 267 
------------------
of 
nr.:.;;~·:r<J.l~0d in i\::~.::}_L.illl~ t.lL0 p:t,ice at axo:cbi'Laut- l·._.;rvels. 
NO<'i when th® time haf.l C(Jme, in:lus l;r•y h?,S not learned 
hov; to us,~ tu:t:l,:;;·st.·).U ogc"iJld:~ E-i.n& hr~s :tl<JL -;...h~<;; mach.lnes, 
th·s skU led m<m, or the technique ~~hi all 1 t would have 
hB.d lf ~;t'12 ma-·C-,3r ic.1.l i'u3.d- b.aan a vallt~bl::: at. ·Ghe s-~~me 
low pr1<1cW a~ which it t..ras EFrailab'Lo to Clzrm;m 
inUus t.x•i:;;;t.:;.11 l·+ 
xllili tary 
-------------------
CHAPTEH VI 
I, ZB:ISS OPTICAL COMPANY OF JSNA - A HlS1I'OlU:CAL !rSSUl1E 1 
One of G~~:rmany 1 s lnterna tional cartel agreements 
that had a profound effect upon tile m1li tsrry pr<~paredness 
of' several nations was in the field of' optical instruments~ 
Through th<e use of' patent and price <Ja:rtels • . the German firm, 
trol ov.~r tbe mltrnufaotul•e of military op'l;iC61l goods; a c.:::.-· 
trol ~;h1ch proved costly to Germany 1s •enemiea ·in two t"lorld 
wars. 
Zeiss, by the use of oe.rtel agrc~ements, w:>s not 
only able to rogtr1ct tho production of v.it,al optical glass 
needed in thf) pr¢cis1on instrt.lments of foreign inrlust<•iee, 
but also obtained valuabl•z information on the relative 
military preparedness of nations. It was able to do so 
because of its position of leadership in the field of 
optic,'l.l instruments. German leadership' in thiB field had 
be•.sn ~whleved in the. 19th Century ~~~Hm that :ua t1on devel-
oped optical glass mt'lnufacturillg to its most, advanced st.ate, 
The Zeiss Compo,ny was the domirl@.t:l.ng group of the German 
optical lnduetries. The other main German companies in 
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Ne tt;.al A. G., ~nd li~'nl~ill!1lnn A. G. wer·i.l f't.uaad d ir~'c tl.y l.Wder 
tbfil oontrolliug 1ntli':t'liHH. which Ze.lalll had .in e~ch.1 
upo.n elUJl:nlning th•l OP!rl;.<~l a~p:'<'lii:llllent; l>h1oh •:;:tdate<~ between 
that firlll• iMld t;he !:'li'>U.Sch and Lomb Conrpl>lUY of !'!ooh•><'~ter• l'l.t. 
!n 1906 t,h•:n'•;) w.\il.lll no i>1111llUI'!!Io tur<w o:i' optical g;las~:' 
in th{)l Un1t;sd Statcul." By optit)li'<l glO.Ill!$ llili m~nt thi) a,lalilie 
not to bo confu.£H>d w1 th op th<>lmio glliM!H;l Uclo~d fo:r poor viilil1on, 
~1hich !l.a a .r:i.ff'·eH!'I.'Illt type of optlcal .gl~~t!!IS, 
oip!l\l mtmutact;\lrers of optiot<l ¢;ood~a in tbe tl'!lit.ad, Stli'tes, 
h~1.d. oeillfn mf).flu.f'actu.rin~ m1Ut1>~ry optl.aal i~oode from glass 
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~~h1oh the American firm had become the exclusive agent 
of Zeiss in· the United S·i;e,tea. In exohtmg;e :for this 
position of pr1mii!.oy 1n the Unil;ed States, 8gusch: & Lomb 
£~old. one~-fit'th of ·their capital stock to Zeiss ar1d per~ 
mitted the ropresentation of Zeiss intet•ests on its 
board of directors. From 1907 to 191'4• no optical glass 
was made in the U.nited States, Bausch & .t.omb had to depend 
upon l.mports ft'OI.ll Zeiss for their e11tire supply. 3 
Zelss reta111ed silnilat' control ov;n; the optical 
gl2osa indus tries 1n France a.nit li.'l:~.e;le.nd dtU'ing; this same 
p0l'iod. In Bngla.nd., ~~here Ch!" .. noe Broth•Jra were the main 
producers of optical glass, Zeiss 1;ras a mt>.jor factor in 
dependent tlpon Ze:l.ss for teol'molo,,;ic.al informt> tion, as t<~ell 
ae maldng them pay rQy!!llties to ~~"'iss foro th•3ir use. 4 
:t:n 191111 the Allied countries sours.ht to place 
ordel't> with Bausch & Lomb, as 2:eiss could no longer be a 
sour•cH9 of supply due to the war. Zeiss objected to this, 
and refused to continue to supply Bausch & Lomb with glass• 
Jwendell .Berge. carte~lh p. 11+5. 
14-Borkin and ~lelsh, .22.• cit., p. 279. 
-~--~----- ---=-o 
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under thr~ir contract of 1907• It wa\~ OV(n' this dispute 
that Bausch & Lomb purchased Zeiss 1 one-fif'th inte1•est 
in that company• 
thB Allied nations made these non-Oe:rman firms wholly 
dependent upon Zeiss for th•:J:I.r supply of glauss; and 
resulted in a ssvere shorti:!.g•ll of mil :I. t1.n•y opt; leal apparatus 
;,ih:l.ch co11tinued thl"Oughou.t the p<srio::t of hostilities, In 
the United Ste.tti'!!s 1 the Alie.n Property CustocU.an confisc::tt''d 
the Zeiss patents, but this ha..:l little effect on u, s. pro~ 
duotion since u. S.~,,,.,.f:l.n:ns had to st~<rt from the bottom and 
''b;-' 
vJOl'k up. A la<ll£ of trained t<ilehn:l.eio.J\S ln t!M~ optical 
field furth'llr harop<>r"od Alli<~d production ot' th<;se goods. 
l!Iitk< the end of the war, Zeiss onoe aga,:l.n sought 
to t[la1nta1n the supl'•>ml!ley it had enjoyed for so lo~g in 
past years, In order to circumvent restrictions put t.lpon 
Vmnlo 1n the NethcJX'liitnds, and it ~~as throucll t!ltH t'il:"m that 
they renewed their oa.rtel negotia"ti.Qns. with Bausch & Lowb,5 
l:'Hi.UolCh & Lomb >1ho bad t'~rm1n11i ted th<lir f h'st e.gree-
ment 1dth z;e1ss in 1915 ent<llred into a new cartel agreement 
ort April 28• 1921• follon1ng at trip to Gurope by ex·scutiv{;;s 
knCH~ledge Of (;eiSS We;S to b•J placed at i;he~ disposal of 
Bausch & Lomo.6 
'I'he oontl'act follovred was .a familiar pattet'll of an 
intern.f.!.tional cartel agreement sponsored by Clet'!lllilll oonoerltS. 
;:,mong the provisions of the agreement was the req.uirement 
that all new patents in the military line ii!hould be acqulr·sd. 
in th•£< name of Bawsch & Lomb and beld fOl' the exclusive use 
or :l~eiss. In consideration of th1s Z<llsa reoeiv<11d a royal·~y 
on all m:U:l.tary app!!n·a·t;us sold by B<:lusch & Lomb, <HWB field 
gh'\sses, regardless of its inclusion 1lt t;he ;oeiss patents. 7 
The agrl\lement also divided the wor•ld madtet for 
optic<~l a;ood.s between the tv.ro f1rms 1 the provhio:n relating 
0L'lerge • l2,Q.. oit. 
7Arnold 1 op. £11., p. 70. 
- --------------------
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B.. & L. obligate thamselvea not to sell d1l:•ectly 
or .indirt~ctly, m1lit~u·y instrumetlts to countries out• 
side tl::t$ United States of America <1\ltd. vice V•3I''Sltl. 
Carl ZC~ilH1 obllr.atc) themHJc~l'\H;;s not to B•9ll such 
1nst:r•uments directly or i:tlli1reotly to the 
United St1ates unl0ss the partie>J have come to an 
<:\grr3ement reg\'a~d.l.ng tlH oond i ti on of scr.lg cmd the 
prosp~Jctiv<~ ·r;e:·ritories o.f di!'!·tribution, 
It was u:ndex•stood. that if eithrg• of the p<:irties 
received bids from a source outside their exclus~hre aNel. 
:;,_~j§ 
o.f sale, it was incumbent upon t;l:lf• pllU'I#i;:c;s to inform their 
"'rne contr~;.ctin£; parties agree to l«!ep th!J fore-
going agx•eem~ntt in iiltt•tct confideno"' as l:'egardil a 
t.hird party and to t:;uard sil•a11ce co:nJ)lH'ning this 
•J~greeroent also wl th the·ir OWll (,:;mploy<Oco;B as f~lr M1 
this may be prli'.ct1c.~"bl•'! under th'" circumtitn.r1oes ... 10 
chance of incurring the wrath of' public opl.nlon, 
Another provision of this cartel agr<Weill\i.mt, srno ontJ 
establishment of a "fUlit.:,,:ry Dep!itrtment". Paragraph four 
of the contraet reads: 
"In l'urthiilranoe of the aims o:f this agreement, . 
Bausch ,lt Lomb in Hodleste:r will c<·r~e.tr~ a ne•~ Depart• 
merJt solely :responsible t;o t.h£0 Boar.d of' Directors; 
t•lhioh is cl':\arged. W"ith the independent developme.11t of 
all scientif'i.c <mel technical tasl{S within ths mHHary 
scope ond 1;h<~ maintenance of oonnecti.ons V(it;h Jena. 
The parti:3lH VJ1ll come ·co C!.l'l agrC:t7riH$t1't a.s- rt;gr..t:rds r~a 
beads to be placed. Ln ch•:\rg;e of this cermrtment. • 
In the military field there was an agr<.!enl<'mt between the~ 
out of th·;; obll.gations to the nations was anticipated,, and 
~rh~~ mutual obligation ragal'cti:ng th>:!' eKohange of 
mHitary aesigns shall bG void t1h:imever tlw highest 
hO!Il<'o e;overnment of on~: p1:11.rty \Bxpre>ssly demands that 
th.::~y be kept in C<)n.i"lden.oe in th(il .interests of the 
nE1t1on."l2 
continue the exchl!lnge of milit<P.ry c\ata in the event of war, 
optics t:Ul the st>art of vlorld ''ial' U. 
11 Htld. I !h l!l6. 
12p.•i! 
... ~· 
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V. A NO!JIF:tCA'I'ION IN PROVISION - IN NArliJ; ONLY 
out, Bausch & Lomb was a/l1T1Bed. th1.'lt its ag:reemen.t with 
Zfd.ss was 1n viol£l.tion of the antitru.r>t laws of the 
United Stt>tes. Upon the 1ni1lis i;ence of Bausch & !,omb. 
'iilttorneys vihO saN thr3 marl!::et-dividlltr.& c1lause as a violation 
sections, but the performance m:' the p:!lr'ti\'l£5 r•;>mained 
t'\ubstantlally thta same. 1~vid<moe that; this -r•evis1rm of 
th·a 1921 agreement was subt•?.rfug;e 1s sholim by the follow-
1ng memor·m1dum of 8dward Be~usch, the head of Bausch & Lomb, 
and. dated Jauue.r·y 27, 1927 1 which stated: 
"It 1s my understand 1I:tg 1x1 s.coo:rd.ance ~~i th th® 
opinion of Carl Lomb, that we Ar'e not 'to bid on 'i"tlY 
n;ilite:try ins t1•uments for use J!Uzywhere outside tb•a 
Unit;ed Stmtes. The agreement is that 1f such 
inquiries oorn<o to us we are to r·~ l'c~r th,~m to Zeiss." 13 
l'he 1921 agreement as well as lat<)l:' agreements be• 
t"Je<:m the t1."0 firms provided for an exch<mge of information. 
-- --- -----------
Under• the oontra,ot any new developments in the military 
optical field were to be exohanged between th"" pEtrties to 
~hlll agreement. It was this provieion that OctW:~<:!d the most 
furor when ot'ou.ght to lig;ht in S•>nete hearings dealing with 
w~re requtred to list for Zeiss any rtetl scientific and: 
11> 
.:;~ptionl instruments manufaoturecl fo~' th·' u. :)• Armed Forces. 
'rivs same> oondi tionH ~•ere imposed upon Zeiss 111 
respect to new disooveri.c\S in the military optical field, 
but z,!l:l.ss, e'SP•'lloially a:f'Mr Hitbr 1 a r:l.se to power•, did 
Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, of Franltfurt, GEu·many, con-
earning mil:l.tat•y transactions for April, i'lay end June of 
"Heretofore the Governm<mt bas m~H·ely been insistent 
ths;t none of ttw detalls as regards th1D des:l.e;ns of 
these instruments be made public, but :l.t !iHilems as 1f 
the qi:vo.ntlties,. Pl'icens, etc •• <.md the amo,,nt of the 
equipment purchas,ed u.re <~.lso considered. secret. 
Obviously, our agrEH;~m<mt with l'!e1asrs, Cs:u•l Ze:\.s!l can-
not v1ork sat;i:Jfactor1ly unless, at least, the latt.sr 
information beoomes common knocoledge to !:loth p'll.rties, 
. ... 
... 
>Ut iilOIDe er•rt~ngm!Hllllte must b@ rl!lll.de lliher<c;by we a:re 
aet'lurii.ld tb:\a H~form~:>t1on ;•1ill be kept in st:r1ot,~st 
confl<l<!!nC~~n J.;;> 
'l:lH:I report aocom:J;~<'>n,u'1ng the lett.>el? ~<.fill) th.<: atat.:.~ment of 
.Bausch & Lomb·~~ m111t(ll"1f dep>ortm•ll:nt, and d<lal t with "1'1\U{';a 
fl:ndl!lrc-1, P'lill"iaoo~~;.ul~ tl\ll,o>aoopae, 111nd bomb-si~t;ht<{~ N<l!elr 
Ul<~ conclusion of tho :report, l:'ti!!lat;ing t() th~~ rJpt~1olill 
Bqu1p;ll,mt Will!! th~ parae:r&ph; 
• It will be noted from tha fot•e~:oillg atri\ t'!iltflents 
j;hat not, rntwh l'ttrtt.,,r 1nf'orllli.>.t1on c~~n Jo,~ obta1ntiid 
l''i.IIJ;lt.X'iting (>()ltlj)'iltitiV\11 fJl'':l.Oii.lh \~h:!.le t.ht"l'l~ bi<llS t-II'•il 
5!1AppOsii!d to be~ pt~b11e, 1t h0l$ lnt,~l~· b'J~~O!!lll!i thr,'J plf',',ot.l(Hl 
to withhold thl(') 1nt'o~m1a,t1o:n frow thlil publ1•"• I·~VIll!'f 
latt,~r and env,.lope f't·om ·tn~> i:fOV(j)t'\OJQO!lt 1s mtH·l~!;;d 
"Conf1d<mt1tol" ~mel Ill<~ ll!l:'lil h!:lll'ii l'!.OCOUUltcitll·lll tl'Hlt the 
1n.form~it1on 1'111ll not b.memno .PUb:UG, i!ll'l\t tl:;.gt it will 
be trent.ed 111 etrtotest oonf'.ldeno!fr." l" 
The mH1tary 1lllpl1e'1<t1onr> :l.nhlllvent :l.n the <)XCih.~e 
ot inform'• t ton ol~~us<!l h l'ut•ti'lw 1~ dillmon!il tr•~ t•$d by a lilltter 
n;tour ltHiil.i mrmtc>ly l:'lll;po~·t h<<~!l H1v,,m Ci'lUM><! to th1ill 
oonlilld<r~:rauon i:.thlt w® w!Juld b€1 b~;~tt<t~:r ttl a :podtion 
to alils1s c you 1f you l~ould repol:'t t,o w11 'lit;.~ t kind iii 
of inlil tX"UllhZ<Utll sr0 und~r tr 1al oU1d Ui!ll) by your 1:0U 1 tary 
lil';>ll''i/lt>;J~, '£b'llt"" llltiiH, biil Ia gl'>:l!l!it lll!lXlY (j\.1>;1\i) tiO!li> :t'!llg$,1"dltlg 
1ni5t:rumen1H> fen• a1l'pl.\onf11s 1 taanks,t sud skl:!.ps, whioh 
dem&l'ld lilP<lOii!i.l irlllli>>'Uitl<iltltl;<. n 17 
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'fhe royalty payments ~shich Bausch '" Lomb made to 
Zeiss similarly inl)luded infornEttion on the m111ta.:ry 
potenti!itl of various n'!ltions doing business ~Ji th Bauscll & 
Lomb. 'fhrough the .medium of accounting on these payments, 
by the .American firm, both l'lithin and without the United 
In 1935t with German rearmament no longer a secret, 
F:lausch & r..omb refu8ed contracts with Great Bri tian a.nd 
I~rance for i~l,500,000 worth of m11:\.taz•y imrtruments. In 
Scma te investigating oommi ttees, thero were dozens of letters 
in which inquiries from foreign buyers or m1l:\.tary optical 
•I:)Jr.ample, on J.l'!Hi,rch ;;o, 1938, Bawaoh & Lomb 1>1rote th~ flt•1t1sh 
M:l.litar;v At·tache 1 in W~lshiU!~ton, th<i< following letter: 
•rn reply to your letter of l11s.l•ch 21!,, 1938, we ~Iish 
to infol'!ll you that the instruments :'hat vHll mm1ufactured. 
for th'" u, s. War Depc-cr-tment are 4 wc"ter St"reo Height 
Findel'l!l• 
"Unfortun.'itely we have ·co inform you that ''ill are not; 
in a, poal:tion i;o t;alce !3r1tif;h ~covcn·mlHnt orders at the 
preeent time. ull::! 
lEho~w-o 0 ·,.,. ~ ~t " 1·'·7 JJ'WJ.{f)""J ~· "-' •-t P• l1 • 
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The fulfillment of any order from abraM required the per-
mlssio,l of Zeiss. and conrslder1ng the source of the ord.ers, 
'~xplanation on•" can offer for th•a uuul!ual dil,int,'lrest in. 
profitabl•;; business on the part of oau.sch & Lomb. 19 
economy to !Wiet ·the 111\hsds of its. war effor•t, Bausch & Lomb 
found that ac t,ua.l iUsclo!n.lres of :l.nforn:n t.ion 11rere no longer 
forthc:oming from Zeiss. In 19)9, '~Hh Cl•;)rmany at war, the 
were being governed by a pollt1cal cont.ing·Jncy clause in 
their contract;, 
On r~arch 27, 1940• an indictment >.-as retu:r.n11d against 
Bausch & Lomb, three. of its officers, C:<u:>l Z·<,iss of Jena, 
and Carl Z~iss of New York, the Ame:r.io"'n ;c::eiss l'Si)r'(1t5E!nta-
trade, under the S~1erman Act, in respect to the dit~t:r.ibution 
of' mili.ta:ry optical eqii!ipment resulting in arbitrary, un-
r.:;H;.sonable, a.nd noncrnnpeti't:\.ve prices; B''"'.:~m:oh & Lomb 
pl 'aded nolg aogJ;,enQ,~~~ and f1nes of $1;1, 000 were Hssessed 1 
on i'Jay 27, l91H) um !'lt<l"Ch 5, 191>1; respect1vely, 20 
19Bo:rkin and otJelsh, tiEl.• Q.ll. , p, 28 5 • 
.. ~o 
"' Bel"ge, Qll• Sl,ll., p. 2.55. 
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'rhere was no indictment returned against Bausch & 
Lomb for unwiti;;il%,?;1Y giving away secrets which affe.oted 
the national secur:l:ty of the United. States, but 1f t'irma ,, 
engP,ging in eartel agreem<mts, sucb as this, were amenable 
to prosecution for these aots, a second. itl.dictment would 
probably lm.ve be!!!n made, '!'he fact that this cartel arrange• 
ment hindered. tht3l United Stat;es ~ffllLr effort is appar•:mt when 
ons considers 'that the shortag'~ of optical instrumemt;s was 
x·ated as the fourth motllt s~r1ous bottleneck in the United 
world war II. In its final report• the '!'emporary National 
Economic Committee, which investigated foreign pe.tent con-
trols over AnHwican industry, stated.; 
"The production of vitally important materlc<ls l\\S 
optical glass and chf.lm1cals has been restrl\ined through 
internat1orual pat•::>nt controls and croa:•·.J,icen~?ing, l'lhich 
have' divided th'1 wo~·ld m!il.rk<llt into closed areos. All a 
result the capacity of Amet•lcan industry to produce tht;~se 
matJ;~rl.m.ls is noc 2~!'iaqu&:te to !!l<Jat the nel!)ds of the defense program. . 
21.;auoted in Geora;s !!:. Falk, Pljtentcl ang IndU,str:!.al 
l':t'g£:rl!IGS, p, 6J, 
------------
CHAPTER VI! 
I • G. FARagJ'HHDUS'l'B!E A. G. 1 THII: NONO.L!TH 01~ 
Gll.TtH!HlY.1 $ INT!l:BJ'!A.l'IONhL Cl\RTll:L ST!:WCTURE 
The point has been reaohetl. :l.n th:l.s sttldy where 
attention needm to be focused. on the protagonist of 
Germany's cartel system, I. G., Farbenlndustr!e, the un-
questioned leader of world c.\Cirtelism, ;,Jhose C(>~rtel ope:r,-
ations affect almo:at every oivil1<tlli!d na~:J.on in th!l> 1r10rld .• 
The study of cartelism is the s l:udy of' I. G. F'arben since 
1 t was this .f1l'lll which exploited and eonaumiuated the develop-
ment of the oa:rtel device. Because of its uniqueness in 
the oartel field., a oareful study of !, G, Farben 1 s back• 
ground and operations shol!,ld prove invaluable. 
Germany • s had ins cartal in both th® domet~ t1a nnd 
1nt.:~rnat1onal sphere wao the firm of Int,,reSiHm Gemelnshaf't 
Farben1m:lu!iltr1e Al:ttiengeslllllschaft, more commonly :referred 
to as l. G. Farben. I .• G. !<'arben ~:rcos the largest industrial 
corporation in Europe in 1941 1 and aoco:rding to the U, s. 
:Oepartmsnt of Justice at that date 1t was the la.rgest 
--------- ---
chemical company i:n the world.l '!'he influence of this 
chemical oombl.ne permeated the chemical industries of every 
o1v1l1zed. nation of the •~orld •. The hiscory of this group 
under the Nazi regime "reads like a detective story" 1t1as 
··the. way the late President Roosevelt described 1 ts operations)! 
Germany 1 s economic power was bu1l t up by olHlmical and metal• 
lurgical industriE:H> t and the dominant tMw\bera of this giant 
structure wer'il six chemical companies which ev<:!l.ntually evolv111d 
into one concern known as I. G. Farben. 
Germany Is posi t1on of primacy in the fl.•1lld of industrial 
chemistry '<lias achleved mainly beoause of three factors. First, 
Gel'lllany made an early start ill the adaptation of an ed.ucationr<-1 
system which ~;as geared to meet the needs of a modern 
1ndustr:l.al nat:!. on. Secondly, because of Oer•many 's dearth 
of natural resources, parttculary in iron, copper £md oil, 
mttention was paid to the developement of synthetic mater:tals 
to offset the det'iote:ncy in resources. A third f;;;.ctor was 
psyohological and can be ascribed to the chln'e.oter of the 
Oermt<n people, this factor involved the great drive of the 
l,u... S... ltS. AJ1ied Cbem}oaJ .& .l:l,jr.a Cnrporat.3rm e.t. al. 
in u. s. Diatriot Court for the D1.str1ot of 1'1. J, {Criminal 
action No •. 75JC) retu.rned May 1';, 1942 par. JO• quoted in 
Geort~;e Stock.1ngs & Myron watkins, CaPh1 11 J.:R, AG:1·1o:a, p. 414. 
2colaton E. ~/arne, "IrJteruation Cartelst A t-!:enaee to 
World Peaoe," Gm:rent ld3 stotQt 1 VIII (Feb. l91+5J 113. ---- ------------
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Garman oh:-n:-aoter for sy.st·,;mat.Jzatic>n and an intense 
nationalistic ambition.) 
The Big Six chemical companl.as whloh formed the 
great bulk of Germany • s in<'Justrim.l po~;er ~1ere incorporated 
in 192.5, and thie corporate g1•oup came to b,~ Known as 
I. G. Farben, 'l'hese Big '0.\ix of the chemlcal field 1veNll 
1. Bodisohe Anilim & Soda Fl?,brik, ·;f Lud.'tligstlafen; 
2. l~arbenfabr1ken vorw. Friedrich Bayer ·!: Co,, 
of L(:rvarl<usen; 
J, Farbwerke vorm. i"ieistex• .Lucius •n1d 1Jrtl.al11l:'lg, 
of Hoechst <'lilt Hain; 
4.. Akti®V..,f:;·sSellsc·h(ift ftlr 1tn11anfghrlk~lten, Of 
Berklhl; 
5. Leopold c~~ssela & Co,, lH~t ll. H~~; o.r F'ranl<furt; 
6. Kalle & Go,, l>. G •' of Blebr:l.cl<. 
4 
Even before this formal .merger, ther•a had been 
numerous instanoes of ooop·c::ratiml bet•Aellln these firms, The 
first steps t;,;ward merging and. cooperation came in 1904, 
following a trip to the Un1 ted States of Dr, Carl Duisbere;, 
the founder of I, G,, and later the Chalrman of its :Soard 
of Director's, Dur1ng his trip to the United States in 
1903, he became so deeply impr;H;sed by the Amarioan trust 
3stooking; and \1atkins, .fm• c:tt., p. :372. 
4Joseph Borkin and Chi:J.rles A, '1/,~lsh, Oermem:v 1s 
j1astex• Plan, p, 22. 
6.4 
movernent, which sutoaeeded in uniting competing enterprises, 
that upon his return to Germany the following year he in-
formed his competitors in '·l· detailed €Uld extensive memo-
randum of his exp<~riences in Am(])rice.. ThuB the basis was 
The three largest firms, HodisOb<~, Bayer, Bnd 
Berlin, r•el'Johed an agreement almol.'lt 1mroedi<tt<ely1 and 
i'~ 
entered into an Interessengemenschaft 1 or I. 0., 
mat ion and patent lie:H£~wlles, reciprooi ty 1:n res pee t to 
pooling of profit<~. Shortly aft<~r in 1908. 1 Hoechst• Kalle 
m::1d Cas~Sela formed a separate OIJu•tel. TI'HJ> prov h1ions of 
the agreement 11et•aeen these U;ree smaller firms were simi-
lar to those concluded b;y tbe first three. W1tl'< these 
m£e:rgers, the t~;o German firms bad attained an almost 
•ab;:lolate monopoly in the organic <lyeatu.ffa, pharmaceutical, 
explosive, and synthetic chemical 1ndu1Jtries of the world. ,6 
I. o. 's internal integration was oomple·ted in 1916, through 
the a.1l<1lg;amation of the two groups as a wartime measure. 7 
.'5carl Duisb.;n•g 1 illeine Lebenss,~rln.ner\mfien, quoted in 
Ervin Hexner • ~f',tion<~>.;L QF.!rtliils, p. 4. 
"''Community of Interests of Dye Indus t:r .teru, !nco.rpot•w 
6Bork1n and Welsh, QL?.• ~. p. 26, 
7!i':rank !11.mk1 '.!!tle j:.;em;t<tcy of N§!<~iSllh P• 116. 
---------------
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II. I, G, 1S Il.OLE IN 'l'Hli: S'l'AGE OF CONJ:i'LICT - CIBCA 1914. 
B9fore returning to 1925 and. I. G. 1 s formal incor-
poration, mention should be made of th'> role which this 
oombi~"l played in Germany 1 s war effot•t in the first world 
war. Its op<H'Sttions had. at that time. and again sca.rc.ely a 
ge:neration later, greatly though unsucccessfully aided the 
imperialistic dreams of the Reich, 
The role of I. G, F'at•ben in ~>or•ld Har I was not 
m<9rely a minor one given to a corporation during tlle time 
of war, but one which conceivably could MV<'l> altered the 
course of that first world conf'lict. '!he new type of tri .. 
nitrotoluene used in (.Ierman sh•~lls wB.s p<~rfeoted by I, G,, 
'''-8 wa.s the poison gam used to SO!ll<~ extent in that oonf'liot. 
Germany lost the war, but it wtts not due to the want of 
materials ~rhioh I.~G •. could produce for the fatherland. 
l>laJor Lefebure ln "'1'he Riddle of tho Hhin,z," succinctly 
stated the value of I. G. to the German l15'.:r effort during 
the first Horld illar when hw aRid: 
"On broad 11nes 1 the pre•wa.r anrl w~u· activities of 
I. o., prod.uoed the same result as an attempt to 
str!irigle the economic life of possible opponents 1 
enfeeJbl1ng their rlllsistance to the subsequent delivery 
of a hamtnel' blow designed to take maximmn advantage of 
the situation thus created. 'l'wenty years or more und<Oir 
the regime of a forceful economic pol1cy, not without 
1 ts sinister aspects prepared the ground by ~~eakem1ng 
us in the concentrated chemical warfare which emsu,-sd. 
\ 
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"The success of this policy maneuven?·sd U}'J into such 
a position th(ilt 11e barely esc&~ped def~.:H'd; under the 
halllllle:i' blows of (h>r!Jl.an dhemlcal aggrt~sslo:n. '!'his in 
fact applll<U''l to hav~l b•!l;m the Get'mlln COlfC~ption of 
modern Wl~r in 1 ts l:'!lla:tion to lndustr•y. 
I. G. w.a.s l:lltPong.sr at the oonclusio.t:l of the war 
than at lts start, and this is attributable to the?. proo.lgiotHl 
growth of prod.uct1on which O(lourred rJuri:ng the hostil1tii~S. 
concerns suff.er.~c1 &;ree.tly from tho loss of ,,1artime contt•acts, 
LiUt I. G. l<arben 1 s industrial power remained reht t1 vely 
of the Du l?ollt corumented on this slttntion in 1920, saying 
"(Hsarmament is a t'iiu•oe t;JhH& Gt'lrmsmy r·~tains organic 
chemical monopo11ea,n9 
He:11lng explor•3d the background let~d lug up to the 
merger of the Big S1.x .tn the chemical f.ield 1 attention :l.s 
now directed to :l.ts growth s:l.noe its formal .l.'!:J.Oorporation 
ln 192.5. I, G, 1s oper,'tti<ms and control of Gcn•many's oham:l.-
oal industries expanded rapidly from this date, By 1930, 
Sv. Lefebure, The H~ddle $!., th<a lihixw, quoted ill Borkin. 
and welsh, 2.!2.• cit., p, 29. 
9H};lar1ng!' 1 S);)eoial Conun1ttee Investj.uating th•e .li1u:g1t1ons 
J;ruil.usj:;J;'ii'Hi!; u. s, Senatiill,. ?3rd Congr~ss., fl<?.por·l; .(i9Lfl}, ql!Ot;i~d. 
1n 8o1•kin and Wdsh, ibid,, p, 32. 
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piil:'t l.@lly o~· oompli! t•.illy u;~ned tmd ormt.r~lll·~d sub·~· id ix:lt>.i.es, 
m.nd if the$fM3 ''1ere inolud·e~d, th:llse !'i~~u·f'e:o \!10Ul·:l. no aoulJt 
011:1 doutll·ed. 11 Ey 1931, I. G. had Y'llc>.OboJ <1 pb•:mot~h:Jt'lal 
ai:U\\ Wlth 1'77 ml:liUvidion~"' oover:l.lJ!~ r1, v;;u•i,~ty ::Jf f'1olds.l2 
It wa~ el;l:i,J.nnt:.\~d t..hut 'by l9J9, .:r. G, rmM; a p;u•ty 
to or th+i! actu.•~l lH'OmOt<i1r> or· s~veral hundr!lld lnL•n'net.iowl 
. 
-----
.... 
-- ... 
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founded in Germany and its operations represented the 
"aome of Pan-<lernlanism in the economic sphe~·e." lJ 
The products which Nere itWOlved 1n I. a. F1;l.I'bal1'S 
1nternat1oool eartj~l c~greemmnts r@ad like a \liho'<J l>lho of 
vi.tal commod.1t1<3S, Items fluch as phavmaceuticgl drugs, 
magnesium. synthetic vubb•'lt'; am.l pot2H3h, were all included 
in the family of r. G, 's c~;rtel.hl,~d. pPoducts, '.Che operation 
of' these cartels, !J\Ud their latent effects upon for¢18,11. 
countries should prove 1nterent1ng :reading to those who 
view eart,11S all solc::!ly economic ent1 ties • 
!, o. l?arben took the lead in setting up int,o;rnational 
cartels dealing in phar·!'~aceutical :produo ts, an .. 'i as a conse-
q,uenee its powillr r•eached millions of people in the far corners 
of the world. On;;; of the vital pl'otiuot;s which I. G. con-
trolled was atabr:l.ne, a cool-tar derivative used in the 
treatment ot malarta. Before I. G. deve~loped this synthetic 
quinl.ne, thr~ natural quinine :tn the world v;as ulkiii·nly in th<:l! 
hands of Dutch interl'iHtJts, because the Dutch huid political 
cc:mt.rol over Java wh•n•e tJ;w c:l.<lhona barkr from which quinine 
was extracted 1 was found. Al;abrlne was claimed superior 
to natural quinine beea,~tse of' its greatel" potency, I. o. 
Farben obtained. a patent on tj'l:l.s synthetic quinirull, and 
through the use of lic,:>nses limited the ,,mount that was 
product, vitally ne<J<ded by the Armed For(}es in the malar-ia• 
inf,Jsted regions of the South :Pacific. 
In the U.nit<'Jd States, only one company had a 
license t;o lnanuf'acturil Fl.tabr:l.ne Wldet• ·t;n\'l I, G. Farben 
sl.dim•y of St;erling Produc:ts, with ~>~hom I. G. had other 
daalingr;. Comm<U!t:l.:ng on the effect of' I, o, 1 s control 
over this vital <.lrug, Assists.nt Attorm>y Oeneral 
'rhurmtm !u:•nold, who 1nve ,; t;lg;l.t,~d the cartel !'i!J;re.,lll\ln'~• 
as head of th'<> Antitrust Div1s1ol1 of the Depa:rt;r:">l1t' of 
Justice stE:ted: 
"A single pa't~<emt controlled by I. G. !'lgr11en, dictated. 
the terms by which thls e~:sr;ential t'l.:rug could be manu-
fact~.tred in the United i:lto,tes. , •• 'l'Olil.ay the situ:c.tlon 
is safeg.<larded. by the seizure of tlv:; G:ll"m~;m rights by 
the Al1<m Property Cuatodi:m. But the sp•ectnc1e of' tho 
jH•oduction Of this <HHient:lo.l drug:; l•:Jft SO long; to the 
S•c;Cr(~t manipul~·,tion of a Ckn·uwn-Amoricnn combination 
durl.ng a period l·ih<lln Cl<~.rmany t~I"!S prepsu·ing fot• war. 
4 against us;, is t,oo shocking to !lli\Bd elaborra.t:lon .... 1 
l4'l'hur•man Arnold t Atl,cmtio r<Jonthly 1 Oo to her 191~2 • 
quoted. from 1b1(,,, P• 17;5. 
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:r, G •. ><lso took thiiii lead in Becuring patents on 
othor phar·mrul,3Utioal products niileded to cm·e the ills ·of · 
the worlds 1 afflicted. On€! stwh patent was secure<,'). on 
"Bayer ;,:05'' • "' modicinal formul~~ v;hi<)J:l w;~s a cure for 
sleeping slokn<::HH;;, so common in Africa in the 19th <cmd 
early pc.>Ft of the 20th COl"ltury. ~'his 'dlBcovery ~1as made 
.Leverku!iHm, G'!!t>rm;;uzy, shortly &lfter ene end of \•Jorlrl i4ar II. 
Th'l.a company W<'i\S one of the orli!;inal Big Six chemical 
compiAnies . which bad IDerged into !;, <h Parben <Hl a wartime 
me.t;,su~·e in 1916, The Gernwms refusecl to 1:1ivulge the 
formula for Bayer 205 0 i!lstel!ld they sought to exploit thc"l 
gl"e.t:•t value of· this >1i!!oovet>y by offel•in~ to exchange th>.:J 
iileoret process in re tttl•n fo:r- the l"®S tor<~ cion of Ger·many 1 s 
lost ooloni<:H> in Afx•ioa. J:hey were· t;hw<:u•ted ln their 
efforts by the AlLI.ed power•,;; •~hioh r<';lfused to con:;ider 
the exoh<mge.15 
'l'he. Alien Property Custodili!,l1S Office, 111 191', nuctionr'ld 
off one of th'il most import:c!n·t; pt•ewe.r• I. G. F'a1•her1 subsidie.r·ie:s 
-------------
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1n lilli'11X'ioa, i:.h'*-' E<li,Y1U' Colllpllllft of t{~w Xt;;rlt• to th~ b:l.;j:hest 
h1:.'\der. Thl~ H~<ywr int;\\jro.s.tf; in ,\\metiCI'lt inclut'U.n,g ll!eized 
t,l<!i!~>t. Virgln:\.fJl, 'l'nis QO'!!iJ?I.\\111 wboel(l) sol.$ 1nt!\lr~~~¥t \<Was in 
phnrroac,l\1!tiO~ll p~•oouot'~• prO!ilpU;~ ~~Old the d:fliHl.tufrs 
branch of 1tn ~c,::tu1s;it:il)!:l. to lllnother fir£~. 'I'hs mo!llt 
1'hA:1Ugb they had ~oqu.i.r~(l th0 f'ii,tlt to use this 
t:nademat•k 1n th!ll United Statii<S; thcH'iil l!iHMl! som~ queat1on 
K~S tO StiiJ:rlings 1 l'igtltt> to U$<!1 i:bl$ tli'!MiS!lliU'.K 1n othfJHI:' 
~~r!ltas of the wor'ld • lline!l>! th~~ O'IU¥'Oh~u•e did t:.ot oonfet· clear 
:rigj'Jts ~nr.i title>s to lllOOG! Of t'lli<f!3l:'t$ pNJp'i.'lrtUlt! in South 
Aw.erio~I~, aml in 'ii..'n~~J;l&><ltl. fSii!.ther tban e:nga,ge 1n lon;,:G l1t:t-
gat1on with th® Oex'illi!!U l'lay.,r, St•n•ltng; cox~cluded an Sii.J::I'&tll .. 
llllllnt wlth r. a. !>t>rb~n ln Ne1t York on Oc'tob,~· :.'!fJ1 1920.16 
'!.'hll\1 Ot~l't<)l agr,•em.a~nt provided tk><"i.t ooropetit1on 
betwe>Stn th&; twQ fia•ms 1n :•;;out;h Ar>\f<lt<1o•l wl:'ls co b~' ll!Umi.n?.>t\!>d.J 
th~ aoropw;l:l:Y with the oheap®st oo!it WM$ to 13\!pply tne Jll..'l.t•ket. 
--- ------ ---
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'l'ne agr.:;,ement gave the Gennan firm the whole South Amer·ican 
l!l:'l.dtett ·save for msp:l.t•in, wh:l.ch Sterling was to prov:l.de.l7 
'I'he pol:l.t:l.o~\.1 implications of ·this c?:trtel agreet1lent 
were brought to light t•f'ter G:"!l'lnany' s em trance into Vorld 
War II 1 when Sterling agreed. to mnre 1 ts <lu.bsidiary company, 
. agents in turn affix,~d I. n. labels on th••HJe pr•od.uots1 
ther<~by preserviru~ r. o. customer good-will <>Ylld serv:l.ng 
as a good. reminder of th'!l fact ttJc?.t G<l:r;Wl'~t.Y waB ostat-.sibly 
bei:ug clock,aded; but FJllill could SUw':IPlY ttl~ (lUstomers. 
As le,te as Novemb~u· 191H) 1 <lOCOrdi!l,!:!; to tesUmony given to 
a Congressional Committee, the p1•esl.ds:nt of ~ite:rling assured 
I. a. of the corttinunrice of his effort to protect I. G. 
interests in South Aillerioa.18 
'rh.is agreement nurtured otber politioal ef'f'eots 
~rbich pl'OVCd inimical to the interests or the United Natio.as 
in \>Jorld t<lar II. ~t'he provision that e:rltitled I. a. to have 
exclusive m£~rkets 1 in tbe great me.Jority or co!il~lodities in 
r.atin Amerioa 1 was an important mea.ns of "ext<JJnd ing Axis 
i.nfltv,moe th,O'Ire•''l9 In addition the sale of' products by 
17nork1n and il/elsh • .212• cit. 1 !h ll>O. 
18Ibi<J., t .lH llf2 • 
19•cart,~ls and Pr:i.vate Gove~·nment," :;t'ne CowmAAweal 
Vol.. XXXIX (FebrlliU:'y 2 5, 19L;I<·) p. 1~60 • 
AmericH-n conclir'ns ua:l.n,~ deceptive labels such as Sterling, 
provided ti'le S<Juroe of dollar balances for the German 
20 government. 
VI!, I, G., ALCOA AHD DO~J CH!l:NXCAL 
Havlng exam:l.J:J.ed. I, G, Farbe:.n 1s pharrnta(;eu';ical cartel 
opeX'atL,ns. we :noi'J tum to I, G, 1s rol<~ in the magnesiun1 
oartel, and examine its rela.tirn'lsh:l.ps w:l. th its American 
pa1•tners. The magnes.i.um cartel serve 61-s another example 
of the effect the Gernl'cl'll ca.1~tel system h£>.d upon the national 
defense :pot<mtial of foreign nati:.)ns. As !i?- eonsequ•'l>noe of 
both domes t 1c monoptJJ.y and interne tional om· tal at•range-
mants 1n this lnd.ustl:'Y, N'Lioh 1ndu:ced Germany 1s potential 
oompetitol"l!l to curb production• Germany secured an init.1al 
lead in the production of' magnesium. The l•&ad was so great. 
th!il-t I, a. remained substantially unchall~1!lged until 19Lfl. 
:Production estimates conducted hy the U. S, J:lureau of l'l1nes 
revealed that G<iirmany produced 61 percent of the world* l:l 
total outpt.tt of magr1esium in l9J?, and the Unit•sd States 
20 11 l?atents 
(February 14, 1944) 
Weapon of Monopoly,ft 
p. 7. 
--------------
prodt.taed only 10 percent. By 1940 Germany was still 
prorlu.o1ng one-half of th,~ world's output, ~Jhich the Un1t;ed 
Stated \1RS producing IDJ:;!out llt.%.21 
l'lagneS1um is one of the most importm~t metals used 
in 1ndustriul production both in tlma of oeace and war. 
- - ' . 
lfhen this metal is p1•operly alloyed, it oan fulfill m%Uly 
of the :!\motions of AluminW'!l '"i th grea.ter efficiency, since 
it is lighter, has g;pos;tor ras1l1emcy and has gr-eater 
strength. Among its military usr:!cS bU'e airor~1ft construction, 
incendiary bombs and flares, 'rhe two principal producers 
of magnesium 1n the United States during the years 1919-1927 1 
Company, a subsidiary of the Aluminum Collll:<~"·!lY of America, 
In 1927 the two oompani<'lls entered into a, cross lioensing 
agreement, under which the Ametr'ioan Magnesium company stopped 
1 ts production of crude mag;nesiuro, arranging to buy what 
1t needed. from Dow.22 
In 19:)1 1 !. G,. Fl!'.rben, the p:rinctpal p:ro:J.ucer of 
magnesium in Germany entered ir;to an agreement w1 th the 
Aluminum cernpany of America knOWl'l as the Alig agreement. 
"./ 
--------
.21Berge 1 .2l2.t., .!U.t...1 p. 22C, 
22w~xner1 .2l2.t.. 5!J.L.. P• 2)1 
----------
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7r'5' 
'l'his agreement called :f'ot• a pooling of p<J.teuts ~md technical 
addition, the o.mtrrtct called :t'o1• ·the establishnlent of .._ 
Joint corporation. the !~agnes:l.um .Developn;.ent Corn:,lany, ~tith 
ownership equally divided bet~"i'een Alcoa and :r. o. 'l'he · 
Magnesium Development Corporation was primarly a patent 
holding corporation t;o wh1oli I .• 0, transfii>rred s.ome 
fabrioatior. patents and Alcoa cc.,ntributed process patents. 
I. G. and. Alcoa were to share equl!!lllY in the b.onefits 
from this agreement, but in r•eal1ty I. c. was the primary 
beme'fio1ary. By the control ot pel.ten&a and. technoloa,<;y turned 
over to the Hagneaium Development Co••poraM.on, :r. o. limit!ild 
the use of these p1•ocesses 111 the Un1 ted States, and excluded 
Alcoa and other pote:ut.it{l American licenoees from foreign 
mal:'kets.. 'I'he con~raet also limited. magnesiulli prod!,ict1on 
in the United States to 4000 tons a year if US\il was made of 
the produot;ion patents • 23 
compmay in tbe Un.l.ted States entered into "' p8.tent holding 
agr$ement tdth Nagnesium Development Oorporll,t1on in 
January 1934.24 Th1s was followed by a sales contract 
23Berg$, ~ ~. p. 222. 
24aork1n and Welsh, oo. e1t. 1 P• 229, 
-----------
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contract a m<;<X.l.!l1Um capaci i;y of 6000 tons 111 ye1u• was put; 
o.n Do~; 1 s otttput, :::nd. t;h1s restriction wa.s still in effect 
in 19/.fO • 111hen Gc,rman pro<iuction of mag;nesium vtas estimated 
at 60,000 to 75,000 tons, or ovar ten M.mes ~he C<>pacity 
of Anwrican indus try. 2 5 
77 
to I, G;. more> than J 1Doo,ooo pounds of m21gnes1um ot~b of 
' <?{!. 
l:iCWl 1 8 t.otal p~'Oi.luo~ion of slightly !llOr''i' th'''.n I.;,GOO,O\JO,'" 
'.Phe Pe sul t of 
imports from GermMy; •~hil<'l inrpor'~lng only 186 tons from 
the United Statli:la, 27 
' 
effort;. BlllC6 it l'i~I.S abX'lAptl,'f CQi:; Offo it tllSO h::mdloa_pped 
2' 
· OFJerge, .2.!2• Qij;,, p. 22J, 
2 fsot?Hn ,:;ul.O Welab, Q!..?.. clt. 1 
28Berge, !m• .QJJ;.., p. 22tf, 
7,8; 
' ' 
magnesium pl'Oiiuce.c1 in i\rncrice., ths gres;ter th~ military 
t "' ~ q 'l'' ' d ... i '' n 9 9 st:reng ·," o, ,,;e ~n ... r·. lie 0<1• .. 
to cases <~uch as this which led 1'hur!Jt1im Arnold to eomment 1 
·~Jh,~n Hitler canH~ to power, he fOii,lld the oo;,r·telized 
·society of' the democracies a ready inetrument :f'or 
'~conomlc aggresBion. He assist:1d En¥1 encouragad the 
mc:mopoh :~t"' in demo<:H'G.t:l.c (H)Untri•'.HJ to r~>etrict their 
O<>~n production in Gr~rmany, he played on th®lr fear of 
surplus produol;;1on 1 their desi:r'~ to hold up !:heir 
prices and st;abl.lize1 their corrtrol, ••• Hitler ctoubled 
,,.._ __ ..,...,~-· 
.Q!l.• c:l,t., JJ, 217 • 
?9 
~) ~.H:ld, t;.r'l g>l !:'!.1 tb-':.: orcxiuo t1 on of r;~lu_m1num Sl.n.d wr&gl19S1um 
t~b 11~ thl!l dli!lllOOl"'~O lG S S toodl S l.iillt f<U<i h~ OP''U'£'! C<l!\1. 
;?:Llffi ilt:Yr·'ly th:rcn .. tth a 1 Ct.Uf~; llt1 t o.f b~i;a 1-o ma t-:i1t' liitlS. u JO 
30·rnurm&n Arnold• ~Row C~u··t~b Aft•11ot You. • !}l!i&#'~Siltl 
i:li!fSUrY't Vol •. !.Vl (l'l!'d:•oh 1943) P• )29, 
-------------
out of the oil busin<!?ss, while StandA.rd 1~as to :r·efrmin 
from chemical undertakillgS not rri!lated directly to petro-
leum, g:his idea ~>me embodied in the Division of' Fields 
ngre·o;ment between the t;~o firms, A 'second part of the 
compact provided !'or thrs transfel' to a jointly o1med 
compRny, Stf!.ndard - I • G,, rights h1 the hydrogenation 
pl:'oGess i.n all countries. with thrs exception of Germany. 
h. third document of the ag!:'eement prov:!.ded for ooorrUnation 
in r<~spec.t to perlpher•al oa1.1es betl'Jeen the oil e:u:trl cherfilcal 
fields, when<llver trle t;1o overlappe•:l. The fouJ•th pa1•t of 
th<9 a.g:rsement, cal1'3d. th'~ German sales a.greement, prQvided 
for 1;he fixing of !!!hares of the respectiv'" Jlarties in the 
G"!<l'!llan m!>.rke t for pe trol,'lttm produo ts. :31 
In 1930 1 tr,e two companies !.'loncluded an agreement, 
r·ri th the intent of implementing the aforementioned Division 
of' F'ields Agrr,•sments, !mown as the J·asco Agreement (Joint 
Allli~rican Study Company), r,;tipulaLing tli<•t ~1hr:m ei th•sr pa.1·ty 
developed s.n;r 11ew ch~mleE~l process 1t should of'i"."'r the 
ot:h·?r an option to have r•:tghts in the process aJH~igned t;o 
&, jointly owned companyt J<"'sco, Inc. ,Jasco was 'to ms.l!;e 
experimentations on mm processes t:tnd to f.'unction as a 
----------
liac:ma i:ng <J.grilnoy for the, explol t~ttion of p<Ol tents on 
p<:·o:nisiug new oheruioul pr'ocesses. 32 
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Under the Division of Fields agreement betwe~n 
StfJ.nila.rd and r. a. • th<l developrnent of :>yelthetio ru.bb0r 
was assigned to 1. G., sinca ~lle processes used ·in 
its composition lver<l in the oh31mical rathGr than the 
petroleum 0.•<>10.. Hesea:roh on 1 ts development was carr•ied 
out by both, however, sino<> Stc;.ndar.d ·regH1•ded synthetic 
rklbber d•"velopmr<lnt as coming within th;~ purvi1'iilW of' tho 
Jas(>O AgreerMmt, o.<;ali:!'l!:\ '":l.'<;ll joint dev.;;lopm<Snt of border-
line cases. I. G. as early o.Hs 19}2 had developed a 
tiyut.hetic rubber, oJSlslgmil.ted as Buna hubber· 1 but did not 
give its formula to Jasco till ••fter tho start of the 
ll!iH'.lond world W<U' in l9J9 1 d.espite the fact it had Oeen in 
t\tll scale P>'oduotion in Germany 11ince 1934.3:3 
I. 0:. 'ivl!U> able to prevenc Starldctrd Oil from com-
mUting; itself to a polliit.ive program of synt.!1e tic Pubb'Jlr 
d~evelopmenc d.uring th>:se five years by wl.thhold.in£:, the 
t0obnology il posrs,~sBJed on the process. As early as 19).5, 
)2.~ •• p. 9.5· 
JJ !big, •• p. 97. 
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E3tandard realized t'hat I-. c-. was not com:)lyi:ng Nith its 
In tht:J words of' an official of StandHrd 011: 
"TIH;) Hitl<H' gov•ernnHant docs not look v>.l. th r."',vor upon turn• 
m!'leerial and d.oc:llt1.er1 to civc permission to I, a. to 
S tand!trd 011 r-0c~ 1 ved lit tl<:, if ar,y, inf orlll'J. Uon on 
synth·et.l.c :rubbe.1~ f1•om I. o, 'rhis tact is made clear in 
nou:r pfE!Opl&~ have .u,:;ver macTe r~:!.una ••• !. G. has 
not furnished anyone tEIOhnleal information." 
·"The only information our people have is derived 
from publ iBhod patents •" 
"Inform.·~ tion • , • about the:o tecl:mioal i!tSp8cts 
of' this development has .not been forthcoming as 
a reHul·t of t.hc~ G~::rmmn ¢;v·vet~n.lm~n't ts r·,~~f;Ar:~nl btS<'C~-:;use 
of mili tH:t'" '"""''~dier.toy to pel'!!l1t I. a. to reveal su.oh ~ y J~ lnform;::~ft1on to D.:nyon3 outside Germany_. tr ::; 
J/j,"'"'"'I' t•l"''' .::-~·~nJ."l .. ~0"''"'•1t'""'" I'·,, •... , •.• t'• i· i·•·>t'' n'" ... ,,, '•la•·l ~··1••1 u '-"' _.,. - ~ -f:/*' J >.J~l~"y u, V -~ t..v·.... "' v ·_.- ~ ~·, f;:~'l} .J. 1~, VI-~..., J.·"'" t,.~ . .,1,n, -u 
Def;anse Program," U. 8. Senate, 77th Con;,;ren~· 1 2nd Se!imlon, 
19142 • quoted in 1Jorl!in and. \ielsh, .QU. £J,.;t., p, 193. 
35uergG, .QU. oi!.;., p, 21J 
-- ----------------
i 
took this eventual:!. ty into account 1 
"BotJ::, parties !'>ftY.'''e that in event of 811 attack 
by a third party 'prought against eithe.r of them 
directly or 1ndir·eotly, in attempt<.ld dercgation 
of' the title to patent rights transf,&t'r(l(i, hl!lre~ 
under, they w11:,1 coop•;rate loy1i\lly in defense Of 
such attcHll< • .,:;;~ 
T'\10 American companies attacked thlll I>tatomt r•i,'!:hts on Bul.'WI; 
the Goodrich and Goodyee.r Rubber Oomp•lnies attempted 'l:~he 
production of Bumi, but the former was sued. for patE~mt 
infringement and the lattea' fo:r·mally thra~C~·t.ened with su:i,t 
by the Standard. Oil Company under the I. a. patilnts. 
These events took pla.oa just t~;o m<)nths before Pear·l Harbor 
in October 19111. 37 
X. STANDARD GIVES BU'l'YL HUB.B'i:R INFOaMA'l:'ION TO I • G • 
Despite I. a. 1s refusal to divulge the \2u:rJa 
prooess~s to Jasco, Stal'ld;cn•d 011 deoided to give its own 
knoY.rledge of butyl r·ubber, a :Standard 011 :sy<ttl!letio rubber 
disoov,~ry 1 to I, a. This type of synthetic rubbel:' could 
be me.d.e more easily and cheaply, but WliJS uot a a good for 
to I. G. full iufonllat.l.ort on its 0.1soov,n·y. 
36tiei!lk"lnn, im• w., 9• 54. 
J7t:;e:rge. ~· cit., p. 212. 
--·-~-.-.. -
o<::mii!:1dorat1ons pror11pt~d this mov~. In th•:> words of a 
,$ tand~li'd of r ie ial, 
84, 
"• , • , ()ll'll~'ta1n •:U.ffloulti<lli$ st1.ll l!ll'l.:i,st whloh 
prevliiltit our• I. t:?, ft•i,"'ndr~ :rrom ~&1vinz, UfJ fu:U t:;$Obn1o~J.l 
1nfm•mt1tion , • • • In vi,J:tw or thi.~ vc,rr·y i::!"'•tu1m~ spirit 
of' coopii!'i'\i>tl<.~l:'l. wbiell (I. o.) ~,t1Ja:playe<1, I !l\111 cot1vitlO\lld 
that it 11'1 not only <;ho l'ight thit~jjt to de!, out tkl~ nry 
best thinl)!: from »Vlilry !rt<>mpo1nt to pg$ll O<'l to theill 
full infOl'!Jlll\ t:l.O!l O:Q. thl.ll C~1po!yrna:t' { 2X<t;j{ 1) l~,t tb 1$ tillite • 
l do not b<r~:Ueve w<:~ htlvo anythb'll}; to l0$\1! l:ly this which 
ls oompm-nbl® with tht' pO!HollOl~ ben:" fl. t to <•ll o.f OW" lnter~;sts. • )8 
>Hth thf;J ootorl/llali:: of Wf.U' in !~urop·!l, I. a·., realizing 
1-h!i'\t 1t c:::>uld no lo11ger P:t'IIIV>:l:l:lt thiil Ql>"' of l. a. ptittel'.lt 
::iitaoo~Ar>d w<Hl t'J?ee to llc'iiinae oolll.~m1'"s ~Xnd&r thv~ !, o. 
;?at!:l'Utl\1 to IThtl.Ate EIUU!.'\ in tb:C1 Unit®d iit:~,lMH., tlve Clrltl!llh 
t'i$1lt to tiT(;) p:roel!!l~>i>li'!li!J in the l''-'ittll~~indet' or th•~> world. 
In exoi:!anj\\ilil foi' th11i1, I .• o. w1.1.s to :reoe.tv"~ OOllSidsvation 
in tWil fo:l:'m of a hio/;h N:>y:;1lty t"$.te fNY.ll 'i:i.ll 11o>:Jn<Je..i f1ll'!ll~ 
X!, ¥/OHLD WAH I! AND '.rHE: HUBBl~H SHORTA.ClE 
•3'l'ANDAHJ) STANDS ACC!JS!IlD 
\41th tbe entrance of the United States into Horld 
il'ar II, and the na tul'(i~l rubber supply out off by .Japanese 
couquesta in Asia, the probbm of producin;~ suff'icient 
synthetic rubber c''H:ne to the fore and became the source of 
con.siderable controversy. Standard OU and its cartel 
agreement found itself blamec1 for the U. S. rubber short• 
age. The position Standard found it~;elf ln arose from 
~he fact that it never considered the political impli-
cations of i·ts c;;-u•tel agreement. The Nazis, the public 
now lmt~w 1 \{ere using synthetic for at hJH!lSt <:me-third of 
the 1r rubber needs. Much of th,3 might of the h'e.rmacht 
was at.tr1butable to synthetic rubber, It was, • on !:.luna 
tires that pa.n21er dl.Vi$1~(:1 rolled through Northern France 
. ' .. • 
and the lOl1fl&ndlil, ~4o With the disclosure of these facts, 
Stands.rd stood accused of being a 1!1\;\lPable party to the 
rubber short~1ge among the United Nations, 
Sanf..tor Harry s. Trtiman, the head of a Senate 
Committee investigating th<> Th!'ltional defenl1!<~ proe:;l:'o.m in 
1SIIt<? 1 had even l1lhouted •treason" when the !!'elationships 
1+0Fleming MacLaesch and Cushm<m Reynolds, Strategy 
of th§! Am.:or1cas, p, 20. 
-- ----------------
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between Standard and l. G, were being 1nvest1gnted, 41 
Before this same Senate Committee, Assistant Attorney 
General Arnold hurled numerous charges against the con-
duct of' Standard and its rele.t1ons ~~i th :t. o. President 
William S, l~ariah of Ste.ndard Oil gave a11swer to the 
_accusations; a brief resume' of the charges and r'~buttals 
wakes 1nter•llstiw.J: r'lla<Ung: 
Arnold.: "ihK!ex• the oart~!l bet>1€l<'l\ll Ste.nda:rd and r.a., 
Gertl1111.ny got tha benef'lts ot the u. :3, tl01clmoloic:l.cal 
'•"' developments; 1:h?J u. ~). did 11ot get. Clerm~J;nys." 
Farish: "'fhe o~u·tel gave the United States :l.ts BtmEI 
Jmov;ledg;e among other thluge," 
Arnold: "Stat:ldard. delay·~d the use of auna rubb•!lr :tn 
this country beoaus<ll the Hitl,~:r gov,'!lrrun<mt did not 
Nish to hf<Ve this rubber· exploited here for military 
reasons •. • 
f!'arish: "Nobody from Standard 011 to Jessie Jones wanted 
to exploit; synthetic rubber at 20 to 40 cents a pound, 
E:'lltcept for m:tnox· specialty p1•od.uct;s, as long as natur•al 
rubber was available at 15 cents <~ pound," 
lirnold; •t~hen Standard 911 developed a new synthetic 
rubbet· called butyl• it turned its process over to 
:t. a. Farben, a1ld refused to g:l.ve :l.t to the U. s, 
Navy." 
:il'l>rish: "Butyl was no good to Germany because it ls 
made of oil and oil is H:l. tler 1 s great laolt, !n 1939 
the company gave samples to the l'iunitlons Boord which 
turned them over to several companies for exper:l.ments. 
Though che&.per th].l;n Bun.a, they decided thst butyl 
was not as good.n+2 
41 "D1mter lJ'WJ,e T:re{lsQn," ~~ Vol. XXXIX 
(April 6 1 1942) p, 15. 
L>2rb1g_. 
- -----------
Upon the conclusion of. the aoousa:cions ::J.nd artswers, up 
spoke Senator 'l'ruman, the head of the Committee, stat>1ng 
th""' t "even after we were in che war· Sta11dard 011 of 
}lew Jersey was putting forth every effort to p!~oteot; the 
. 43 
control of tno Gh~rJrJan goverl'l!llant, over a vital war nu:~terial .• 
To eompanias such 'llil Standard 011 of Ne1.,- Jersey, 
~rho ~<er0 squirming under the goverx.unents inference that 
they had 'been dupes of the Nazis, Attorney General Arnold 
offered consent; decrees. Standard of' N, J, accepted ttw 
decree in 191+2, and was fl.ned :~50,000~ As a result it 
formally terminated its r<,;la tions vii th I.. G, Farberl <iurins; 
the war. Synthetic rubber patents held jointly with 
I. G, Farben 1•1ere, by t;erms of' the d®oree, made available 
IJ,4 in the United States on a royal ty-f'ree biM~is. 
l1'ollow1.ng the filing of' consent decrees by Standard 
Oil, and subm1tt1ng to the provisions of' the decree, 
Standar•d Oil of N. J, bought full-page advertisements in 
newspapers all over the country in an attempt to explain 
its relationships with I, G •. Farbeu, In these advertise-
ments Standard publicized its claim that the. United. States 
l~Jibid. 
lf4"P•.:mding on Patents," Bus+nes§ ~. Vol. DCLX, 
(April 22, 1942) p. 20 -- -------------
had benef'1 ted from the Far ben arrangem<<'lnt because Standard 
bad received much more technical ~.nformation from I. G. 
than they h.9.d given I. G. in x-eturn, Eh:lO£tuse under the 
agreements much of tlle basic reusectrch •~<as to be conduoted 
/;,« in G\?rlila..'l.;{, this claim was true to some extent. -' 
When copies of tho :>tandard ':lll :;;,dve:rtlsements came 
to the attention of tb'..;, German Economic l'linistry, the 
Nin1stry denimlded a full report from I. G. F'arben on the 
chs;rge trJat Standard had the better of' the exchange. 
Fol1o111ing the· t<iar, from the files of I. G. Farben, the 
amma:r to the Economic ~11nistry on this matter was found. 
'rhe con\:,~ntion of the ll'arben report was that the G(~rman 
firm had received from Standard Oil several important 
new.links in ths!r own chain of technology, whereas the 
os tansibly gre>7\C quantities of inforw.lt:l.c:>l'l. they had 
revealed to the American firm had left extensive gaps to 
be t'11led by n;.3w research and developm~mt be.fore they 
11.6 
could be ut:l.lized. 
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I. G. l'larben and its cartel agre.eme:nts were as 
su0cessful in pene·t:vating oth<:r areas o.t' Am•JH"ioan tn<lustry 
as it did the petroleum field.. One of its !!lain interests 
l..n the United States was the General Aniline Works. l'hls 
company was part of Amerl.O(ll.n I. G. • !>lhioh had been organized 
by I. G. Farben in Switzerland in 1928, aud later had its 
holdings transferred to the United States. General i!niline 
Works and its parent company, American !. a., Nare engaged 
in the dyestuffs and pharmaceutical business in the Unlt·,,d 
.States. In December 19)9, American I. o. ~m.s reorgm<ized 
to some degree, .and its name was ehanged to Genl.'lral An1li11e 
h? and F'llm Company. 
To every charge that it was a German-owned company, 
General Anlline and Film Company officials replied tha:t it 
was Swiss ONned., · ~lhen other I. G. Farben agencies ~1ere 
unable to g;et supplies in the Elri tish Empire and in thl) 
blockade of the South American market, General Aniline 
and Film p:rov ided the necessary !!ll>t.er1als. General lmiline 
20 
and Film l'las I. G. l'i'arben 1 <~ biggest enterprise in the 
of Germany 1 s i.mptorial pow.er in North a.nd South American 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals ;>.nd other mat,srials, • 48 
The combin·<~d inv0stlge.tive po~1ers of the United States 
government W3.S unable, even as late as 191+9, to p1·ove the 
Germll\n ovmership of General Aniline and l!'llrn Corporation. 49 
I. G. F'ar•ben had other cartel connections in the 
United States. Among the more important ones, was its 
aggr(~em<mt ~11. t;h tl'!Eil Du Pont Chelllical Compa.ny 1 ~~>nd one of 
Du Ponti s subs1d1ar1as, t.ha il,;mington A1·m~ Cotnp,~n~·. As 
late as th~' winter of l9i>l, Du Pont was prevented by its 
car•tc~l agree:nent with I. G. to sell certain types of 
mati!>rial to Great Bz•itain, rr~a·cer1al vitally needed in the 
defense of that country. When GreH:~·t; Britain in 1941 
attiJmpted to place an order for tetrazen.e-primed amm1mitlon, 
the CP,rtel agreement bet11een Du Pout and I. G. prevented 
the sale. In this :particulat' case, tl'le pat®.ut attorney 
for the flemington Arms Company wrote a memorandum stating 
that, "The fu.rther sale of tetraz;ene-prl.med ammunition to 
48r, !<'• Stone. "The Cartels' l•laahlngton Friends," 
'rhe Natigu, Vol. CLVIII {February 19, 1944) p, 210, 
1
"9r•1artin, .saB· cit., p. 67. 
!ilbrond • •~alii thf> ae;r<Hillllf.iint b$tw~aan tr.\ttt firm euil t.ne 
Dilll'llond i1acoh Company of th~ United Stat.a"'. 'l'he <!affect 
of oerta1n type<r of' ammunition, dur1.1lJ tile two d$Oadeg 
prreoe,.ding \·h:>rld >J<u• II. '.t'blii: result<> of th~;~ a.groHitm,;.mt 
w~re ;a grlW<l shortage ot' ohlorat<J of potash for military 
Jillll');lOSOI'I fll'J.G. r.;:;, toh pl"Od.UC t1on dur•ing Wot•ld 'liar Il. :_)l 
CO<•>P!lnier. sou,sht th® e~llllf w&y out in Ul'* 'b$lttl'" f<>r world 
IDf'il'kO.t~t. ry,'hasa l.J. S~ ,!"trlll!B 1 it W!iHI $f;lili, h1Ml "l:la.~·t,!et~.:l.~~ 
)013et•ge, .rul.• cit., p •. 217 
.5libid • • P• 186. 
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or the arteries." 'rn.,y were no longer aggressive alJd 
would rather enter an agreement providing for a protect1!!d 
marlwt tharl fight for an ever inere'·'aing share of it. 
Anti-trust officials of the Department; of Justice cited 
cases where powerful American chemical companies had. been 
reluct;an·~ to enter Latin Ameriot:tn l!!(;,l."J(E~ts pt•otected by 
cartels in pre~>~a.r days in the fear that aft;:ot• the ~>~Eir 
I. G, JJ'erben might retall.ate,52 
XUI , I. G. F '>HBfN B.OLE 
was the Imperial Chemical Industries, LM. Unlike I, c:~. 's 
dealin~s with Amr:n•ioan f'irm~1. those conducted ~<ith British 
ent<ll:rprir>es were all aboveboard• since there were no an.ti-
trust laws to hinder their cartel agreement, I. G. and 
Imperial Chemical Industries eltminated what m,.,rket rivalry 
remained in the dyestuffs trade in 1938 by the establishment 
of a jointly owned corporation. Trafford Che!llicals 1 Ltd., 
to manufacture certain dyestuff's in ·a:ngland. :!'his cooper-
ation by O/llrtel agreem<mt was being negotla.ted at a time 
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from ec;.r·U.et' denl1n.e;s in nltt•ogell ana n.itr·o~enou<> fert.i-
llz<>rs, nlk<~Uea~t &ud e"plcm1ves. Like t;he l!llajC>r1ty <:Jf 
Of :':!\\Stern B;Ul'Opill thr'OLJ{j;b the O!lll'!.Hlll ar:;•:::;n,;;cm.¢lltS 1 t 
poss<;sed in th 'c I'4ak;;ion. Through tik'1 usi\1 or the cartel 
I. G. ~qas ai?le to exe••cis<> oonr. idel';'!bl·" lai'lu<~noi\!1 Oc'llllr 
·me pw•pos.a bG~hind this p~~tl'lation of !J,alJ(G,n isl!~uztri~s 
was to impl&ment a oontin(!)l:lt!al eoonoo1y pl<\lln, {Cf'Q•1jm·aumivert~ 
sohi!ift) ~;hleh requil'>ii!!d th® flall!:a.n rlfl.tiona to f\1mieh 
rnineral.s 111 return for which they were to receive from 
c<elldtic£->ls, and cosmetics, :ll1 i>.Jil.ltion to machinery and 
technological t~.nd 0ngineerit1g services • .54 
I. G. Parben 11ent beyond th<:J more prosaic functions 
organization of oil~seed prodUction in Humania .and 
Bulgar•ia. r. a. ,offered soed.n to tlle farmers of Bulgaria, 
to buy the entire crop at pre:3.rrangod prices. voM.ch were 
at times above !#he woJ:>ld mc;rkmt prices. l'brough furl1ishl.ng 
technical advice\!' se.ed.s, f•c~rti.lizero am: inst~ctic1des 1 
.I. G. was able to expand itt~ marl>tet, and by setting; up a 
oil-seed prod.uc ti.o:n exclusively to Grorm~?.ny. 'rhia t>li\S a 
typ:l.c.~<l CE\Se of I. G. 1 s economic p•ene tr:rttion l.n tlhcw 
intel'nal economy of foreign ootmtrl.ea, somewhat similar 
.54Karl Fall(, "German Industrial Octopus," 
Cy,:rrent llistory, III 1 (Nov. l9L>2) p. 215. 
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to t;h<} prc,s(;mt ?oint li'OW' i'rQgl'O.tu1 c.xcept the objectives 
Vll!H'e leas lllF.Ignl'.nlimou&. 55 
In t.lle :l.nduatl.':iJil,l field, r. o. tool( fldVIi'I:Ut&.(iil<li! of 
~~· aumanir:m lt•w of l9J6 wh1Qh gr'«Hlt<ld ~:, procect.\.ve monopolY 
for n limited p~:r1oo of tlme to 1ndul'Jtr1sll <llntar*'~'iiM>s 
not priljviou~;ly foun;i.i in tb'~ c;:omttry. ln August, 1937, 
I. G. Pal'ben aoqulr,>d~ <:~s a t•esult of' the l;<m 1 th;i~ :r. ,:;. A. 
(!,lba} f~wtory 111 Buohtar•c:st to lllll>YlUfactuJ."~~ ~:milin dyas 
' <::1) 
•\nd ~~.~~s cii;:;le to ex:olud+l <all oOtll)!hli'ti tox·m in tn.illl >.u·r~''• ·" · 
55I. '""'11rrll • . ""l ~q. P• c;.~ • 
56rt1d. p, ~:2o. 
of ~~x·l.t(:tr'il in. thiir I!!!Rtter. I. o. Parl::J,'l>:!l B!'\(J<Jld be deelgn'i<ti'ld 
l'i\E~ en "''~oopol :1. t :l.oa.l" ot•~,;e,n1;::161 t1o!a, t'S~.tf~·nt• tll!'.m sol~olY a a 
97 
It was stated before the TemporJ<:·u·y Nat:l.ont>l Economic 
Committee in 191.>2 1 that the "oolos:sal rc>mificationsn of 
type of study. Joseph IJ.orkin and Charles A, \ielsh had tbe 
following statement to make about the extent ana ramifi-
cationu of I, G, 1s operat:l.ons in their book dealing with 
"It is probable thet t even aftiJl' th«l prot•raoted. 1nves-
t:l.ga.t:l.ons by studentel. and by goven"'l!ment which have been 
tal~en :l.n t'E~cent years not all of l. G, 1 s linl<s to 
American industry or to South Amex•io .. \lln markets have 
been brought to light, It is even more certain th>lt all 
its l"<olat:i·?nsbipol outslrle this h>1Hll1sphere hav111 not bt1e:n 
disclosed. • , • 'I'h.~> t>lirm!i "monopoly ,\f\l1d (%U'tel" are 
1mtdequate when applied. to I.· Cl. It is an agglr.)mer-
ation of roono\)olles and an aggregr.ticm of cax·tels< • • , 
Perhaps by compounding the idetct of un:tversc,ll ty and 
a.bsolute cotttrqS a tertn such as "panopoly" ~1ottld b.e 
!l)Q.l1<9, f'Jt,tiJ:tt);, II 5 J 
~ltnlator Ha.rle;y K:l.lgore, who was the Chairman of the Senate 
NUitary Affai1•a Committee, >~hich dealt \»>ith tM technical 
problems involved in th•9 war mobili:<:l!itt1on of the United 
/il.rll'l of thf' ea:rbels. Both WOl'k<ld toga ~her in easy !1;!).rmony 
for the domina cion o:f the 1cyorld iliconomicH>lly and· polHically, 5'? 
58sork1n and l~elsh, .Qll,. ill• • p. 33. 
5S\iarley Kilgore, "'l'he Me:naoe of the Blook Ince~~:l.on-
al," Natio s;~ont:l.ol;} Asaooiati,on JotarMl, Vol. XXXIII, 
(April 191-> } P• 9. 
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Though the majority of evid.enee condemns I. G., SIS 
the economic arm of the Nazi gov()rnment • some reports 
indicate that th•D obeisance of r. G. off:\.oiall;; to the plans 
of the state was not achieved ~~ithout some protest on their 
part• The "For(~lgn Policy ttel'ol"ts" fol:' October 1944• stated: 
"It ms,y be noted. that in the o<<Se of I • G. J:7aroen-
. i110..ustrie th~r<e was reluctance on the part of th1;; fox·mer 
(iireotors to adhere to the requi!'·ements imposed by the 
!Utler re;;;;im<JJ• ,'lad t;hey are kno~m to have appealed to 
their forei-gn partners ill an att<~mpt to halt the process, 
necoJ.•ds indiO!!'ite that thoy !'•SHl;\.,;te\9. for a time at least. 
the increased davelopluent of some synthetic industr•i'l!s 
w1 thin Gs:<•man;v - development:~ 111hich !lppeared uneconomic 
to ·the original m,<J\nagement. • oO 
Eoonomic objectives may have been the intel'lt of' the ellirly 
directors, but these obj&otivr:ls were perempto!'ily mod•ified 
Despite this nugatory reslsta110e orrered by some 
dil•ectors of I. G., th<l firm hand of ·the state was disC•i>l'r.t-
ible in tho structure or the organization. An example of 
This plan was init;h<ted 'by I. G. in 19!~2: ,d.th the 
esta.bllshment of the Fluszpatwerke G. m. b, B., with 
capital totalling 800 1 000 :reiahmarlt!!, t;o mine end manu-
facture fluorspor end otbex· fil:~Ol:lt8.es used in m<tking such 
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items as optical ~>lass,. steel and alUlllinum. This new 
company had as its obJactive the dav'i!!lopment of :f'luorspor 
deposits in ae:vmruzy 1 and 1n other Eu1•opean cOUlitr:l.es as 
well as •oversl\l'as ter:rlcori<Hl belon,;ing to continental 
states."6l 
The political and economic effects of. ·chc intrilr-
national o;;u•tal oper·ations of I. G. r'arban induwtries upon 
v~u·ious nations have been briefly ci>~scribed. The writer 
will return to the dest;inies of I. G. Farban in the. post* 
war period in a 1-"Lter chapter. 
CHAP'l'EH VIII 
GERl~MiY 13 CliHT!liL SYST'i:M A.."'D ITS POLITICAL AND BCONOl'iiC 
BFF'i:':CT UPOl\T INDUS'EE.l!ilS AND G01lEHNi'lE~~TS ABHOJW 
Cartels have acqu.lred their nefarious reputation, 
p:ilrti.cularly in the United States • bE!leause they are assoo1-
a ted with the economic aggression of German totc1li t~trii!Ul• 
ism., Chsrmany 1 s r'aaor<l of mil:l. tar.•isin and stggression has 
not helped the reput;atio:n of cartel.s, ~lhic'h ttHl popular 
mind invariably associates with Garlll~tllY. :rnvest1gat16ns 
relating to the effects of cartel agreements between 
Qerm!ID. and ilmerioan firms upon ·the Nationill.l Defense pre .. 
paratio:ns of the United States have further ser•vad. to 
denigrate inti~l"¥J&t1onal cartels in the l!merioa:n mind• · 
Inability to.disassoeiate cartel policies from 
German aggression 11!3 not only i>t'ue of the average person, 
bu.t also of the studellts of cartels, A survey of the 
writings of the cartel system reveals that most writers 
oC'!\Id.emn the system for its $usoeptab1Uty to misuse by 
th'"' totalitarian govemiment"• 'l'he 1ntsm!il.tiot!al o~'ll:"tel 
syst<em is not a har•mfUl system ~ .!ll.§., but in its 
structu.rra and proced~.<res lies t;he nuol,~us 1'1h1ch Cl'\rt ~~ive 
lOl 
fruition to totalitarianism and militarism. This relation-
ship between total:l.t<.u•ian:l.sm and cartels ~mn aptly st1:1.ted 
by Hendell Berge 1:n hi.s t4r•it:l.ngs on cal't>els, He said: 
"'rot ali t<lrianilsm repr<Hients simply thEil ul timal;e 
commmma tion of cart(;;l:l.sm - the fil>f"l.l, full exprelilsion 
of th•3 re2ot1ont~.ry forces stemming from s:peoi.al privi-
lege. !n tcrcal:l.tarian st<tl>es all indur;trinl <:Jntm·pris.;~ 
is subservient to the predatory intere,sts and fear 
dom:l.natod '11111 ot' a govel'l'llllent which op•i!nly flouts the 
demool'atic principle of tll(> aons<mt of the gov el'ned. 11l 
century lt~d another writer· to 0omment thftt "it is history 
that the. cartel syat<~m is always ripe, with the passivity 
of a trollop, for the >1ot•st uses of nationn.listio P<'.ss1on." 2 
'l'he political 1mpliae1tions inherr~nt in thl'll stl"ucture of 
cartelism as practicad by GermHny w:l.ll be the subject of 
discussion in this chapter. 
The opinions of munerous writers will be anmly;:ed 
and appraised in an t:tttli!Illpt to gain an insight into the 
motives of th0 O•:lr·man oartel agreements. i.Jere Germany's 
llvendell B·n·ge, £\l!I'tr~l!;!, p, 11, 
2 
"No Peaoe ~~1th I. a. !lt'!rben.• F,ortuni\l\, Vol. XXVI, 
S·s];:rtembtn• 1942• P• 107 
--------- -- --
maoblmtionil dasign~;~d. t;O ti.ebilit;,~te tha eoonom1ea iiU'Id 
d;;d'er:u.Jlve >l:lffort!s of rm.tious sfbt•ood'l :~l:u;~:;~a aNI thr' 
of $tat'''''• ,,~.~; tho; pret~!lmt t:tme and in the future. 
It hl?.!ll be,.,n. claimefl by some thtd;, und<:~r th<!! <:i-G.!;is 
of tbq Naei :t'lil!llinl$1 th~~ O>&tm~lll oax•tt!~l syste11> paeMd 
tbroue;h ::an ul t11ll<;<IHll £~ubtla evolution. 'l'he a;,rat>lllll, tkll;;!>e 
Cl'i l;ica tmy t '!:H110£~lll¢: "t!HJ ll.il:'>il~Ot pvli tiao-.1)0 OllOII!IiO illi:!tl"U .. 
l\'\Clll.t Of. tbe l'llll.:i!i j;')I\U•ty tat l'IO!lllll liUld &O.I:'OI~clf ;~i!lllded 11ith 
th<!> ai>l.f;;le aim ot rea~·n11ng Cl~l'tm:U:W for tmr. '' 3 Otbt~l' ob~ 
fl d.~:t<li:~illl'<'A.<<J m~;1faHtat;1zy,n of na.t10Tllli.l i1l·tn whili.tl :!. tal ooeur• 
re:nc& takes pl!lXH! in Gi.J::;l''i1l,1<1Y• u4 
Opinions as to the pEtl't pl<tyed l:ly G<H~JJI:i\ll Oi!U"'t•~la in 
,· 
1nt•'llrnrilt10u.t\l l:'<)le<tion:s lll~Y diff<llr, but on·o oonclue:l.on 
S@«rm:> j.ustif'ied1 rul!naly, that or•:n•t•.rl ftot:l.vltii<HI do &~j'f;;;G;~t 
c~10 pol:l.tio&l as,t,$otm~ of 1.nterxlational o:.rgan1zat1on. be 
thtiy G'n'rl>•l'll or othcu:;><,d.lll'l!• T.be :PO<~er of t!:w lii:l'i;i::!Sl" c<>rtelst 
liUld their d0o1a1onr1 ~t<i>l'e) oft!illl "mOl''l :l.mptll't!lJ:lt th01n t;b0€10 
3
:tJ;J1d. 
14. 
kouill ? • Looi:;n,)r, 1:¥o.gonm ~awl ·~'::u:rzo.tllh p. ;1,;. 
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of a sovereign political entity such as Holliimd, Denmark 
or Portu~:,"Ual, u5 Hot1 tbis power rep<•<i.lsented by cartels 
'rha t the cal·tel system in Gel?lllany ~m1s an instru-
lllli>llt of nm tional policy Nhich led to milita:l:'ism r:md war 
1.r111.s a discernible fact lo~;; before t}le rise of HH:ler to 
power. Some s·tudents ·or Clel'ln?.n cartels in the prew>vorld 
v-i&.r I period cite the gr•eett gro~>rth of cart\~ls in the fir•st 
decade of the twant1.eth century as being " contr>ibutory 
factor in the stflrting of that; war. 'l'he l'e:ason they arrive 
at; thb oonolusion is 2>.s f'oll<Y.<iS: Piit;h the grot1th of thG 
oartel system, G;u"maxzy 1 s industrial mi~"ht ?;:rew to be the 
most powerful in JJ.urope and as a result thJ1l compet:l.t:.ion 
1'his great competition offered by German industry wss made 
possible by the utili<?.atto:n of oax•tel!l as OPganisn1s of 
state policy under th~l direction of ·the n&tional govern• 
ment. The tligh tariff policy which hl;\d been enacted by 
5payson S, · Wild, • Sano'tions of' International 
Commod :1. t;y.· Agreements •" .(ilueriomt iourual S!f. Jntc'ilrnatigun;t. 
Law, Vol. ~XX (Ootob<H' l936j p. 65. 
10~ 
ayut,jm to flQur1uh. 
Ilm.pid. incl'6·'.lSe tn px'ocuo't:l.v•::~ o~~:paolt:;y in <l<H'tn.<»l'.l.Y 
otbii:r tl!'.lt:l.ons. 'I'his 9.U!:H1t for JlU:\.t•keta l'l.bl'O.ll<d oftllll:l turnad. 
r~ E>Conomio to po11t1onl W£1rfar,~, ~lnd. SiOi!i'llld hhe aea~l1! <'Zlf 
G'iliX'IlMl!.n ;n111t<;u:-1sm ~~b1oll bu:rg.;;onecl lnto World Har :t. 'l"ne 
t'ruH& of 1ts r,n•od\wtivity withou.t ooml.~ in·t:o ocml'Uot 
w1 tb oth0z· indu!l t;rl.<~l POW•l!1'S ~1\::l.road. 6 
~" p:~.•imiJJ! rae tor :bl o«~ul.'l in$~ tJorld ~leu~ :r t;O t;iill;;lll allF.~oa, the 
poUtiCHl 1n,id('lJ:lt$ b~ir14,;; ,j1.u:~ a f'acr:~d.e fo:r· th<.• «oonomie 
()A• J. HOiili'l1'l.t4tti>iUt u:Hmif Car·tfllt1 13:rolre tll:t~' G<n'mli.ln 
l1()pt;fb:Uc,~ ~J:.!n?\!1'illl''2t!Mllt Vol. xxnt. (!1i•n.,on l9LJIJ) p. 279. 
--=== 
-------------
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world powers be :tug unavoidabls; und•er the C$.rt,':l BYcltem. r 
Close cooper.at:!.on between c«rteh>. and tho national 
to aohieva tJS.tionr;\list:l.c ends. In contrast to the pe;.'iod 
a.llbx<ce call for the clevelopment of !'\ dua.l ity of into;.'ests 
upon th,c;, suprmn:"!.cy of the s tg te • w 1 th itt~ economic ally 1 
the cartels• to be us~'d solely as a meHUS to achievn this 
end. In this period. ~~hen Ill. Germ1ut corporation s:I.<S'!led a 
no German company was pern11 tted to gain a comm,ert.nal ben<:ll-
fit at the expense of the inter<est of the state. 8 
7Ip1~. 
A ~ouenLe:r Heimann. gatents t:pr H%t:}.er, p. 6. 
,------ --
===--
greB,t era of cartels • not only in o,~rmany • 'but :tu the rest 
ot the world liiS well. It t11as an era rnade to ol:'der for 
the German oa;:<tel experts l th<~ Old :l.nt~n·na tional ties were 
lllUioidy me11ded af't;Gr the war, l:m:l.l·t upon, ~nd extended~ 
'£h1s period of extr,;~me vationalization of industry acr.11eved 
its most oomplet1~ fonn in GcH'llli'l.l'lY d.Ul'ing: the twenties and 
;~a.s follcr<Hlld. by the x·ise of the !H. tl0r regime. 9 
The thoory 1noi;ivati1~g: this great period of 
rationalizaticm. was th~ self-suff1o1ency of Gel'many • and 
ive enemy in peacetime in order to achi®Ytl a ligl'itanlng 
vlotory in mu·. This theory Qalled for· the coordination 
of two main polio1eoq one ~<Ail £m i:nct'e8se of eQon.omio and 
military p<»I<::U' at home, with a simultan<Jous rE<dtwtion of 
lO'i' 
m;;;;r::;x>tiiiJdl;;.cM•snt. ~~~1'>o· f.·,,:r'tJI.Ulr!h•.e.d so .:~s 'to c;l.it!>il"11'1.11~ 1:uzy . 
10 1oophol<i.\s. 
th<; Of•r>tll:lt vll:liCh al~, >'11th 1)111ti<8llt <1omlt1oJ.tion Hex><~ t~ 
llll&ll!le.nta ••bioh "'''~'!llc~d th~; vital o~'['!l.'m'l ,)( ivn• l\Lttl' muclli.ne. 
'l'hill) cancet:rtrat1on of econom1o p0'11'll' in •.;hiJt hl:.n·:l$ o;,\" '" f<;!,; 
10$· 
in a great cartelization drive, Fear and desire t1ere the 
emotions employed by Gel:'many through tl'.«ll oartt,>l mechanism 
to :pr'ilcipl.tate this oarl;elization of U:urop<3an industry* 
which !OOshed s;rJClo1;hly t'<ith the political pl:?.ns of the 
companhls to lllli!.ke nu:uerous alliances with German ind.ustl•y. 
The terms cUotated by Germexzy for industrial peace weakened 
tb.e non-Gel"man industcy 1 whlle str0ngthening the indus triml 
;~<•r machine of the lieioh.ll 
in the oartiel arrangemertlllil were oont:l.nu~.~lly l"i!lvealed. 
Germ:suly •s productiv-;, Ollrpacity continued to grcm, 1'1h:Ue 
non-Germatl companies, oom.placent in tho evanescent security 
these agreements of'f'er®dt continued to restrict th•&ir own 
ct~pacity a2ld output, to limit their teohJlice,l research• 
and to be genl!lrally inditfel"ent to the development of new 
prooesseth 'fhb nel:n~l<:ms seour :l.ty was evlC1er1t in many 
strategic commoditht~ oontrolli3d by cartels a11d Cl.iscusscd 
compi'mies entertained as to the seou1•ity of thesa agree-
ments ~teN allayed by the prof:l.ta they reaped !:tS a 1•esult 
11r•':ranois E1ddle, 11 Cartals 1 An Approaeh to th!l! Prob-
lem, l[!ti* Sptili@Qh'iHh Vol. X (l'!a.reh 15, l9L~4) p,. 339. 
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:rearmrunetlt in the 1930 1s, since this increased their 
produotion and raised th\l' prices of their prOduots, As 
O<!!!rll!f1n rear•mament; begHtlt so as to p~crti(~:lp,<?. te 1n tbe pro-
fits 12 , . 
Germ~:my, through the use of the intermtt:l.onal cartel 
syst<::un, was able to achieve a victory in the esopolitical 
ar1ma even before the f:l.rst shot 1'1'!'\S fired in world \far :u. 
:l.ng disasters which beset the Allied Armies and Navies. 
\1/hel'; the Allied 1mtions l\lOU!!;ht an answer to th<l then 
enis1ll&.t1c Pl'obhm of why German war production had been 
allO'..:ed to get so far :l.n advance of Allied production, the 
there.tofore obscure word, cartel. oa.me into popular usage 
:l.n the All:l.<iJd >mt:l.ons. 
'l'he Kilgore Committee, which :l.n 19411, conduoted an 
1nv!i}st1gatton of the economic 13nd poll tim'l.l asr,ullot;s or 
12Henr:l.oh Kronste:tn, ngurop,>an Cart>:J>ls, II 
'Jih! CgMonwea;t., Vol. I!Xl, (June If, 191n) p, 172. 
--------------
J.J_O 
in·ternational cartels, elaborated upon the role played by 
G~n·man cartels in harnper1ng Allied military preparedness, 
'l'he f oll ow-i:t'.lg 
is an excerpt fvom its repo1•t: 
n.A def~3ated Oermatzy em~:n•ged from tl'l\' first ~.~or·ld 
war Nith h$1" lmper1!ilistic .. minded itKTustl•ial hier-
archy in tEet • • • • German.y 1 s Lndust.rlc'tl manage-
ment secured loans from abroad ;~b.ich enabled them 
to consolidate into gigantic domc">sti<~ and inter-
ue.tional monopolies , , .. • 'l'hey were bent upon 
recapturing their. wca·ld position in dyestuffs, 
phar·ma.oeut1cals, military optiollll goods <md other 
commodities •• , • Ger·man i:ru;\ustrialista, ba.oked 
by the gove.rnme:nt they bad forced to do the:h· bidding, 
thJ.•r:>a tened to il~nuie th•; foJ?eign mark·~ t13, threatened 
to sell gooo.s at lo1qe:r prices., thr'.l&lt,}tied to tmleash 
new teoimo1cg;iers 1 threatened to ditlrupt th·~ controlled 
markets of otheJ? countries. 'i'hey bl1ackmailed their way 
into world markf)ts • • • • 1:J'sing oo~~m"'rolal relations, 
in particular the Oo!i~'tel, as a N<~apon, they rearmed 
th.eir own oourltry and. dirsar·med. thei.t' prospective 
victims • • •. 'l'he alli61nae between iHtler ·lllfld the 
German cRrtelists acoeler;<;ted this qw.'!nt for dom1..: 
nation. 'l'he economies of' otht;r countri~~s t~ere 
penetrated by agreemente m1wng German, Bri tish• 
American, l<'r•;nch t"-00 other concerns through 111hich 
Germany. built up a netvwrk which imp~'<ir<>d the pro~ 
duction of oche1• nations, obtained sources of i'm•eign 
exoha:t'.lg(il • • • ga.tih>3red1 ~conotlllo intelligence and. sp:r.1lad Nazi pl'Opaganda. ..1 
Earlier investit~at:l.ons by oth·~r. Congressional bodies 
aTha the Temporary National Economic Committee had rea~~ed 
th,;r same oo:nclusio:na r®lative to the intent and effects of 
l:Jquoted 1n Colston E. l.Jarue ;, !ntex'ttational C~u>tels, 
A f4enaca to P<!l:aoe," Currenl;i Higtor;y 1 Vol. VIII, (lr,sbruary 
1945) P• 112 .. 
final ~·epo:rt o.f !> '1', N. 11. c .• hear1n15 1:rl 19110 stated 
among otlh~:r facts.* the followillg ¢ 
liJ..l. 
"1, 'l'hat foreign oompani<vs had taken out patents 
and. •E>nte:red. mto cartel agr&(1raents in tl1<ll United States 
on essential war materials f"or the purpose of~ and "'1 th 
l:he ·effect of, blocking Am~Jr>ioan d.ev·alopme:nt and CX'<i:1at-
1ng serious llhortr,>.ges • • • 
2. 'rhere had been a division of NOrld markets by . 
pa.t•"r1t agt•e·smeuts between dom•:~st:l.c and f'oreign companies 
W'hieh gave foreign interests th·~ right to d.etc:rm 1ne 
\~?he:re and ho~r the fimerice,\1:1 companies may iS~ll O•ll'tai:n 
. m11ita:r.l' supplies , • • 
}. It seem.s probable ths:tt' vital m:UHary .1n:fOX'!:llat1on 
ie;; l.leen diselosed to f'or•a1g-n oomptmies thx'ough tho 
re•juiremen:t of itemized. dRH!041ptiv"' royalty pz;,yments in 
patient liokmae agr•H~ments.al 
'£h'il ov;mall fact,s discovered by tr•ia wx•iter in the 
course of research upon. tb<J intent and •lffeots of G·,l·maey's 
cart,&l policy • saer.ns to indio"lte th•lt the pro~tram was oue 
delili£.'!led speciflo~•lly to achieve the ends of the atc',tce• witil 
economic GOl1Siiier<'rt1ons being incidental factors. Though 
some may ola1m1 with nominf.tl jus Hf'ica;ticm, that any 
14!~uoted in O'lor;cr<~ E. Falk, l'§;tencs ~•nd. Iaduat;ti§l 
frogr,ilss t p. 103. 
------ - -----
discussion ~<hich involves Ger•many and itCJ policies is 
subject, to J:ll'ejudioes, due to that countx•y's militant 
histo1•y in the twentieth cen~ury, the opinions of t;lr:><:~ 
great; llk"'jori ty of obs<3rvsr~> seem to intllct Chn•ruany 1 s 
intern..,tional cartel agreements as conspil'<tcies ·to UJ:lO.er-
mine the ecOllomic and political po~•r:u' of potential adver-
o:r•lginal intent of the cartels may have been solely eoo:uom:\.c 
in character• 'bwc t;hay state this intent was ephemeral, ~\nd 
the ainH!l of the stNJ.t(3 soon b<<c8.me ·t;he ral~gn 11 *.9·t;re of the 
by Congressional groups wer<~ outspoken in tb.eir COlldem~ 
nation of the pernicious influences of cm:·tel agreements 
betwllien Amerio~;'m a:nd German firma. SimHarly the majority 
of American writers sm students of cartels are :l.:n almost 
complete unanilllity in their opinion tiJJilt G'~rnu;m~inspired 
agreements were a carefully calculated instrument of 
Oerm1;tny 1s W!'n' lords• existing 1nainly to enhsiXAOe the power 
of the s ta t;e. 
In England, with a fairly long .history in cartel 
' d.eal1ntliS and no antitrust legislation, opinion was divided 
on the question of the effects of Germe.tty 1a cartels upon 
that country's war effort. In fact, the govel'%lment has 
--- -- -----
tended to cUseount the charges Hs unsubstantj.al. 
Oliver Lytthto:u, B1•U;ish Production Nini<ste1•, stated 
before the British l?ar·liament in 194.5, that, "the fi'ee 
flow of soim1tj.f'ic information in an lna.ustry is abso-
to Germany, and ! mt'l.Y. sHy tha:t; thort'l is no evidence 
whatsoev<f!r tlw.t any British f'i:rm has e:nt•3Jl'Od int;o, an 
;u•r"·tngement ll'th.1oh ):'estrioted prod.uct.ion of strategic 
materials. ol5 
.pespite .statements such as this, the overwhelming 
weight of opinion on the sub,ject, ~1hich the writer was 
able to discover, saw in Gel:"many •s ov~:n•sea:; cartel 
arrangements atl underlying purpose wh1oh waa designed to 
weaken th·~ industric"'l a:od m:ilits:.ry strel'lgth of nationt'h 
'rbe ind.ict;rnent of the aims of Germ1u1 cax•tels we.s made in 
the main by Ankll'ia&>..n w:rite1•s, who supplied t.he main sources 
of this wrlt•>r's informatiol't. What prejudices they may 
have add but little to the severity of the chargee which 
15A. <iyn ','-IUliE:mst "Why Europe PNf\:-;x•s Ca1•tels to 
Competition," J;T§.tis;m,§ Byg;ipe!ffis, XXXIII, (3eptemb~lr 191«5) 
p • .3 5. 
CHAl?TER IX 
AND POST-\IAH D!':V'ZWPHENTS UNDEU ALLISD OCCUPATION 
l}arma:uy 1 a cartel mechanism which was geared to ooordi!Ja te th<:J 
h1dustr1es of the t;,r.:.'lexed. t;err:l. tor:l.es to those of the Ee:l.oh. 
Th<l! a:l.m of this cartelization policy was to create a strict 
relation of depe11d•"rwy of these n;ast 1#1xrop0a.n :l.nd.ustri.:>s to 
those of G6l"f\1UXlY. The conolud1:n.g step in this compulsory 
oa.l'tt1liz.at1on plr.m ws.s t"chievecl on October 1, 191}0 1 by 
. incorporating the pl'Otectorate of Gze.;hoslovr!ll<la. into the 
customs territory of G~;rmany. This customs territory had 
been created *"t an eax•lier date in Germany to consumm::<.te 
a plan for a complete ratlonmlizat.l.on of industry in order 
to fa.cillt;s.te pl'oduction nE><'l(i.ed for a 1tlartirae economy. The 
lllethod used to bl'ing Czechoslov&J<.ia into this customs un.:l.on 
lr?&s an extcmsion of Germany 1 s Compuhlory Gm.l~tel La;" of 
July 19J8, to :trwlud.e thie area or c0<11.Ipied t·~rdtory ,1 
This enforced cartelization which was in Germsmy 's 
plan for a new organization of continental economy• was 
applied to \lfeste>rn guropean nations once they were under 
th.e suze!'ainty of Germany, The ir,dus ·tries of these 
occupied countries were compelled. to join l!ln international 
oartel of the:l.l• p~•rtioular trade, Because of the pre-
dominance of Garman members in these cartels, all the 
deoisiOllS of the cuavt.:~l were • in prao t ice, ma.de by the 
German majority. Technically speaking, ho~•eve.>r, this 
leadership of Q,Sirmmn interests in that~e _t>;uropean c:;wtels 
was achieved by the greater production quotas of German 
industries, rath0l' than by votes of cartel n~<Mlbers. 2 
ot the WEI.!' wel'<s af:f'11l.ated in a prhab•~ or!,\<mization, 
tlle Intl!!>rnat1onal Steel Cartel, were nor!/ t'<~<tu,tred to 
Join a German .sponsored iron and steel cru•tel. '1'h1s 
compulsory car·~eUzation took place on June JO, 1941, 
or c.ontinentell 1£urop!> was controlled from offices in 
$erlin.J 
2ona. lUngwood and 'Sr>nest ;>, Hediger, "G~~rman Cartels 
Invade Jl:urope, » Pgreifi ~p;+.icy B:!Ports • Vol. XVIII (August 15. 1942) p. 1+8 
3~. 
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This control by German or Gel'man dominctted. oart<:.ls 
replace the e<'trlier international tHlroent cartel whlc.h had 
been formecl in Germany, but had colla)'J<'Hld due to th(~ parti-
oipation of the.:J Britlsh and the i3'1edes, Under the new 
oartel, division of the Europea.n mar·ke t among the various 
The same ;procedure '"H:ts followed. in respect to the wood pulp 
woodpul:p Ci:<rtel at th;:, start of the t'lat•, a new Europee.n 
cartel under the hege1nony of' Gennany wa.s formed/' 
In addition to tho ab.ove oommodit:l.,~s, Germ,an cartel 
control extended to othc~:r impo:rtaw:tt pl•oduets; these 
:\.:U(Jluded synthetic textiles, fats and IIJOaps, radio equip-
ce.1•tel agre<~ments in these goods wer<? intended to dovetail 
with Nazi economic plans to brin,'i: ch'e direction of all 
E:ur•ope.S\n inc1ust:rial acti'I"Hies und.er the authority of its 
German Cartels Undex• the 
of E:cgno.IDies.j Vol. LXII, 
trol, <~·11d the right to dissolve or combine existing organi-
zations and to regula.t(~ proeed1.U'(;s,5 
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e:dgm1oies. As a reen.1lt of th.;>se fa.r-si[tbt•~ provisions 
ln cartel contracts, mt:my ee.l'tBl agreements between Get•raan 
and t'Ol'iilign industries ~Jere mer'lly suspeactect for the 
.;turat.ton of hostl.lities, and wer<a to be :re:,;umed following 
the war•, 'l'h1s modus vivendi haci the effect of giving· 
German firms the right to resume their positlon of primacy 
1n many world mstrkats folloH:I.ng the war. 
The !1.g1•eement between Ste.ndard Oil of New Jer•sey 
and I. G. Farben iS e. case in. ~•hich the porHiilbility of 111ar 
was taket~ into account long' before hostilit.;1<~:•S beg(;t11.. In 
his testimony before the Truman Committee in 19·!~2 • 
commented upon this provision, thus: 
11 0ul' contracts wlth I. a. F'arben of 1929 were 
run until 1947. As you gent>lemen doubtless l~now, 
contracts such as these are noj;, in law abr.ogat<:ld 1 
but merely suspended ~~han th<ll parties• nations are 
at \~tar. 'l'he parties to such a contract must ther,~­
fore find some way of getting along with their gwn 
business while the e;:mtr"i1ct;s are eo suHpe.nded." 
In eff<llct this agreement said that :l.f tl';ere ls any hinder-
anoe resulting fvom governmental action, in the; United States, 
then at the conclusion of su.oh interruptive notion, the 
parties would oonclude a ne~; agreement in the spiJ:'it of 
the old. 
The practical ef:t\11ct of this contin.;;l_~enoy providon 
transfer of :.woo I. G, pat•ents to S~andard Oil in 19J9, 
~rhis magnanimity on the part or. r, a. Farbeu was 
esp<lloially note'.~orthy, since prior to thiil date, I. G. 
of its patent knOI<~ledge, 'l'h'il lllOt1ve which prompced this 
tr.,.n.sfer•;lnce of pate.;;rts ~m.s the perspicao:l.ty of I. G. 
lll1ght aeon be at wal:' with the United St.ates. If this 
~-~== 
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happ;;med they lmmv th'" patents t~tould be s;e;iz,~cl by the 
Alien Property Custodl!'J,n, h'~nce the reason for ·th·3l.r 
larg~sse in respect to the patents., In f'!ddlt.l.on 1 ''~ith t.he 
collectable following the l'lflilt'• 
The a1•raugement s made for the pa t<3nt tr:c.nsfer wer<> 
concluded in the Hagu.e, Nethel"lrmds, in 1939, be:f'or•J that 
co1mtry was inv~<ded by Garmany: The trcmsaotlon thftt took 
place there was not; made public, ho,.'revt:H't until le.te 1941 
<1he:n the Department of' Jus tioe condL\Oted an. imr:•cs tigntion 
actioll by St?tting that the Compcmy was pr•otect1ng its own 
t'lh!>.re in the ps tent rights Nhloh >night bs in j eopPtrt'iy if 
the Alien Prop,'lrty Custodiall seiz<~d th<l!Jl and classed them 
111 their emtl.rety as enemy property, 7 
following the war these countries v.<ould Nant to ooop•i'll'ate 
these !1I1;f,Ot1at1ons. 'l'his ~;as indicated at; the time of 
the transfer when a Stmnd<?crd Oil off!cia.l wrote to his home 
7Ibid. 
-
-
---
--- ------ --
some 2000 foreign patents and we did our b®st to work out 
complete plans for a modus vivemdi l•Jhich would operata 
bhrough tlv'J tm~m of the war, whetl'ler Ol' not the United 
5ta tes came in, n8 
", • • if, by r•eason of unforseen political events, 
the execution of this contract shs1ll br;, made iur osa~ 
ible, tempora.rily m• perm<WH?ntly, or t.he firm of 
Carl ZeiiHJ liml ted in tiHJ enjoyment of .1 ta full Ucense 
claim, this agreement shall be susperided J'or that t1roe 1 
and upon an appeal, the bo<J.rd of arb1 tors· shall make 
such dispositions alii seem n(~oeas'''~'Y !n order to carry 
out the w111 of the part1es to tilis agreerne:rlt under 
the changed oondit.l.Ol1s,. if pos1'31bl·s. "'51 
The intent of such pr•ovisio:ns as this was tl'H! .retOlltion of' 
a f'oothold :l.n tiv?. industries of r'oreign countries, regard-
less of political actions or tlil"il event of bost:!.l1ties, 
The Kilgore Commit tee reJ.'lebed this eonclusion wl'lcm it 
"'fbe Germsm iXkh<strie~l growth (J<M; been tb"J m&l.instay 
o!' the in terl'l.rc. t.i omal Olur>tel system. In their agr•!lemen ts 
;;'! 
quoted in H·endell Serge, Qartels., p. 27 
9 u ,_§......va, i:IB!,iSCh .& r,.omb O:otioal Comtl!i!.niT I £!.&• u .. 
Complaint ::md oons,>nt decree, July 8-9, 191i01 quoted in 
J oaepll Borkin and. Charles .i!. Welsh, f:ie:rmr.rny 1 a !ileu;j;er ~. 
p .• 312. 
---
' 
---
---
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"with Eil·.l.tish and AnHH'ioa:u com;:>anies 'the Giiil:'Ina:u 
cart<~lists specifically provided that in the event 
of war Cftrtel arrm::~gements would be resumed whlllcn 
hostilities were terminated. Any effort to Pett1in 
the internl\tional cartel system will thf3Nifore help 
to ke;;rp in po!ltex· the 0fJtrmem mHi tarl.~t-tndustr:I.Blist 10 clique which has planned and launch®d two world wars." 
DUl1INO \vOHLD \<iAli II 
An anomalous sHuation which exil';ted 0.\.tri.ng ~Jorld 
\>Jar II w1.1s the oo11tinuation of limited oooper"tion among 
ce1•tain cartel members looated both within the United Nations 
and Axis countrl~s. An exa.mple or this waa the liai!!on 
maintained between cartr~l members dealing in electr·h~~:11 
lamps ':1Ud equipment, This cartel, ~lhich included Philips 
e.nd Ge.nr~ral Elect.ric in. the United St;~atea; among others, 
communicated with and aided each other dur.ing the eax•l;y 
years of World ltJ~ar II. The principal office of this oartal 
W!J.S located in Holland, which was ~-~lso the home of J?hilips 
of' Hollandt one of the most powerful members of this com,. 
bine. In 1942, on ~l?ders from the N!izi-co:ntrolled main 
off1ae in Holland. the Amcrioa.n trustees of thol Philips 
lOquot;ed 111 n'l'ho s~~me 010. Gang," Maq,on, Vol, CL!X, 
· (Nov~,~mb<;;r 25, 191;1<) p. 632. 
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oowb:l.ne ,,•;ided £l O®l'r~~m Cf.u•tel ptC~rtner in f:I.E,iltl .. ng c~ pat>.mt 
f.\uU in the SW<i!di:lib Courts. :.)ut•ing thh ~J<I.!ll:?O pEilr•:l.od t.l'll1lliHl 
Amt:u•iot.•n tru!ilt'~~l$ werci l:'t~pot•ted t.o luwe e~tohtUlged 'c-.9ormioal 
befln dl.ll!ll:ll'i.b•:;d. ~cr t~ "our·iously over;~t·1•> ffad AX'I:);IllUt :l.ne 
l'H"H.£l0h • n ll 
o<etrtllla m~n ll1lld do ooopl1lr'N.te dut•:tnr:~ peviods of hoatilitl.ea. 
'l'hot.t&;h such ooopel"at:Lon 1;~ th,;; exoillption t'Glther thb\n a 
r·ult'll• alll:a.mpl.!is suoh !UI thw !'t'bove seom U) v1nd:to<•te th<i.l 
Vol, 
ll:r, F. s·;.;one, nQ~tr.i;,S~l c"'noer," ·~ N!\!UQu., 
CLVIII, (B'ebl'U!U'Y l:f. • .._Jili.ll) p. 179, 
Deoarte11zat:l.on Branch was formed :l.n De~tember 19'·'5' under 
the command of Brigader General \lfilliam Draper, 1·t was 
entrusted with the investignt:l.ou, coo:rdi.:nation, .<md r<.lform 
\~·,.r Crimes Commission hes;:cings. In th~ course of these 
heElrings nuu~;n•ous executives conm:cted lftrit.h such indus-
put on t;•ial I' or complto 1 ty in the s cart in;; of tl:H; 
second Horld \v;.'lr. 'I'he courts trnt tried these men 
acquitted th·em of th<l Ct'imes brought in th·'1 i:orJ1otment, 
since the prollJecution failed to prov•e th.ct these industri-
a11st>J plot;ted tbf:l war·, or' had. a1v advn.noe l{nO\'iledge of 
Hitler" FJ S1Yt>Clfic pl<:.ns for military <,ggresslon. These 
to Nar, but under the concept of law, as int;.~rpreted by 
Amer1Cfl11 judges, only those r..:,t;pons ible for th•c last event 
could be held guilty of a crime. 12 
zones of occupation were attempting to reach a11. accord 011 
1?4 
a uniform C'cu'tel law for German indus try. Though th<;~l'e 
were concessions 011. the part of th'~ !'our respective 
O<trrying Oltt such CE~.rtel l'iiws all enacteld, whether• tho law 
should be mandatory oro volu:nmry, and similar po:l.ntos of 
d'!l.sagreement. 
V • 'l'Hll: CAE'£.iU, LA\4 OF 194'? 
!6greement. was finally reached. bct;~een. the United 
the law \llhl.ch was to deal with c~u··cel operations in the 
sector of G;:.rmany occupied by th·'H;e nations, This 112m 
was promulgated on I<eb~ ;.<,;ry 12, 1947, 1'J.S f'lilitary Govern-
ment Law No. 56 for the United 3tat~~s :zone, rmd. a similar 
text >~l'Hl lssu•!!d as Ordinance No. 78 for the British Zone. 
Included in the provisions of this law ~~ere those pro• 
scribing fJpec1f:l.e practices v1hioh were in restr.oint of 
tNlde in th<o; mHnufacturing and consumer fields, Another 
aeotio:'> vf the law provided for the 1ny7'stlgf:,tion of all 
German. firms l'lhioh employed over 10 • 000 ~;orkers, If .such 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
' 
i-
1 
' 
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economic pov1er, tt.ey were to be reorganized and separated 
into functionable but autonomous economic unita. 13 
'l'his law and similar laws dealing v.ri t:h decarteli-
zation were to be the subjects of much disputation am 
oratory among those interested in the cartel issue in post-
war Germany • Some held that; th,ll law was not v lgorously 
e11foroed 1 some said the law was too ambiguous for ~~ffeot-
ive enforcement, while others held that the power granted 
to the administrat.l.ng authorities was too arbitrary. In 
addition to these diff'ioulchs, the advent of the cold war 
in Europe furti:H'Il:' obfuscated the ce?,rt~ll is suo. 
One of the groups which had r,"'oomt!Nllld;,tio:ns to make 
pertinent to Cartel Law No. 56 was th*1t 'Nhich was composed 
of' fourteen top u. s. business elteoutivea who made a trip 
to Germc·HlY in May 1 191+7, on the invitation of the Secretary 
of \Jar to study Germ!Ul industry and the United States 1 
military &;overnment industrial program. 'I'he report of 
chis group submitted to the \4ar Department and released by 
that agency inclUded numerous suge;.estions, among t~hioh was 
the following relating to deoartelb>at1on: 
"Decartelization: Law No. 56 and Hegulation 1 
embody a l1ter1es of controls and regula tiona 1 man,y of 
which r;;rpresent economic principals tlUit.e ne1~ to the 
lJMartin, gn. o~t., p, 228 
"German milld '4nd to the pnflt industric1l development 
of the country. Since we are now conf:ronCed with 
the urgent neoeasi ty of bringing about as r<1.pidly as 
possible reoov~~ry o:l' tbe economic life of a starving 
people - it is our belief that too strict adherence 
to the Law in its administration will seriously retard 
· this primary obj,~otive• 
"\•Ji th no desire to or1 tioize the principle of ·c.hat 
law as it has been written - we do however, recommend, 
H' at c«ll possiblei that the enforcement of these 
regulations b'~ postponed, o:r at l.:Z!>.st 1mbstanti~'llly 
mO'Jified, until tb·:• indus tri3.l eoollomy is in a reason-nbl~) st '.te of oper!l.L:l.on. "14 
Otll,lr groups ;,1.nd individuals had d.l.ssenting opinions 
as to the worthiness of Law No, 56• anct thoe disagreements 
wl!lre ~~ source of oonsternstion to both civilian <md mill-
tary off 1oi4>ls concerned with cartel (lo As Time magazine 
so aptly put it, "Since the war's end many an important 
squaoll: has been sounded against the u. :~. !•lil1tary Govern-
ment for failing; to do something about Germany's cartels 
- though hardly anyono k~lows what tllat somethilli'". should 
be. ul5 
A o:l.vilian committ;ee headed by F®deral 'I'rade Com-
min1o:ne:r. Garland Ferguson went to Germany 1n Deaeu;ber .of 
(June 
lh',;'iuoted 1n ll:I!B.• 1 p, 2:32. 
l5nc!'!l'1i~la on th1:J Block," 'l'lme, 2 7, l ;H9 J P, 1.)) , Vol, HII, 
\ 
\ 
I 
l 
1948 and held hearings relative to the decartelization 
laws as well as investig,·bing the effects of General 
Lucius Cl,'J.y 1 s order''" of Ne.rch 1948 which had the effect 
of rejeotin&;: sev,':lral test cases which had been ad,jucUcated 
under Law No • .)6, General Clay was at this time the 
IIJ:Llitacy Gov•.?:rnor of the United States Zone in Gorm•:·ny,l6 
In .1\p:rH 1949, the Fert;uson Committee l'eleased its 
pol1ey of' eliminBting the. OEtrtels was t~ound, and went on 
to say that the. policy shol.!.ld have been, am should be 
enargetice.lly enforced •. ·£he report prs.ised Cli'\rtel Law 
No, 56 as a f'a:l.r and indispensable regnlt~Liont and found 
no validity in the claim tl'.tat thlll elimination of excessive 
oonoentr.Ation of economic po•.~er would inhibit German 
reeov®ry, In its suggestions, itrecomrnended the 
deooncentration of the plants of' !, G, Ji'arben, which it 
said had been a mainstay of the Nazi war maohine,l? 
'l'his committee also reported that t;he reason d.eoarl;eH-
to build up German production machinery ~ts fm asset 1n the 
16Mart1n, ,r;m.. cit., p, 276 
17ro1d ..___._,, 
cold war, had obstructed the progr;11m, A seoond reason 
cited by the committee for the bogged.-do~m decarteli-
zation d1•ive was that the British, in whose zone tha iron 
and steel combines of the Bhur were located, were neV(n'' 
enthusiastic about; decar•t,;;l1zat1on. 18 
General Clay was prompt in 1•eplying to the 
committee's charges the1t the Army had obstructed d·:aoarr,0;ll.-
zation; contradicting the assertion, he continued to say 
tlrL:tl; any further brealmp of Ge>rman enter•p:rises nwould be 
a political and not a secut•U;y measure, •19 'I'he resu1t;r; 
of this greP>t varl.:cmce of opinion as to Cartel L&.w No. 56 
-.1as to stultify its use as a decartc~lization weapon from 
its outset. 
The military gove.rnment in Oermf'\ny in iaddi tion to 
the promulg,•tion of' LaN No. 56, also put into effect; in 
th~ Am'ilrioran and British Zonatll, Ll>!w No. 7.5 >rhich provided 
for the reorg<cmization of Germ~.ny 1 s 00.."-1, iron, and steel 
industries. l'he intent of th1s law, promulgated on 
18Bruce Ce.tton, "Deoartelizatlon - Our Last Cr.anoe," 
Nfit19Jl,, Vol. Ot.XX, (F'ebrmwy 11, 1950) p, 122, 
19~, loc, cit. 
~--·--
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November 10, 191->8,. was similar to Law No. ;;;6, which is 
the slimin£:.tion of excessive concentration of economic 
power, and the inhibition of the war potentlal of' Oel'!llan 
')0 
indus try.'· 
been deemed excessive ooncen-cration of economic power' in 
ated were to be dissolved. Num€:rous holding compauies 
were to be liquidated. Among them were twelve steel com-
bines which incl11ded such titans of the Oe1'mf>rl steel 
industry as Krupp, l•lannesmal" ..n 1 'I'hyssen aud Hoesoh. In 
addition to these steel combines, thirteen oth'or opr~ratlng 
coal combines t<tere to be disb<l,nd<~d under the provisions 
of the lGM, Law No. ?5 also provided for thee formulation 
or a steal trustee aasoo .!.at ion which was to consist of 
zation &.nd reorganiz.tittion of the iron a.nd steel industry. 
'l'l?,e memb<3rr:> of this ste,31 association t<ere to be appointed 
by or under ·th·!l a.J.tthoril<!:ation of mil itat'Y govermnent offlcials 
2l 
aftsr consultation v1ith appropriate o,,rwan groups. 
20:~ar·t1u, .2.!1• ,m., p. 272. 
21 Ibid,, p. 27). 
By June, 1951-~, the job of' ~1plittin[;; up these great 
Hasid.ngton, D. c. 22 \.Zhether complete decentralization 
st;ock boom in 1954 1 e.s a partial substantiation of th~ir 
belief. Leading this. rise in vaJ,ueru were the stocks of 
the thirty-eight so-oS~lled "deoart;elized" iron, steel and 
the end of Hov,"'mber. 'l'he expectations causine; this 
~·JOuld soon be tc'l>rrnina ted, and that "teel and coal 
compal:lies would once again combine fen· yet mox•e profitable 
One of the first ta~:ks to f~toe t;h., 11ilittwy Govern-
ment in Garmi·:my in the postN8.r period WHB the dissolution 
22 11 German Car.•t.els Try m Comeback," Business \vQek., 
(~iarch lJ, 1954) p. 148, 
2J"Beh:l.nd the; Headlines " ,Xhe New HeQUbl1c 1 
Vol, CXXXII, (February 7 1 1955J p, J, 
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of the I, G. Farben combine, 'l'he dismemberment of this 
colos6US of German industry, lr·Ihich had plant a in all four 
:!Iones under occupation, was put in th·~ hand!''> of a com-
mit tee which was .to stu&y the organization of !, o. 1s plants 
s.nd. xnak<~ gpp1•op:rlate ;:··~commendations for dis solution. 
planLG or groups of pLln·i;m could. be opel't'cted economically 
as scp·:1rt1te units, In adcLl.tion to t.his, other studies con-
patent<; and trademttrks 1 its interrmtional and domestic 
ceu•tel agreements, and its selling and accounting arrange-
An ag;reement was then renehed on an American pro-
po>Jal th1:1t 1n each zone, pend1n,.~ H. final decision on 
costabl1sh1ng tha new cwnel'Ship of the separate units, the 
control off:l.oer in the cUffer<m·t zon~ls would. desigr1ate a 
trustee for each uni-t a:ru:l. transfer> the legal ownership of 
the properti•Els from thG Allied Control Counell to this 
trusteJe. I. G. properties had up to this time been UJ:lder 
t;he control of t:tm Allied Control Cotmcll, ;-Jh:l.ch through a 
Control Council Law had formulated the law requiring the 
24 dissolution of I. G •. Fo:J.rben. 
24Martin• op. cit. • p. 215. 
~J2. 
Follm~ing t;he approval of this plan, and. the trimS-
fer of prope1•ty to the trttstee ctesignated by th•a control 
officers in each zone, Cfen,Jral Clay was able to announce 
This pronouncement ty General Clay was questl.oned by some 
crltics Nho claimed that the breakup of :r. 0, W&tr~ true 
only on paper, They held that though Parbtm had been 
split into a number of 1ndepend.ent compani·f0s, each under 
a German trustee who was respollsiblc to A. !•1, o., all but 
one of these trustees were old Farb,~u officials, Hence, 
these critics claimed, the e,otual structure of ownership 
?-
was unaltered.<;;~ 
Various plans ~t;cr,e eonsidered a a to the final 
disposition of I, G, l?al:'ben 1s hold1ncc:. Oue plan pro-
posed would 11ave fragmented I. G, 1 s holdings il:rt;o eighty 
separate units, but this, along with other plans, was 
abandoned as unfunctionable 01' too extreme. In 1954, plnns 
were completed under w!1ioh r. G. would. emi.H'ge as six .sepa-
rate chemical companies; some of these companies already 
formed were already l.n competition w1 th each other. <:6 
25.rug_: 
26Ml~.rul.!! Week, 1oc. cit, 
i-
O<llrmmny 1 s path of' leadAn•!$hip in tl:le O('l.rtel fi•i:ild, 
am how the exat•citJe of thfl.t le6u:l.ership hi!ld repe.rouasions 
upon t:r.e economic r:md polHio.al 1.n1~t1tutionll H.b:road has 
been traoed. 1n prev1oui> (I!Utpt·:ill:':S. l'iO'a W.e tiro® h!ils arr1v1!!d 
~rhen we must evaluate this n;ovement 1n order to guide or to 
dill'a.l i.Wfi'ecuv'"ly wi tf! any new d~velopment~J in t!:w oartol 
field. in tl'l>e t'utur'iil. That th<Hil® 1nt;WI:l!.~.uonal bu;;d.naas 
i!igree:<1ill!nts st:l.ll OJ)•:'!l'i'lte over <!1. widlll 1/j,l'c~~t of th'~ wm·ld 
r.odiil~· 1s ti'l Cillll't'''1nty. Thi!! United Stl!lt>3s State t<~i~p£il:'Cmiillnt, 
for example, I:HuJJ evidc>.ntMll that over• tw~nty major ioJ;li!r,-
natiollllll. Qswt~l.s l!>l"$ flou.rianini; tQdl:l,y wt..liJide th@ United 
have seo~.<!"ed t.n,,~ Eu!:'opll!nn marll:e t for a ~'I ide r.fJ.lld'.l) of blll~io 
);)!"OO!!Ots. l 
------·-· 
lnu. N. Strikes tat C.a.l:'t~h," t!l!!i!1Utt~@§ !~'IS.kt 
(N~y 16, 1953) p. 158. 
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Though. at the present time, there has been no 
evidence of German regnancy ovex· these cartels, will 
l1ist;ory repeat itsellf, gnd see the reot•udesc(~l1Ce of Gi:n;•-
lllany 1 s leadership in future cartels? ltiill this leader-
ship once again ally itself with the n;;,tionalistic elements 
in Ge1•many and pos'e a threat to Norld peace and economic 
stability in the future? 'rhese are the ques tl.ons which 
must be studied and carefully snalyzed so as to prevent 
a repet.:tcion of events that; followed the first, l!lorld ~Jar, 
It is true 1 11e are p1•esently living in a different mUieu 
in which the threat of Communism is the rnain concern of 
the ~festern world 1 but this does not prevent the Nma1s-
rmnce .of a ne~; menace which ·~he wo1•ld may have to face in 
th'> future. Since th!3 aupremaoy of ce:rtels may netm"ll at 
any time in th'i'i future, an 'uooerstat1ding of the cartel 
organizatio,tt and it$ pra,c ticea is SS13<111tial, as is the 
methods to regulate th<' actions of th0se intern&tional 
given an insight into oa1•tel oper,etiouts. What is left to 
do nov; is to examine 1nterll't1onal cartels, !!Is they exist 
today, and then att<Jmpt; to vl.Sllalize Gt:mr.any's x•ole in the 
cartels in tho futur-e. 
------
II. 'UlTERNATlO.NAL CARTELS, A lU~T!WSf'EGT OF 'rf!OUGiiT 
The problem of curbing cartels is on<'!> of the greatest 
international problems ~~ll.ioh must be f<wed in the near future. 2 
'!his statement !lWJ.d.e by t;he late Pr•esident Boosevslt ln 1944 
may appear a bit t''o stringent t;o apply to cartel!.;;, but some 
tion of. cartel regulation has been a vehememtly debated 
issue among eeonomists, businessmen, and government leaders 
fo:r th<J last gen,<errt'tlon, Opinion on th" subject is u.ivided 
into tt.;¢1 main divergent schools of thought, These m.."l.y be 
called the Europerin school and tl;re Amerioen school. The 
r~uropean school iW•zS in cartels, per .ll.!:!.1 a.n efficient and 
sensible method of o1•gen1zat:l.on, while the Americ:~:u school, 
imbued with over two generations of anti trust legislation 
and investigert:to:n, sees C$rtels as a pernicious influence 
economic totalttarilmism, What is the reason for this wide 
variance of opinion between 'i:uropean f:l.nd Amel'ican students 
of cartel practices? An examinat1o.n of background and 
tilougl:lt w:ill make the point olea:r. 
2"Nonoply," 'l'ime, Vol. XLIV (Sept<'>mber 25 1 19'-fl<) 
:p. 56. . 
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III. EUl'lOP.EAN VIEW ON CAHT!ilLS 
The majority of .European students of cartels desired 
the continuance of int•ar11ational cartels in the post;war 
per1qd 1 though they ma,y grudgingly concede that some super-
visim1 or regulation would be in order to prevent the repe- · 
ti tion of the abuges of the past. •rhe thoughi; of eliminating 
oe.rtels in their entlr•ety ie one l•lhich never enters the minds 
ot European bu;,;iness and goventment · leaders; To the 8uropean 
mind, cartels r•epresent a form of liltab111ty 1 and the thought 
or going baclc to a state of unfetterod oompeti tion is abl:lOr-
rent to the European ind.ustrh\lists. Cartels ha\'·~ so perme-
is difficult to see how they can be ellmim;ted without 
economic ohaos.J 
Cartels and other forms of monopoly organization 
have been seen as a stabilizing factor in the economy of 
the prcii-~lorld ~;,Jar I period, th3 stability of Gorman economic 
life was said to be due to th(~ cartels which were•· >110rk1ng 
·toward a stable p:f'i~e situation. 'I'ha t they created problems 
3 A. ltlyn IH111ams, "1-lhy ;:<;ur•ope Pl•efi.'lJ~s (l,rtels to 
Cmnl:(etltion," Natiop.'s By,s1ness, Vol, XXXIII (§~ptember 191+5) 
P• .::>5• 
' 
which were to contribute to thcl starti.ng of that wsr was 
overlooked. That oartel.s are conducive to price stability 
measure of th,.,'iir success in this importomt nspect, aoeord-
iJ:li.l, to one wri tor·, should be the gauge of their jus·~ifi-
4 
cation. It is this effort of cartels to scablliz~ px•i.oes, 
in order to eliminate ruinou<~ competition and provicte for 
orderly marketing, thst is usually c:;nsidered the most 
f<WOx'able influence that the cartel h;~s exerted on the 
genero.l economic scene. Cr•itios of this position are quick 
to point out, howevec.r, tha·b aoonomlc stability must be 
ty achlevecl in one h1dus try will inev i tabl.t be~ t<;ained at 
the expense of anothc~r.5 
or the outstaud.in.f; mcclm:nisms in the <wonot!tl.c r·shabilitation 
of tba old world, 'l'he gl;c~s,t t;.cachnolo,,io.fl.l advrmcements in 
tb ~ t••:entieth century, th1.1y believe, are to a great extent 
4n. C, Trench, uThe Case fo:r Cartels," l,grtnip:htl;v 
H(i!View, Vol. CX:XVII, (i'1aroh 1930) p, 361. 
5"Hole C?f' Cartels in lf)oder11 Jioonowy, • Fgr<!li>rn Po;l.icy 
Ec,mortfit Vol. XX 1 (October 1.5, 19hl+) p. 181.;. 
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ph1lospphy in European trade relations, when overproduction 
threat;3ns, no at·tempt is made t;o lower p~·lce, no effort is 
mnda to push sales j instead prices ar•e stabilized and the 
market allocated by cartel a.r:~:n1gements. 'r'o European eyes, 
a ce,rtelia not a"trust". They think of a. "trust" as an 
agency which tries to supc•ress competition, wlhile a cartel 
l.s only a device to regulat'il o.:>mpetitl.on. ~,'he "trust" trl.es 
to liquidate rivalfJ; the cartel pr<i:Hlerv'"'~ them by promo'tl.ng 
greater stability so as to assure re!i!sonable profits and 
protect t;l:lC! capital investments in both large and llll1lall 
onLerpr1ses. 
Thilil feeling of st.!>.bility through cartel arrange-
mzmts has been the 'thought of Europe;~n blM;iness loaders 
in th'" past, as it is today. 'This is th<< reason Hhy th-a 
strongest advocates of postv1ar o~l.rtels during \vorld Nar II. 
nmoivea. the support of Sweden, Cz.echosloVIil>l<ia, Holland and 
6 NorvJ.sty. 
IV, 
The United. States wa:s the only importl9.nt nation that 
-·-------
1)9 
of economic and political vicissitudes in the postwcn• period, 
it might relent somewhat in its resolves. An economic and 
political background. which was quite dUvergent from th.at 
of Europe ht!iil ahaped American opinion on the question of 
o:arte.ls, or any similar form of monopoly Ol'gantzation. 
Unlike Etu:•ope, the Ul:llted States was less dependent and 
not as sensi·~lv<~ to extraterr1toriilitl economic considerations. 
(' 
cooperati•'l€1: in <aoonomio intercourse in trw form of oar~els 
to overcome the lethargy of their indus tx•ie~J, while 
American businessmen t•ema ined largely aloof from this 
1Ut€H'l'l£,tiOnfi\l COOperation, ooncentrati.l:l£1 their attention 
on domest;ic cooperation, wher•e possible to c1rculllV\$nt the 
anti-t1•us·t laws• 
\4h1le European industril·ll lerad.ers jusuty the con-
trolling of prices. allooat;:ton of terx•itories, and other 
cartel tactics as indispensable to economic stability and 
heal ,:h, the great major! ty of their American count.erp~u··ts 
see these practices as inimlc<.~l 1nflueno\9s upon the economic 
1nstHut1ons of ttrc nation. In addition to ·this, revel-
ations during '>'iorld ~Jar' II relating to th.s influence of 
cartels UpOn the war effort Rnd . the pol1t1oal powers they 
llrO 
exerted, have further served to denie,ratco cartels i11 the 
eyes of American obsel'Vers. 
This in esslilnce e;<plains the rmtsons for the basic 
points of conflict. of thought be·tween European and American 
thinkers on the cartel issue. To th"1 European ml.nd, cartels 
have no direct political effea.ts. 'J:hose ~lhioh have arisen 
in th'<' past have been lnc 1dent<tl to them. not inh0rcnt in 
their makeup. 'I'he American thinker· sees in them a nucleus 
whioh provides not only fox· a method of harmful concen-
tration of economic power, but also a cudgel for political 
:poNer ani militaristic aspira\tlOns. 
Cartels have divided. Latin America and oth,)l' areas 
of the l'ITOrld among themselves. These 1nternii\\ tlonal pane• 
trations tend. to cause governments to consider certain aref.tS 
of' the world. as "flel<is of interest" and certain oth,c'r parts 
as t;erritories outside their sphere of 1ntetn:~~;ts. Ce..rtela 
mal{e use of govermnents to further their tnt,9!'0Sts, or as 
in the case of <l13rmany • cartels can be used as an instru-
:oent of Ukttlonal policy. The x•el~ltionship is a V\~1'Y close 
one. vlhem~ver onlll of the cartels broke down. a w.arlll.u~ 
situt)tt.ion arose between the privF.;.te monopoly groups involved 
with the rel!lult thrc.'t governments found. themselves involved 
in the diepute.7 
7
nenr1oh Kronstein, "European C'n•tels," 'I'he Qogo:g-
WJl:fi.\\1, Vol. XXXVIII, (June 1;, 1943) p, 172. 
----- -
That <Hn"tel relationships tend ·co tr"Zmscend the 
economic and baoome political is p9l"haps the greatest 
llH 
arm of the priVli\te industries to !lerv;; th0 n<,.;3dS and arn-
bitions of the stat,~. !1V{H1 in derP.()Cx•atio st,,,t,J<;, corpor-
.;;d.ms of a st,?.te is a possibility "hicl< few would q1..wst1on. 
V. OU'rLOOK OF 01~FiMAN Cl\hl'ELS TODAY 
cart«Jls 11hat does ths f<ltUl'"il hold for this method of 
bu!ilins!'ls org2mizll\l;ion7 No definitive a:nse~er cem be given 
t<~ thil~ 'luestion, but a fait• predicl;ion 11:::mld bd for their 
decart,~ll-Zii\tion tmposed by the hll1ed Pm1ers follm'li:ng 
the H·ar, carl>;e_ls Gtl."'O still ~· J}:Cl:;t of the indugtrifl.l 
stru.ctt<Nl of Germany ·cMay. !.ihethsr t:l.m('; will see e.n 
territori;';S and m.cu•kets :l.s .?. qu.est:lo:n. v:h:lch cannot be 
a:nsw<n'sd, but that within the cartel structure there is 
the fertility for the growth of such <Ul assoei~;tion has 
been tragically demonstrated in. the past C!:U'tel history 
of Germany, 
As ear+y as 194?, an Economist, ,John K. Ga1lbr€ilath, 
made the ominous statem1>nc ·coot "German cartels and com• 
bines could again, 1~ith a little rf>juwmation, assi.Ulle 
their fol?mer position of' power."8 Though the power of 
G;H'll'ltany 1 s C!U'tels today is not nearly lio1hat it> was under 
the Nazi's, this does not detract from the Genuan tn.J.siness-
man's .fondness for oart;els, The greatest deterrent to 
cartels in ~Jest Germ~ny ·today has been· the unprecedented 
and steadily r1Hillg prosperity which has taken place in 
Gitn:'lllmlY since the end of the· war. Contrast this present 
situation 1vl th the chaos which plagued the German economy 
for many years following the first World \J;.~r. ~'he continual 
presence of unemployment which hovered ov<:>x· the Germli'.n 
economy, cmd later over all the capi t.~>1lis t world, proved. 
highly conducive to cartel devalopm;mt. 'I'h<H>e depr<Jssed 
times followin&; the :f'11•st hforld wiU' caused businessmen 
t,o s<Hilk stal)ility by agresm,ZJ:nts not to cut prices, but to 
... PJor;n !!. Oailb••eath, "Is There a o,,~r.man Policy," 
f•"ortumt, Vol. XXXI, (January 1947) p. 195. 
----
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divide the availal;Jle marlrets on a profitable basis. Bew 
cause of' the prosperity in1tJest Gormm1y today, there is 
little unused prod.uctive capac! ty ~11th the result thF;t 
cart<o:l control of ind.ustry has be(~i'l greatly diminished, 
thou.;;,h not eliminated. 
means for t'">Cartelization, calling again for such tactics 
·rnlt> group rdth 
Unable to completely extirpate such an olt1 insti-
ErhaPd has bes11 unable to do th ls he bas been forced to 
9iBehind the Headlines," e Rsmublio, Vol, CXXI, 
(October 25, 1954) p. 5. 
----
compromise 1dth the cartel ad.here.nta,. rlinister Erhard, 
a Classical ·eeonomht, has st·~ted th<~t th<H'e is no room 
in classic economics for eit-her a traq~ m' shooting;. war 
:;. ,,'}(\\') 
as an :!.nstrument of. national policy,.·· -~!arket economici'l 1 
; 
he states, 1s by defin1tion true international eoonom1cs; 
and l4est Germany is adopt1ng- mt'lrket economics as a 
national philosophy ,10 
>ll. th this adoption of markc;,t economics as a national 
eartc?ls 1 thus patting: tho German economy on a purely com-
pstitive baf>is 0 but -in this endeavor he has been forced to 
compromise. He has alreadY comp1•omised >~ith pro-cartel 
bus 1.neasmen to the exi;ent of agreel:ag that c&rtels should 
be allO'•<ed under the following three oondi tions: 
(a) "Expm•t Cartels" would be permitted in or>der 
to expand German salres abroad. 
(b) Cartels would be perll!it.;ted at. home to make it 
easier for certe.1n branches of htduotry to 
modernize tJ-Je:l.r produc t:l.on f.aclli ties. 
(o) "Crisis Ca1•tels" would be <:tllcwred. should 
ind.usllries fimlfhemselves faced with a serious 
slump in sales. 
lOGilbert Burck, "The German Business ~lind, • 
J<ot·tune, Vol. XLIX (May 1954) p, 111. 
(.March 
:iL:L'' .. G.:rman Cartels tl'y 
13, 1954) P• .149. 
~-
Comprom1Sei\1 such as this mE<ke cleal" the fact that 
O'ol.rtels vdll n"'ver be completely eliminated in Germany, 
:unrlerlyin,'j; implicr~t:l.ons :l.r< such cono:.,;,i;iun~>. It is the 
;;overmnent is uot prepared. to risk 01 re'.'tl shoTIId.oNn fi::;ht 
12 
'I'his 'briefly ls the sltuP:tion in Germcm.,y today in 
respect to cartels. Some may 1ronder wh~~ t happened to those 
14Ibid 
-· 
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his pro<§;rarn the maintainence of' peace through postwar 
cont.1•ol over G"rman commercial I'Uld indu.stri~>l 'enterprise. 
Thl~ rise of a new threat, represented by doviet Russia, 
following th<~ r~ar, was th'1 main factor in softe111ng these 
voices in the >.Yilde:rness of present d:ow t;msions. Glilrman 
industry is no longer a polent.1al en:t~;ny i but is v iev;ed as 
em r:tlly in any future co·aflict with the colossus of the 
'rhe progra1n of' cartel-busting, onCIE! th·e avowed aim 
of' many Am,~riean leaders, would probably have been just as 
abject, even without the threat of Russia in the postwgr 
period, ~lith the coun·tena:uce of many i'Duropean nations, 
who vi,ew cartel agreements with li.ttle disfavor, the pro-
grtnm ~<as 110 doubt d.oomed to failur<~ from thE~ outset. 
l"oreign gove:t'nments just ;.;ould. not eooparate with the 
Un1 ted :1 tta tes in any ooncert<~d progr;;un ag:ail1s t th<;~ cartels ,13 
llven the once ad.m&nt1ne attitude of American public 
opinion r1as shown a remarkable resiliency in respect to 
had onc.e conjured up visions of clandestine Ger•man 
lJnThe United St~tes and 1-lorld Ca~··t;els," Business 
;,;eel£1 (Nay 29, 19'>8) p. 116. 
lh7 
the UEM prospect :l.ve by ldlioh AmEn·ioa:ns v:l.elif onrtels, It 
stated: 
"'rhe rise of Soviet po~•er has for the ·cime being, 
Ht least-, put asia® our synti1etie oonoern about 
cartels in OrBrmany. To get the ro:),uirc>d Oe1•man 
divisions W'fd\ were willing to forget the> liwhole thing 
and admit th::t the d.r·.3am, by 1·1org<).ll.thau, out of 
Harry Dexter ~ihite, Of' a Germany r•::Jltidered he l,pless 
ae<1inst Soviet &g[;t"ession was strloUy for th·r, Red 
birds. 'l'hex·e are evils 11~ cartels \\lh.l.ch T£oonomies 
l'iinister ~;rhard has oourageo.t:~sly a.ttclil\pted to destroy, 
Hitler w;:;s able to use (h~rman industJcy as formally 
oJ:ganized to his ff.,dvantag<;. PosBibly a new h~ade:r of 
el':pHllly l:'or·mid<>bl0 ohal:'~tCt<~r>.l.!i!·tios mig'ht produce a 
new perll • • • • It· is praiseworthy orlly for the 
:Ou E'onts 1 H<3m1l'lgton Avms, Sohnoider-Gr•usots 1 Vickers 
c<nd l\l'l!istrongs and Imperiro~l Chemical Industries to 
manufacture W<il!'cpons, chemicals l:iUd r.:>Xplos 1 ves. '1'h<~~ 
Deir 11 1 s Chc;mi sts ar·:: at rt¥orl{ 1e1l1en G•n'mzcn savants 
take to chemical so i·ance, « 14 
This v ie\.J represents a ohr:ang;e of opinion of '?artels 
expr'~'Jsed. by Amer•1can or'gBns of public opinion in the past. 
'l'he hope is that this view is not apoortBte in respect t;o 
Am.erici!ln thought on cartels, but me1•ely ll\ ti:Jlll)?ONu•y expedient 
to meet the llt!led~~ of the present time. 'rhat the possihility 
of a ne~; IU tler aris 1:ne; anrJ prod.uc 1ng; a new peril is recog-
nh:ed, is encour~,~s:.ing to those, such a.s the wrH,~r. who see 
in ciiu•t;.'il arrmlgement§ an 1ntl~ins1c €U1d perpertw2tl pr&di"" 
lection tovrard abuse !Hl.d. misuse. 
11~"'.{eaning the Chrm~:ms fr·om •cm'tels'' has been an 
UnpNt":tt.abl<e Project•, $e,ty . .rday Even1'flp; Post, Vol. CCXXVII, 
(November 20 1 195!~} p, 12. 
~~----
'rhe p<•oolem of curbing os.rtels aoo. m\l.king them 
innocuous in raspec t to their pote:ntifAl ;;a instruments of 
natlonal policy, as well as impediments to economic 
ex.pansion has not bee.n solved, and will not be solved 
until then; is unanimity among th1c> ViU'ious nations as to 
their injurious eff,,cts. If complete elimination o~mnot 
of l'01i,'Ula t ion should be an ind.is pensabh• aim of gov(l>rn-
ment. 
1'h1s regulation could pos:sibly pr·ovi~le for a 
reghtx•ation liU'Ill r'~vie~< of oa:rtel policies as suggested by 
one writor on the subject, Under i;his p.roposed plan, a 
law would be put into effect Nhich would req~;d.re the 
national registrs•tion of C<l!'tel agrc'h~l!lc~nts. In addition 
to this a p•sriodio review of the. agl•eements; in ~1hioh the 
goverrament would consider the effect of !l;j1f<H'Y agreement 
upon the military securl.ty •. foreign policy, and upon the 
v·olume of into:n•national trade. Since it appears that 
oart,,ls 1~111 be with us for quice some time in th,e future, 
regulation such as this is U(]jeded at the present tame.15 
15Mno .Perkins, "C6>rtels, >¥hat Shall \~e do about 
Them," Earper!J. Vol, CXIC • (Novenfb,~l' l94ll) P• 5?6. 
--.. -
No doubt incentives t;owa1•d. c'''rtels vJ01.tld diminish 
wc~re 110rld co:nmerce to proceed in full volume and :h1 proper 
balance. lJnfortune,tely, hOWi~V era th<llli'e is no iunnc,;dicite or 
loug-r•t.m <:~xpootatiOll of this, so thc~re must be some toler-
al;.ton of th":l system no matter ho>~ dlstast•aful to ·those vJho 
see in the sys·~,~m l'·estriction of trade, r•.'lduotion of pro• 
duct:ton ana e<nployment, hie;hc?r prioEHl, lo:,;er. standards· of 
11vlng; and a threat to democra.tio iutJti·cutions. It ruusi~ 
be remembevecl. tl:F:<.t ther<; tH''" m£my ·v1ho just; as sincerely 
believe t;bat the f:Nle snt;ox•prise and profit syatem can only 
be saved. by collective economic s<~ClUl'H;i under a system 
of cart0ls, A compromise of th,~se viev<:points by thr~ 
acceptcmce of' some sort of l."egulation seel!t$ to offep the 
best solution to the probl(•m. 
Cartels coolt~ conceiVIl.bly play a COllstrucCiV0 role 
in. the futl.lr'''~• It would be necessslry for them to follow 
an expansionist philosophy rather than one b&\sed on 
r•'lstriotion, if they v1ere ·co have a truly am~1lio:rating 
affect upon ~he ·economic well-being of the tqorlct, lt ia 
a oe:rtal.nty that we have not f'ou~ a system to eliminate 
them, let u.s hope we can find a system to 1Inp:rove and 
regulate them, 
CHAP:I'EH XI 
St!Mf'iABY AND CONCLUSIONS 
'l'he cartel organization we speak of tod;:w gra1~ out 
of the mercantile protEoctionism of th1~ 16th 1md 17th cen-
tury. Various forms of CIH't<>ls had thE)ir antecedents many 
hundreds o:t' yer;trs prior to this clat'"• bu;t tbe modern c0rtel 
orgt•,nization took form during this period, as did th•!l 
modern n"tion etate. 
'J.'he development :and growth of cgrt<lls in Gex•many 
cmne shortly !tlfter thrc; t nnt:l.on 1 s uni fica t.l.O!'< in 1870. An 
to ooopiH''ction t;o achieve a mef!sure of s tabU:!. ty in their 
achieved through the use of cartel agreements. The g1•owth 
~l:he a ttl tude of O'H'lll!:l.n courts toN•9>rd cal:' tel agree-
mants aided thelr gro>1th during their early development by 
economic instability and as org.anlzatlons neoeseetry to the 
~~ell-l:v;;ing 0'' the whole eoclal community, Cliven S1lOh 
encouragement t;his method of husinesli! oooper,.tl.on became 
------
1.51 
an integr~~l par>t of German basiness philosophy 1 which has 
per•sisted to the present day. 
At the beginning the interests of government in these 
cartel organizations were mot:l.vated by economic considerations, 
but gr.adually the government began to V'iew them as pot;ential 
tools to further the politieal ambitions of the state. This 
reevaluation of cartels by the state cam~ with the extension 
of certain domestic cartels into 1nterna!l;ion!'l.l cartels, The 
combined economic ·- political ohare.eter of c&.rtals was 
solidified with the adve11t of the Nazi governmen·t which 
exploits{\ cartel agreements tQ a<arve the ambition of the 
The results of this fusion of aims was manifested 
during the first few years of the second World \iar when 
a shortage ot strategic n1aterials faced the Un1tecl Nations 
who were aligned against Gex'lllm1y, t;he gr0at p1•omoter of 
international c!U:>tels. Many oommod:l.ties vital to the 
arsem•ls of the United N:1t1ons were 1n short~supply, and 
the p1•odu.ction of ~l1ese commodities, the Ul'lited Nations 
discovered had been affected by cartel agreemGnts in which 
Germany had been a OOlll!lpiouous !ll<7mbe:r. Qommod1t;ies suoh 
as alU!l'linum, maE,""Ues1um, tungsten cw.rbide, and synthetic 
rubber, among others, were in short~supply. 
The leading German Comn~•ny in these international 
oartel ~1tgreements W&S I. G. Farben1ndustr1e 1 one ·Of the 
worlds largest ohr~micol oc1noe:rna 1 whose cartel agreements 
,--
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reaohlilld the industries of evliflry roaJor nation in the world. 
The Hat of aO!lllllOO:ities atfeo·ted by tbi!l oornp.m:r'y •s oartel 
ag:reellHmts l.naluded wmzy oona1d!:llrli1ld vitStl to a nation 1 a 
wall-being. both 1nd.ustr1.tl 'md soo1Hlo .Prt.)cluots suoh as 
phiU'm,aoeutloals, ml\l~:;nesium, aynthet1o rubb®r, a.lwnlnwn <md 
(tr;t'l.sollne vr•;re m.ll included., d.irtllotly o:r 1nd1reotly, und•:n· 
cartel ae;reeme~lta in •~M.,;h I. o. Ft~rben ~'ll1t'lia a leading, 1:!' 
not the doml.n<l)!'lt: roembOl'• 'l'he relat1V<il> tmltterlal u.ntJ<'GP<>red-
ness or tba 1JnHed NaUO!HI 111 the f:\.r·s~ few Y'~ars of World 
:agra.:tment~> w1th foreihU aom''"'n1es. 'l'he l:)V<.mtuality of 
w<as was ta!um into otmsl.derat1on and px<o'l11s1ona for the 
oont1nuo.noe O'f' roylillty payments on p~;,t~nt\11 and proteot1on 
for I. <l. 1 111 forel.jZ!l 1:at<l!rests dur1¥lg i:>er·i.l.'lds of hoatU1 ties 
we1•e 1nolw1ed in oart<llll ~;iif;re~ents. :rhese p~'Cfll'iOll.OnOt aided 
both dollar~~wise and propagiMlda-whe 1n S ;Uth Amerloa during 
the e!lrly y\la:rs or tile second \•iorld l>ar. 
In ada.J. t1on to I, Ci, Ft<l:'b~n. nuulel'I::IU.ilJ oth<ilt' Garman 
o0ll!rw111es part;ioi;:ni'lted in O!llrteJ. ag:reall\lllntu wl,1on flf'feoted 
the production of e·cr~«teglo goods. The Krupp Compcmy of' 
wholila oat•te:t &1;\l."OI!I!liH!lnts witl:t Am.i!lrl.ol,\:er fir.ms retarded, tbis 
ooutlt-ry 1s war .. tim~> 1ncluatrin.l oxpi\tllilion~ 1\rupps agreettent 
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with General Electric affected the production and utilization 
of tungsten carbide, needed for the making of .t'ine cutting 
edg<11s for machine tools, and delayed the retooling of Amari<H~n 
plants at the start of the secon,d World War. 
'l'he fourth most serious shortage facing the United 
States in \l/orld ·war II Has the shortage of' military optical 
equipment. This sbol'tage of optical g1;all!s fox• use in 
binoculars, r~.tmgef:l.nd.ers, and bomb8ights was attributed in 
ltlrge part to the cartel agreement betweep Zeiss and the 
Bausch and Lomb CO~\pany :ln the United States, The nature 
of t~he agreement between the two firms made this oountry 's 
supply of opti.oal glass almost entirely dependent upon 
Ge:rrnany, An exchange of information provisions of the 
agreement, relative to the development of military optical 
equipment in the United. States. was valuable t:'i Germany, 
since she was kept 1nformeK1 of any new developments by 
the United States involving the use of milit;ary optical 
glass. 
\~1 tll Germany 1 s defeat and subsequent Allied occupation, 
a dee&rteli>r.ettion movement was started in Germ:tmy. 'L'he 
Allied powers promulgated sev\~ral anti-cartel laws, and 
disbanded the great industrial combi.l1es of' I. G, J:>'arben and 
Krupp. '!he effectiveness of this dec,.rtellzation program 
has been questioned by some observers, and. mony claim the 
program is a tanure. It is the opinion of some, including ----
15/f 
th-e writer, that oar·tela in Oel"m<tJ.'lY are there tc1 stay, at 
ll<liMilt 1n the f orl!lseeable future. 'I'lle differences of opinion 
oeta1een; Euro.c"eana ~:uld Amer1oZtt:H!I on the merits of cartels, 
and the threat t>f CommuniSm killed r•ny ehanees of' extirpating 
tll>e ol~rte 1 ay stem in Germany • 
Since cart•:~ls are here to stay let us hope they will 
be regula ted a.n;l clo<lely observed by the :na tio11s of the 
world, Open cov•2:nants in futu!'<l oart0l lilgreem,;mts are 
neo,JSSt"iry to prev.s:nt mlsusG t~nd abuse of tlv ca.t·~·el system, 
Continual vlglhmce is incumbent upon us lest our oh1ldNn 
suffer from our present and past compromis<:Jill with the 
system. It is tile writer's opl11ion that the disclosure of 
the past fifte12·n yam's h0:s focused a ns1,1 light and interest 
on cartel opcrgt1ons, let; us m£<1ntain this in:.:er,>st. in the 
futUJ."e• since apathy today may VfH"Y well r·eSL\lt in world 
tragedy tQlllcrro'~. 
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APPENDIX. 
The compo "''nts of I. a. "P&.rbenincl.ustrie A. G. 
and 1 ts subsidia·des are included in the following 
list;ingro, 'l'he list is not complete, since some 
corporate identit:l.el:! have been ma1nt8.ined, out the 
list we.s the most sHtisfactory compilation avail-
able in l9Lfl. 
l, Bodische Alt1lin und Sodafabril! 
J. I>'&.rbefabriken vor.m. Fr.iedr, Bayer und Co, 
4·, .Farbwerke vorrn, ~leist<~r Lucius und Brt~en1ng 
5. Leopold Casseyla U!l(l Co. 
6, Chemische Fabrik Grleshelm-Elektron 
7. Akt. ;,. Gas. fuer Anil1n - fabrikaten 
8, Chemische Fabriken vorm, Weiler-ter-meer 
9, Kalla Und Co. 
10. Koehn - Rott1>~e1l A.-G. 
11. ['ynamit A.-G. vorm. Nobel 
14. Karl Jaeger, a, m, b, H. 
15. Hbemiaohe Stahlwerl!e 
16, Ampere, G. m. b, H. 
18. Phi.lona A. - G. 
19. Jacob 1 s Mine at Preusslsoh Eloernec.ke 
20, Hermine ~line 
21, Dehler 
-------
2). 
26, 
27, 
28, 
.Stickstaff-Kredlt G, rn, b. H. 
Koliner.Kunstduenger und Che!!!ische Fabrik 
A. G, fuer Landes\{Ul ter 
Chemlkallen-Werke Grieshelm G, m, b, H. 
Zuckerfabrik Koerbisdorf 
A, G, fuer Stickstaffduenger Knapsack 
Elekto-Ni trum A, ·-.G. 
Soc, l:!:lectroquimco de Flix 
30. 'l:eer~f'arben-Industrie A, - G. 
J2. .numlnum - Werke G. m, b. H. 
)), Blektrochemische - Werke A. - G. 
Jl•, Slektrochemische J.ferke .. G. m. b, H. 
J,S, Chemil'lche \1erke Loth~·uger 
)6, Auguste Viktoria !'line 
37, Chemlsche 'tferke Durand und Huguenin H. - G, 
)8, Delvendl:~hl und l:fuentzel G. m, b. H. 
ItO, Chemische ?lerke Schuster und Wilhelmy A, - G, 
tn. Erdoel und Kohlevert'iertungs A, - G. 
42. Diusberger Kupfepbuette A .• - G. 
Llj. Duetsohe Nolybdoenvterke 
1+4. Bergen Kohle A • - G. 
.l(i) 
45. Deutsche ll:<:l.elstGingesel.lschaft vorm. Herrn, \Hld A. - G, 
72 .• H. 
'H) 
1 )'. 
85• Ch •. ;.;, Huls, G, m, b, H. 
---- ------
----
1\)6 
97, A. G, fmr Chemische Indu:ortrie, G•)henkirchen-Sehalke 
98~ i•zlend.e Calori Nazionali 'Aff:tni (A. C, N, A.), S, A, 
99.• Societe. Chemica Lombardo A. E. Bie,nohi 
\Jith sirnHtu· l:'es•:rvat:tons as to completeness, the 
following list of' fields of products of I. G. Farben 
is given: 
Coal tar dyestLlffs 
Innumerable organic and inorganic chemicals 
Solvents, such as those for pa.ints, lacqu,n·s, varnishes, 
accelerators an.d ant1-oxydents 
Preservatives 
Tann1ng: agents 
N:l,neral colors 
Synthetic bulldh1£C mat.·:'Jrials 
Light and heavy metals• including aluminum, magnesium 
and the rare ana prev lous raetals 
Synthetic gems 
Synthetic perfumes 
Insecticides and fungicides 
Photographic production and equipment 
Cell wood 
l1a.yon 
Celluloid 
Plaatlcs 
Synthetic rubber 
Exr)losives 
'1l'i'~r<\tes atld .rert1l1zer-s 
Vi.~tra (r?ynthotl.c textUeB)1 
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lHeproducsd from Jos<&ph i30r'J:\:1n and Charles A. Halsh • s 
O()Ok, Q"'H'iaan:y 's !'las tli:ll' jJlan. 
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